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During the past two decades business has become 
increasingly active in the political process, and scholars 
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continue to debate the extent to which this activity is 
organized. This fundamental issue is addressed by examining 
corporate political activity within the context of resource 
dependence and class cohesion theories. 
Political action committee (PAC) campaign 
contributions, this study's measure for corporate political 
activity, are structurally analyzed to determine if either 
resource dependence or class cohesion theory explains the 
forces which drive business participation in the u.s. public 
policy process. The rationale which forty-two diverse 
corporate PACs exercise when selecting which congressional 
campaigns to support during two election cycles is explored. 
Resource dependence theory contends .that a firm's 
behavior is a function of its dependence on the environment 
for resources. Successful firms attempt to manage this 
external dependence by controlling or manipulating their 
environment. corporate involvement in politics, therefore, 
will reflect a firm's dependence on the government for 
sales, subsidies or regulation. The regulatory environment 
in which a firm operates is this study's measure of resource 
dependence. 
Conversely, class cohesion theory argues that a firm's 
political activity is a function of its top management's 
inclusion in a network of corporate elites. Board members 
and chief executives from the nation's largest corporations 
coalesce to advance a political agenda which is compatible 
with the overarching goals of the business community rather 
than the parochial goals of an individual firm or even 
industry. Interlocking directorates, professional 
association memberships, shared educational experience and 
geographic proximity of headquarters locations are this 
study's indicators of a corporate elite network. 
Two categories of analytical methodology are applied. 
Multidimensional scaling maps corporate patterns of support 
for congressional candidates based on a PAC contribution 
proximity measure. These patterns are subsequently 
subjected to discriminant analysis, canonical correlation, 
regression and chi-square analysis to test for Resource 
Dependent and Class Cohesive political behavior. 
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The results are conclusive: Support of selected 
congressional campaigns is more likely fueled by fragmented 
business interests, as resource dependence theory suggests, 
rather than the collective motives of a corporate elite. In 
fact, no support emerged for class cohesion theory as an 
explanation for the observed patterns of intercorporate 
relations. 
Further, a corollary proposition that PAC activity 
will vary with the ideology of White House administrations 
is not supported. Rather, PAC contribution patterns do not 
vary significantly between the Carter and Reagan 
administrations. 
This research renders four significant contributions 
to scholarship: 
1. It provides empirical evidence to clarify a 
central issue in business-government relations, i.e., the 
atomistic or collective nature of corporate political 
activity. 
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2. It introduces a rigorous mathematical technique to 
the business-government relations discipline. 
3. It indirectly addresses an ongoing scholarly 
debate over the role of interest groups in a democracy. 
4. It indirectly addresses the current public policy 
debate over campaign finance reform. 
To Honah Lee 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Empirically, there is almost no research which 
directly addresses the fundamental issue--is there 
evidence which suggests that individual, familial, 
or class interests rather than organizational 
concerns explain behavior, and particularly, 
intercorporate or interorganizational behavior? 
The key issue is whether there is a unified set of 
class interests that is transorganizational, 
extending across organizations, or whether 
organizational interests and actions are more 
fractionated. Given that different organizations 
sit in different positions in the network of 
interorganizational exc~ange, a resource dependence 
perspective would suggest at least some degree of 
conflict of interest. On the other hand, the social 
class perspective suggests a commonality of 
interests formed by common schooling, membership in 
social clubs, and sitting on overlapping and 
interlocking civic as well as corporate boards of 
directors. Thus, the question becomes, "To what 
extent can intercorporate relations be accounted for 
by patterns of resource interdependence?" or "To 
what extent do they reflect class interests and the 
homogeneity implied by this overarching conception?" 
Pfeffer, 1987 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to enhance 
understanding of business-government relations by examining 
corporate political activity within the context of resource 
dependence and class cohesion theories. Corporate political 
action committee (PAC) campaign contributions, this study's 
2 
measure for corporate political activity, are structurally 
analyzed to determine if either resource dependence or class 
cohesion theory explains the forces which drive corporate 
participation in the U.S. public policy process. 
Specifically, this research examines the rationale 
which corporations exercise when selecting Congressional 
campaigns to support. Are these decisions fueled by 
individual, self-serving business interests, as the resource 
dependence theory would suggest; or, are these decisions a 
function of membership in a corporate elite whose collective 
motives transcend short-term goals so as to ensure an 
economic stability conducive to long-term business 
interests, a position supported by class cohesion theorists? 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
Structural analysis is the preferred analytical 
approach for this research since its viewpoint parallels 
those of resource dependence and class cohesion theories. 
Structural analysis examines interrelationships among 
organizations in an effort to understand individual 
organizations' behaviors (Mizruchi and Schwartz 1987, i). 
Resource dependence and class cohesion theories both 
necessitate the study of interrelationships, the former in 
terms of similar constraints and the latter in terms of, for 
the most part, economic and social ties among executives. 
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specifically, multidimensional scaling (MDS) , a 
mathematical technique new to the study of business-
government relations, is used to structurally analyze 
corporate PAC contribution patterns. Regression, 
discriminant, canonical correlation, and chi-square 
hypothesis testing augment the MDS analysis. Research 
results provide evidence to explain the patterns of 
corporate political activity as exempl~fied by corporate PAC 
campaign contributions. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research analyzed intercorporate behavior 
patterns associated with PAC campaign activity in an effort 
to effect four significant contributions to the field of 
business-government relations: 
1. Provide empirical evidence to clarify a central 
issue in business-government relations: the atomistic or 
collective nature of corporate political activity. 
2. Introduce a rigorous mathematical technique to the 
business-government relations discipline. 
3. Indirectly address an ongoing scholarly debate 
over the role of interest groups in a democracy, a debate 
with roots in questions that were first asked by the 
Founding Fathers. 
4. Indirectly address a current public policy debate, 
the reform of Congressional campaign financing practices. 
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It is useful to cast these four aims into a systems 
framework. One of the principal contributions of systems 
theory to research design is its ability to place the design 
in context by making explicit its relationship with a 
broader supra system and a more narrow subsystem and, 
further, by identifying its perceptual level as 
"Environment," "Unit," or "Subunit" (Lendaris 1986). The 
four aims of this research can be placed in this framework. 
The first two aims, to provide empirical evidence and 
introduce rigorous methodology, are at the unit level of the 
focal system. The third, the role of interest groups in 
society, is at the environment level of the focal system; 
and the fourth, campaign finance reform, is at the subunit 
level of the focal system. Table I summarizes this systems 
framework. 
The two sections immediately following expand on the 
relevance of this research to the supra- and subsystems. 
The balance of the work deals with the focal perspective of 
this research. 
Suprasystem Focus: Interest 
Group Theory 
Madison, in his essay No. 10 from The Federalist 
Papers, foresaw a problem which results when a citizenry 
enjoys the freedom to form special interest groups (a 
contemporary example being a PAC) so as to influence 
government. If one faction attains a dominance which 
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effectively quells the concerns of competing interest groups 
and the general populace, then democracy is threatened; 
however, eliminating this basic political freedom--the right 
to organize and petition the government--would be, in 
Madison's words, "worse than the disease" (Berry 1989, 3). 
Berry (1989) describes this so-called "Madison's Dilemma" as 
follows: 
Can an acceptable balance be struck between the 
right of people to pursue their own interests and 
the need to protect society from being dominated by 
one or more interests? That is, can we achieve true 
pluralism, or is a severe imbalance of interest 
group power a chronic condition in a free and open 
society? (4). 
Madison's writings point toward offsets to the 
"mischiefs of factions," his term for interest group 
domination. He held that a republican form of government 
with cheqks and balances would enable the needs of the 
populace to be heard over the clamor of powerful special 
interest groups. He further believed that large numbers of 
diverse interest groups would create a competitive 
environment in which no one group could attain dominance 
(Berry 1989, 2-4). 
Pluralist scholars have adopted this latter belief and 
argue forcefully that interest groups and democracy are 
compatible (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961). They contend that 
citizens can best influence the legislative process through 
groups of activists with shared goals. As issues emerge, so 
will appropriate interest groups. Given this vision, 
interest group activity serves the democratic process well. 
It emerges as an equilibrious mechanism for carrying the 
will of the people to their government. 
More recent research extends this argument to the 
question of corporate PACs (Epstein, Edwin 1984; Sabato 
1984; Matasar 1986). Proponents of corporate PACs contend 
that the corporate sector's heterogeneity renders it 
incapable of deliberate collective political action. This 
business-PAC fragmentation along with the myriad special 
interest groups with free access to PACs are the Madisonian 
check to one segment's excessive power. Rather than 
undermine democratic principles, PACs buttress those 
principles by providing a vehicle though which all citizens 
can exercise their basic rights of free speech and 
association. 
Power elite theory counters the pluralist argument 
(Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967, 1970, 1974; Whitt 1979, 1980; 
Useem 1980, 1982, 1984). It contends that a core group 
inevitably attains dominance and thereby overwhelms the 
pluralist ideal. This dominance, achieved through class 
cohesion, organizational skills, and access to resources 
denied others, is frequently associated with large 
corporations. Referred to as the "American business 
aristocracy" (Baltzell 1962), "governing class" (Domhoff 
1967), or "power elite" (Mills 1956), this cohesive group 
is defined as: 
6 
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A social upper class which receives a dispropor-
tionate amount of a country's income, owns a 
disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, and 
contributes a disproportionate number of its members 
to the controlling institutions and key decision 
making groups in the country (Oomhoff 1967, 142). 
Power elite theorists maintain that a corporate elite 
is quite capable of championing a collective political 
strategy. These theorists describe an inner circle of the 
most wealthy and powerful corporate executives who coalesce 
to advance a specific business agenda •. The resulting 
political clout undermines democratic principles. 
Berry (1989) ties PACs directly into the pluralist-
power elite theory debate. He contends that the growing 
importance of PACs in the electoral process demands a 
reevaluation of this "classic dilemma of interest groups in 
a democratic society" (117).' He speculates why no new 
theory has emerged to explain interest group behavior and 
concludes that "the reason, in short, is that the task of 
formulating one is extremely difficult . . • it is almost 
pretentious for a social scientist to try" and, further, 
most scholars "find it more fruitful to work on narrower, 
and in their minds more realistic research problems" (13). 
'At least part of the concern arises from the rapid 
growth of PACs. The reform of Federal election campaign 
legislation in the early 1970s resulted in an environment in 
which PACs flourished. Between 1974 and 1980 the number of 
registered corporate PACs increased twelve-fold, from 89 to 
1,109. While numbers in all six PAC categories increased, 
none approached the phenomenal growth rate of corporate PACs 
(see Figure 1) (U.S. Federal Election Commission 1990). 
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My research pursues Berry's recommended path. It does 
not presume to advance a new theory which will resolve this 
centuries-old debate. However, its conclusions shed light 
on these core issues. 
Subsystem Focus: campaign 
Finance Reform 
It will be recalled that the subsystem's unit focus is 
campaign finance and that its subunit is policy shapers. By 
examining patterns of PAC campaign contributions and by 
testing the resource dependence and cla~s cohesion theories, 
this research should bear on both levels. 
At the unit level, the accumulation and analysis of 
PAC campaign contribution data--irrespective of hypotheses 
tested in this study--will prove useful. Scholars will find 
them easily accessible and, it is to be hoped, applicable to 
further analysis from a different perspective. 
At the subunit level, shapers of policy from 
government, business, labor, and issue-oriented groups such 
as Common Cause can extract valuable empirical evidence from 
this research. Results which lend support to the class 
cohesion theory would raise concerns regarding the potential 
influence of an industry-diverse corporate elite. 
Alternatively, results which support resource dependence 
theory would lend credence to the proposition that, while 
corporate PACs may fund the same campaigns, they do so from 
self-serving rather than collective motives; thus, the 
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desired equilibrium among competing special interests can be 
achieved. 
The importance of testing the two theories is 
reflected in recent events: the savings and loan debacle 
and its associated "Keating Five" scandal, the 1989 downfall 
of House Speaker James Wright, and the skyrocketing cost of 
Congressional campaigns have focused attention on 
Congressional ethics and campaign finance reform. 2 Calls 
for reform have arisen from varied and diverse camps 
including the Democratic and Republican parties (Oreskes and 
Toner 1990), Common Cause, a liberal watchdog group 
(Abramson and Jackson 1990), even a member of the Fortune 
Top 50, American Express (Cabot and Sheekey 1990, 64). 
The extent of PAC Congressional campaign support 
inextricably involves PACs in the reform movement. First, 
nearly half of the representatives elected in 1988 received 
fifty percent or more of their campaign money from PACs. 
Seventeen senators elected in that same year earned the 
dubious status of "PAC millionaire," having received one 
million dollars or more from PACs (Wertheimer 1990, 45). 
Second, PAC contributions clearly favor incumbents. In 
1978, sixty-eight percent of PAC support was channeled to 
House incumbents; in 1988, eighty-three percent. Incumbent 
2The 1988 congressional elections cost more than $400 
million; the average House seat's cost exceeded $350,000, 
and the average Senate seat nearly $4 million (Cabot and 
Sheekey 1990, 62). 
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Senators' campaigns have enjoyed a similar boost--from 
forty-eight percent of PACs' Senate contributions in 1978 to 
sixty-four percent in 1988 (Oreskes and Toner 1990). 
Corporate-sponsored PACs may well be singled out for 
special attention in efforts at reform. First, corporate-
sponsored PACs constituted over forty percent of all PACs in 
1990; this is in addition to the single issue and 
association-sponsored PACs that are supportive of corporate 
't' 3 POS1 10ns. Second, the dollars contributed from 
corporate-sponsored PACs have also maintained a vigorous 
growth rate--their 1988 contributions were up twenty-seven 
percent over 1987 (Abramson and Jackson 1990). Finally, 
research indicates a clear distinction between corporate and 
other PAC types in terms of incumbent support. Handler and 
Mulkern (1982) note: 
The most significant development in PAC giving in 
the 1977-78 election cycle was the emergence of a 
set of corporate PACs that have defined a new 
identity for themselves and broken sharply from the 
incumbency-access orientation that the aggregate 
statistics seemed to show was the continuing 
dominant tendency in PAC giving (7). 
Spiraling campaign costs and consequent fund-raising 
requirements have resulted in a Congress perceived by many 
to be removed from ordinary citizen access. The 101st 
Congress, for example, is more indebted to special interests 
than any previous Congress (Wertheimer 1990, 45). This fact 
3For a roster of PAC types, see the definitions 
beginning on page 17. 
leads to widespread agreement that campaign reform must be 
enacted, but there is little agreement on the shape such 
reform should take. 
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In summary, then, it would appear that the results of 
this research may have far-reaching effects because of the 
current political climate. 
DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS 
Fundamental to systems-oriented research is the 
recognition that each reader adopts a unique perspective 
which is dependent upon a variety of factors such as 
background, interest, and role. The preceding section set 
forth the research context so as to reveal the 
investigqtor's focal perspective. The following section 
defines some key terms so as to link other perspectives 
through a common vocabulary. 
Structural Analysis 
Structural analysis is an approach to the study of 
organizations which emerged in the late 1970s. It specifies 
relations among organizations as the fundamental unit of 
analysis. Individual organization behavior is examined 
within this interorganizational (e.g., intercorporate) 
framework. 
Structural analysis of business examines a variety of 
strategic behaviors. Research in one area, the analysis of 
coordinated action among large corporations, has focused on 
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a debate between two competing theories--resource dependence 
and class cohesion (both defined below). These theories are 
considered to be the two major structural perspectives on 
intercorporate relations (Mizruchi and Schwartz 1987). 
Class Cohesion Theory 
Class cohesion theory contends that members of the 
power elite, including corporate leaders, share a common 
mission: to enhance and preserve their privileged status 
and to bequeath the same perquisites to their progeny. To 
achieve their purposes, they are both capable and motivated 
to transcend their organizations' narrow interests if deemed 
necessary to perpetuate their version of capitalism 
(Mizruchi 1987). 
Resource Dependence Theory 
LiRe the class cohesion theory, resource dependence 
theory attempts to explain organization behavior by 
examining power relationships between and among 
organizations (e.g., intercorporate relations). Unlike the 
class cohesion theory, it contends that individual corporate 
interests are more meaningful than are classwide business 
interests in determining power relationships and the 
consequent organization behavior. 
The theory posits that resource interdependencies 
(e.g., supplier-manufacturer or firm-regulatory agency 
interdependencies) are a major source of interaction and 
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conflict within the business sector. Management will strive 
to reduce or manage the environmental uncertainties created 
by the interdependencies in a variety of ways, such as 
mergers, acquisitions, and/or corporate political activity 
(Pfeffer 1987). 
Corporate Political Activity 
The objective of corporate political activities is to 
influence the operation of the political system, most often 
by enhancing access to lawmakers and regulators. Edwin 
Epstein (1969) has defined two types of corporate political 
activities--electoral and governmental--as follows: 
Governmental activities • • • include both political 
involvement intended to influence the formulation 
and execution of policy by governmental decision 
makers and efforts designed to create a public 
opinion favorable to the corporation's political 
goals. Electoral activities center around the 
selection and support of candidates or of issues 
that come before the public (67). 
Activities which are common to many politically active 
firms include, but are not limited to, coalition building, 
advocacy advertising, lobbying, constituency building, and 
campaign contributions through political action committees 
or, as they are widely known, PACs. 
Ideological/Pragmatic PAC 
strategy 
Researchers have identified two dominant PAC types 
based on PAC expenditure patterns: ideological and 
pragmatic (Handler and Mulkern 1982, 14-15). 
An ideological PAC will target conservative or 
Republican candidates in an effort to change the overall 
composition of Congress. Challengers and open-seat 
candidates are more likely to be supported by ideological 
than pragmatic PACs. 4 
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A pragmatic PAC will target incumbents in an effort to 
secure and maintain a high degree of access to legislators. 
These PACs place less emphasis on party affiliation or 
ideology; rather, they support those candidates who are more 
likely to be responsive to specific company-related issues 
owing to the candidate's Congressional committee 
assignments. Further, since incumbents are more likely to 
win an election, the probability of supporting a winner is 
enhanced. 
Regulatory Environment 
Two regulatory environment classifications, based on 
the emphasis and intensity of various business regulations, 
are defined. 
Economic. Industries whose regulatory interface 
reflects economic policy are defined as operating in an 
economic environment. Industries impacted by economic 
regulations include securities, banking, trucking, 
4While support of incumbents could certainly represent 
a PAC's ideological expression, past research generally 
regards incumbent support as a political strategy driven by 
rational, access-seeking objectives. 
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railroads, utilities, and communications (Eismeier and 
Pollock 1988, 43). Sometimes described as traditional, 
regulations based on economic policy are supported and often 
initiated by business. Economic regulations are defined as: 
Government regulation that creates the necessary 
institutions for competition: government money-
supply management, enforcement of private contracts, 
protecting private property, patent and copyright 
protection, and so forth. The primary role of these 
regulations is to protect and enhance competitive 
forces in the economy, not to supplant them. On the 
other hand, when competitive forces are augmented by 
regulation as they often are--to limit entry into a 
field, such as traditional airline and trucking 
regulation--the results benefit specific businesses 
or industries (Fritschler and Ross 1980, 41). 
Also included in the economic regulation category are 
industries with significant defense contracts since their 
profits are intimately tied to an accommodative rather than 
adversarial business-government relationship. 
social. A social environment characterizes those 
industries that are more directly impacted by the new 
regulations ushered in during the 1960~ and early 1970s 
(e.g., mining, construction, and manufacturing). These 
regulations, directed at social rather than economic policy, 
are defined as: 
Regulations defining what goods should or should not 
be produced. They provide product specifications 
and procedures in industrial processes designed for 
industrial safety. These regulations define modes 
of environmentally acceptable production, types of 
employees who should be hired, acceptable working 
conditions, pay conditions, retirement systems, and 
similar issues (Fritschler and Ross 1980,42). 
These multi-industry regulations are regarded as a 
threat to corporate discretion and managerial autonomy and 
are therefore resented, contested, and sometimes ignored. 
Interlocking Directorates 
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Interlocking directorates are created when company 
directors simultaneously serve on the boards of two or more 
companies. Interlocking directorates can be either direct 
or indirect. 
A direct interlock exists when a director of one 
company sits as a director on the board of a second company. 
Thus, the two companies have a common director and are 
directly joined. 
An indirect interlock exists when a director of a 
first company sits on the board of an intermediate company 
together with a director of a second company. Although the 
interlock between the two directors is direct, the route 
between the first and second companies is considered 
indirect since the connection takes place on the board of a 
third party (U.S. Congress, Senate 1980, 5). 
Interlocking directorates provide a special 
opportunity for intercompany communication and consensus. 
The linkages at the board room table create personal 
connections through which information can be passed, 
arrangements can be made and policies formed (Useem 1984, 
chapter 2). 
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Political Action committees: 
PACs 
A political action committee is a formal committee of 
an interest group which is created to solicit voluntary 
contributions from the group's membership. These funds are 
disbursed as contributions to or expenditures on behalf of 
candidates for federal office. PACs must register and file 
detailed financial records with the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC). The FEC defines PAC money as "separate, 
segregated funds to be utilized for political purposes" 
(U.S. Federal Election Commission 1986). 
six categories of PACs are registered with the FEC: 
corporation committees have reported a connection with 
a corporate entity. This research examines the corporate 
PAC category. 
Nonconnected committees have not reported a connected 
organization, but rather have identified themselves with a 
single issue. These committees are sometimes referred to as 
ideologically based PACs; for example, the National 
Conservative Political Action Committee is dedicated to the 
election of conservatives to public office. 
Trade/Membership/Health committees have reported a 
connection with a trade association, membership 
organization, or health-related organization; for example, 
National Association of Realtors, National Rifle 
Association, American Medical Association. 
Labor committees have reported a ,connection with a 
labor organization; for example, AFL-CIO. 
Corporation without stock committees have reported a 
connecti~n with a corporation without capital stock; for 
example, Airplane Owners and Pilots Association. 
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cooperative committees have reported a connection with 
a cooperative; for example, Allied Grape Growers. 
As shown in Figure 1, as of December 31, 1989 the 
largest category of PACs was Corporate (1,796 registered), 
followed by Nonconnected (1,060), Trade/Membership/Health 
(777), Labor (349), Corporation without stock (137), and 
cooperative (59) (U.S. Federal Election Commission 1990). 
Election Cycles 
An election cycle is the two-year cycle associated 
with Congressional elections. The FEC records all PAC 
financial activity which occurs during each two-year cycle. 
For example, the election cycle 1977-78 includes all 
financial activity occurring between January 1, 1977 and 
December 31, 1978. Most PAC contributions and expenditures 
filed during this time period would be directed at those 
Federal candidates running in the November, 1978 general 
election. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter introduced the research objective, the 
methodology employed to achieve this objective, the 
significance of the research, and an overview of the 
terminology which is used throughout the thesis. 
The remaining chapters examine the following: 
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Chapter II reviews the literature bearing on business-
government relations and on the two theories to be examined, 
resource ,dependence and class cohesion. The former 
emphasizes research which examines corporate political 
activities and strategies, while the latter examines 
research that traces the evolution of resource dependence 
and class cohesion theories and their linkages to corporate 
political activity. 
Chapter III describes the research design: The 
research question is identified; the hypotheses to be tested 
are enumerated; the variables and sampling strategy are 
explained; and the methodology is discussed. 
Chapters IV and V deal with the 1977-78 and 1981-82 
election cycles, respectively. The data are presented, the 
analytical logic is discussed, structural findings are 
displayed as "maps" of firms that engage in similar PAC 
behavior, hypotheses are tested with a variety of 
statistical tests, and conclusions are drawn. 
Chapter VI compares the two election cycles. The null 
hypothesis tested is that there is no significant difference 
between political behaviors in the 1977-78 and 1981-82 
election cycles. 
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Chapter VII summarizes the results of this research, 
its overall conclusions, and its theoretical and managerial 
implications. Its limitations and some avenues for future 
research are also presented. 
Perceptual 
Levels 
A 
B 
C 
o 
E 
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TABLE I 
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT IN A SYSTEMS FRAMEVORK 
Suprasystem 
Environment 
Democracy 
Unit 
Interest Groups 
Subunit •••• 
Bus -Govt. ReI. 
Focal System 
Environment 
Interest Groups 
• Uni t • • • • • • 
Bus-Govt. Rel. 
Subunit 
Campaign Finance 
Subsystem 
• Environment 
Bus-Govt. ReI. 
Unit 
Campaign Fin. 
Subunit 
Poll cy Shapers 
Note: A "System," by definition, incorcorates three levels of 
perception: Environment, unit, and su unit. The unit level of the 
focal system corresponds to both the subunit level of a "Suprasystem" 
and the environment level of a "Subsystem." Clarifying the perceptual 
relationships among the three systems enables the systems practitioner 
to establish a context, a critical problem-solving step (Lendaris 
1986). 
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Figure 1. Growth in the number of PACs by type, 1977 
through 1989. Reprinted from a press 'release issued 
by the Federal Election Commission, January 17, 1990. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter begins with a review of five works which 
are widely recognized as classics in the business-government 
relations and interest group theory literature. This review 
is followed by an examination of more current literature, 
with a special emphasis on research which focuses on 
corporate political activities, strategies, and influence as 
well as the legitimacy of business intervention in the 
public policy process. Finally, resource dependence and 
class cohesion, the two major theories of intercorporate 
relations, are discussed. 
THE CLASSICS 
The five works discussed as classics were released 
from mid-1930 to the end of the 1960s. These authors 
examined the business-government-society interface from 
various perspectives. A recurring theme among these works 
is power--whether interest groups exert too much power and 
thus negate the influence of the citizenry on the democratic 
process; and whether one interest group can tilt the balance 
of power and thus achieve dominance in the political arena. 
Linked to the issue of power are questions of oversight--
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both self-regulation through such mechanisms as overlapping 
interest group memberships and legislated regulation are 
addressed. The origins of interest groups and the societal 
conditions which foster their emergence are also discussed. 
Finally, the age-old debate between pluralists and power 
elite theorists is woven through all of these works. 
The discussion attempts to identify meaningful 
connections between the works reviewed and three major 
elements of this research: resource dependence theory, 
class cohesion theory, and corporate political activity. 
E. E. Schattschneider. Politics, 
Pressures, and the Tariff 
E. E. Schattschneider's 1935 seminal case study in 
business-government relations can be viewed as a precursor. 
Resource dependence is foreshadowed in his conclusion that 
protected industries, reacting to the perceived threat of 
imports, brought about the 1929-1930 tariff revisions known 
as the Hawley-Smoot bill. He reported "the power of well-
organized manufacturers, who descended on Congress in record 
numbers and lobbied for favorable tariff legislation under 
the ideological cloak of nationalism. These so-called 
"pressure groups" effectively blocked the counter position 
of less organized and lower status importers whose very 
existence was threatened by high tariffs. 
This meticulously researched analysis depicts a 
complacent, uncritical Congress which crafted a bill 
attacked by both leading economists and the American Bar 
Association; yet, it passed with no real political 
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opposition. Schattschneider concluded that it is organized 
special interests, not the public interest, which determines 
public policy and therefore "policies can be explained in 
terms of the processes by which pressures are shaped and 
modified" (5). He called for rigorous research that can 
explain, monitor and, perhaps, predict political behavior: 
The connection of interest and political behavior, 
though real, bears close scrutiny. The task is to 
measure the strength of this drive in politics, to 
observe its direction and variability, and to note the 
manner in which it is deflected and controlled (4). 
David Truman, The Governmental 
Process 
David Truman's 1951 work builds on Schattschneider's--
he employs similar methodology, reaches similar conclusions, 
and, like Schattschneider, foreshadows the pluralistic 
viewpoint and application of the resource dependence model 
to the study of corporate political behavior. 
He concurs with the need to know more about the 
relationship between interest groups and government: 
Significant amounts of power are wielded in 
American politics by those formations usually known 
as "pressure groups" • • . we have had no inclusive 
working conception of the general role of "pressure 
groups" or, as I prefer to call them, interest 
groups (vii). 
Even more to the point, Truman's principal objective was to 
examine interest groups and their role in the formal 
institutions of government in order to provide an 
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adequate basis for evaluating their significance in the 
American political process (505). 
Truman is regarded as an early forerunner of pluralism 
(Berry 1989, 8). He advanced the thesis that political 
interest groups are not a unique phenomenon, but rather that 
they are simply a specialized combination of individuals 
with a common goal and a need to interact with the 
institution of government (ix). Indeed, he notes that 
the persistence and the dispersion of such organizations 
[political interest groups] indicate rather that we are 
dealing with a characteristic aspect of our society 
(11) • 
Finally, Truman related the origins of groups and 
their formation rate to environmental conditions, a clear 
harbinger of resource dependence theory. His disturbance 
theory traced a cause-and-effect relationship between events 
which disrupt some societal equilibrium (e.g., the recession 
of the 1870s) and the consequent formation of offsetting 
associations (such as the growth of local granges to 
champion farm interests). Truman posits that the formation 
rate of interest groups is a product of both the complexity 
and dynamism of societal, political, and economic 
conditions. Thus, political interest groups emerge as 
natural conduits between the individual and the formal 
institutions and processes of government. He predicted that 
a just and desirable equilibrious position of the social 
system results from emergent group pressures. 
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Truman held that 
two elements in this conception of the political process 
in the united states • • • are of crucial significance 
• • • multiple or overlapping membership and • • • the 
function of unorganized interests, or potential interest 
groups (508). 
He asserted that multiple group membership creates 
conflict for individual members which in turn reduces the 
cohesion in any given group and provides a "restraint upon 
the activities of organized groups" (510). Further, those 
who "assert that the organization and activity of powerful 
interest groups constitute a threat to representative 
government" (515) are ignoring the impact of 
counterbalancing groups which will emerge (e.g., potential 
consumer groups organized to offset excessive tariff 
proposals). 
The advent of corporate PACs, well after Truman's 
time, introduced a new dimension to his model. To the 
extent that corporate PACs respond to environmental 
constraints (resource dependence), and to the extent that 
these constraints are perceived in similar fashion by 
managements otherwise independent of one another, corporate 
PACs will tend to act in rough unison even though there is 
no planned coalition. 
Bauer, Pool and Dexter, American 
Business and Public Policy 
This view of unplanned unity of purpose in PAC 
activity heightens interest in two of Bauer, Pool and 
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Dexter's 1963 positions. First, they regard business as a 
highly atomistic interest group class with influence only on 
narrow issues. In the absence of PACs, this view could be 
contested only with difficulty but, if PACs tend to respond 
to similar environmental constraints in a similar manner, 
then business may not be as atomistic as it appears. 
Second, Bauer, Pool and Dexter acknowledge that their 
work in some ways departs from Schattschneider's: 
What we actually found, on the contrary, was that the 
most important part of the legislative decision process 
was the decision about which decisions to consider. The 
model of the legislative decision process toward which 
we inevitably moved • • • took as the relevant criterion 
for crhoice the overall needs of his [the legislator's] 
position, rather than the view on specific policies held 
by special groups of the public (405). 
This conclusion, considering today's reality of mounting 
campaign costs, might raise two misgivings. Legislators' 
concerns obviously include reelection and, further, 
reelection requires money, which PACs can provide. 
A related matter is that of overlapping memberships, a 
condition advanced by Truman as deleterious to cohesiveness 
among interest groups. In contrast, Theodore Lowi (1964) 
regards the predicted effects of overlapping memberships as 
"one of the most significant differences between the 
pluralists and Bauer, Pool and Dexter" (697). The 
influential Bauer, Pool and Dexter case study examined the 
political processes associated with foreign trade 
legislation during the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations and found a direct, rather than an inverse, 
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relationship between overlapping memberships and cohesion. 
contrary to Truman's hypothesis, these authors argued that 
such overlapping permits the pursuit of more narrow goals by 
specialized interests within larger associations--goals 
which might be incompatible with the larger group--thus 
preserving the cohesion of the larger group. 
The authors might have advanced another explanation 
for the direct relationship between overlapping memberships 
and cohesion. Class cohesion theory would suggest that 
multiple membership is a vital network, i~ to be expected 
and, indeed, is fundamental to cohesion. 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action 
In 1965, two years after Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 
Mancur Olson added another dimension to group theory, one 
which is marked by its logic and simplicity. This important 
book has provided researchers a theory by which certain 
group behavior can be explained and predicted. Olson 
outlines his thesis as follows: 
It is often taken for granted, at least where 
economic-objectives are involved, that groups of 
individuals with common interests usually attempt to 
further those common interests • . • [this view] 
presumably is based upon the assumption that the 
individuals in groups act out of self-interests 
• • • but it is not in fact true that the idea that 
groups will act in their self-interest follow 
logically from the premise of rational and self-
interested behavior. • • indeed, unless the number 
of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to 
make individuals act in their common interest, 
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rational, self-interested individuals will not act 
to achieve their common or group interests [emphasis 
in original] (1-2). 
Mancur Olson particularly questioned some of Truman's 
earlier conclusions regarding the inherent stabilizing 
attributes of interest group behavior. He doubted Truman's 
assertion that "'suffering,' 'dislocation,' and 
'disturbance' will almost inevitably result in organized 
political pressure [emphasis in original]" (Olson 1965, 
123). Olson notes that there have existed many 
disadvantaged groups who were subjected to serious 
disturbance yet did not organize (e.g., labor during the 
post-Civil War or the depression era). 
Olson also questions overlapping membership as another 
latent restraint on interest group power. He views with 
skepticism Truman's contention that 
tariff seeking manufacturers were also consumers, 
churchmen, and so on • • • [therefore] if the 
manufacturers' association went too far it would 
alienate some of its own members (Olson 1965, 124). 
This skepticism is entirely consistent with class cohesion 
theory which would suggest that the players' roles outside 
of the manufacturers' association are a mechanism by which 
class interests are communicated, understood, and supported. 
Finally, Olson also objected to Truman's negativity 
toward regulatory or constitutional reform proposals. 
Truman (1951) questioned the effectiveness of lobbying 
regulations referring to them as "minor weapons • • • their 
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political significance • . . [being] probably far less than 
the investigations that usually father them" (528); rather, 
"Guardianship will emerge out of the affiliations of the 
guardians" (535). Conversely, Olson did not believe that an 
equilibrium created by overlapping memberships and group 
pressures alone would ensure a fair and just social system: 
It does not follow that the results of pressure-
group activity would be harmless, much less 
desirable, even if the balance of power equilibrium 
resulting from the multiplicity of pressure groups 
kept anyone pressure group from getting out of line 
(124) • 
Edwin Epstein, The corporation 
in American Politics 
Edwin Epstein's 1969 treatment of interest group 
regUlatory reform falls somewhere in the middle of the 
Truman-Olson continuum. He agrees with Truman's contention 
that much existing legislation is ineffective, but Epstein 
supports Olson when he notes that some monitoring of all 
interest (not just corporate and labor) group activity is 
necessary (304-314). 
The Corporation in American Politics (1969) is 
recognized as a "landmark of scholarship on corporate 
political activity" (Mitnick 1989, 1). In it Epstein, a 
proponent of pluralism, argues that corporate political 
involvement is both inevitable and legitimate. The 
interdependence between business and government supports 
both an inevitability and a legitimacy thesis: 
In the pages that follow, we shall •.• advance 
the thesis that corporations, just like other 
collective social interests, have legitimate 
political concerns, which are the consequences of 
organization goals and which therefore make 
political involvement inevitable (16). 
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A slightly different, but supportive, perspective is 
afforded by resource dependence theory along with the advent 
of corporate PACs. It can be argued that PAC activity 
arises from environmental constraints as well as 
organizational goals. Just as individual persons are, 
corporations and their PACs must be permitted self-
preserving reactions to outside pressures. Thus, patterns 
of corporate ·PAC activity are both legitimate, as natural 
reactions to external conditions, and inevitable, since the 
I 
entity is not expected to sacrifice self-interest in the 
face of environmental constraints. Finally, inevitability 
is reinforced by the ease with which PAC activity can be 
undertaken. 
Epstein contends that collective political action is a 
time-honored tradition which enables individuals to advance 
their special interests. Like Truman, he defends the role 
of group versus individual political activity in a 
democratic form of government. He credits Truman, among 
others, as a group theorist who regarded the "interaction of 
associational groupings as constituting the warp and woof of 
American politics" (269) and he challenges those, like R. M. 
MacIver, who predicted that the result of such interaction 
will be a public which is an "amorphous residuum that lies 
outside the contending pressure groups" (270). 
33 
Epstein dismisses the power elite model which posits 
that economic elites act cohesively on public policy issues. 
He cites the Bauer, Pool and Dexter study as evidence that 
intracorporate and intercorporate conflict, as well as a 
large corporation's sensitivity to its public image, curbs 
the potential political clout of the business community 
(172, 225, 239). One might add, given the likelihood of 
unplanned unity, that PACs' reacting jointly to 
environmental constraints is a more parsimonious explanation 
than the power elite model. 
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY, CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
In 1980 Epstein observed "Research regarding the 
political activities of American business is a backwater of 
intellectual effort" (1). He urged his colleagues to "leave 
the side-lines [sic] and to enter with adequate numbers and 
serious commitment the research arena on business and 
politics" (48). While the ensuing decade might not have 
yielded the "brave new theoretical frameworks and dazzling 
empirical breakthroughs" (1) awaited by Epstein, there have 
been significant contributions to this increasingly 
important and complex field. 
The majority of the following work was published in 
the 1980s; two articles date back to the late 1970s; and 
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Epstein's 1969 book is revisited. The section is divided 
into three topic areas: Corporate Political Activities and 
strategy; The Legitimacy Issue; and The Influence Issue. As 
in the preceding section, an effort has been made to connect 
the works reviewed with my study's major elements. 
Corporate Political Activities 
and strategy 
Keirn and Zeithaml (1986) propose a theoretical basis 
for determining effective corporate political strategies. 
Their "exchange model of legislative decision making" (828) 
and "typology of legislative decision situations" (831) are 
rooted in the assumption that reelection is a legislator's 
primary goal. Consequently, the corporate strategist should 
consider the majority voting constituents' predisposition 
toward an issue when an elected representative is asked for 
support. The authors recommend an analysis of three 
contingency factors in determining the most effective 
corporate political strategy: (1) the salience of an issue 
to voters; (2) the level of voter consensus or conflict; and 
(3) the corporate position on a specific issue vis-a-vis the 
voters' position. 
This argument seems to miss an important connection 
between the legislator's primary goal, reelection, and PACs. 
While voters' predisposition toward an issue may be contrary 
to corporate interests and must be taken into account, the 
extent to which a legislator defers to that predisposition 
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may be restrained by practical considerations imposed by the 
dollar cost of achieving the primary goal, reelection. If 
so, then PACs would appear to be useful as conduits of 
campaign financing. Further, money contributed to a 
legislator's campaign is unlikely to be wasted regardless of 
floor votes; it is likely to have a residual effect that can 
be brought into play later. 
Maitland (1986) maintains that managements need to 
look beyond their firms' individual strategic imperatives. 
The atomistic nature of the business community prompts firms 
to adopt political strategies without regard for their 
collective interests. This "reciprocal noninterference" 
(70) dilutes business political resources. He reflects on 
Mancur Olson's free rider dilemma when he suggests that a 
lobbying tithe be paid to encompassing organizations, such 
as the United states Chamber of Commerce, so that a 
coherent, broadly beneficial political agenda can be 
advanced. 
Like Maitland, Ullmann (1985) notes that individual 
firms may adopt the "free rider" (143) rationale since many 
of the benefits derived from political strategies display 
collective-good properties. Also, as with Maitland, he 
recommends a pooling of political resources, but Ullmann 
urges coalition building rather than reliance on 
encompassing organizations. 
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Ullmann examines political strategies within the 
context of the regulatory process. Corporate strategists 
may attempt to influence a regulation at any of its five 
life cycle stages: (1) Formation; (2) Formulation; (3) 
Implementation; (4) Administration; (5) Modification. 
Ullmann posits that the collective benefits resulting from 
corporate intervention in the regulatory process will be 
weakest in the later stages and strongest in the earlier 
stages; therefore, firms should pursue collective political 
strategies in the early stages of regulatory reform, and 
individual political strategies in the later stages. 
Ullmann's life cycle paradigm acknowledges the 
strategic role of PACs. "Not only the content of the life 
cycle but also its process can be influenced" (146), 
specifically by impacting a critical component of the 
overall regulatory process; that is, the composition of 
legislatures through political action committee campaign 
contributions. 
The case study, as employed by Schattschneider (1935) 
and Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963), surfaces again in the 
work of Yoffie and Bergenstein (1985). They use two case 
studies to illustrate their proposition that political 
strategic planning, rather than a muddling-through approach, 
is necessary if business is to be effective in its 
interactions with government. They further contend that top 
level management involvement is crucial in both the planning 
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and implementation stages (see also Post et al. 1983; Useem 
1985; Miles 1987). 
These authors acknowledge that the so-called ad hoc 
approach to corporate political activities was, at one time, 
adequate. The role of the corporate lobbyist, however, has 
undergone profound change. Whereas the corporate D.C. 
representatives of the 1950s concentrated on government 
sales and marketing, today's Washington office is charged 
with the more political objective of securing access to key 
decision makers so that public policy issues of interest to 
the firm can be influenced. 
Yoffie and Bergenstein's conceptual framework for 
political strategic planning is similar to formats 
recommended for market-oriented strategic planning. It 
stresses political goal definition, the integration of 
corporate goals with political goals, and the development of 
policies designed to accomplish these goals (see also 
Fischer 1983 for a similar conceptualization). Only then 
should tactics (PACs, lobbying, constituency building, etc.) 
be evaluated and implemented. 
Perhaps the parallel with market-oriented strategic 
planning should be carried further. First, strategic 
management in general is under serious attack by both 
popular and scholarly management writers. Second, the 
proliferation of strategic models confuses the issue to the 
extent that there is some uncertainty as to what exactly is 
meant by strategy (Gilbert et ale 1988, 1-3). Finally, at 
least one eminent scholar suggests that strategies emerge 
from day-to-day activities and are crafted, much as an 
artist's work evolves, rather than being formulated by a 
group of all-knowing executives (Mintzberg 1987, 66-77). 
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Once again, PACs appear to augment this model. If PAC 
activity is sensitive to the corporation's environment, and 
since it is simple and easy to implement--involving as it 
does relatively low risk decisions--it'does not seem to 
require a strategic framework to be effective but certainly 
can be incorporated into one. This tactical flexibility, 
coupled with strategic usefulness, answers the critics who 
claim that managers spend too much time planning and not 
enough implementing, as well as those who claim to be 
confused about what strategy is. Finally, as noted earlier, 
PAC activity can be a learning process, entirely in line 
with Mintzberg's (1987) concept of emergent strategy. 
Another consideration has to do with the role of 
strategy and tactics. PAC activity is, very likely, best 
considered tactical. Tactics, in contrast to strategy, 
cannot rise above the here and now, tend to be situation-
specific and, moreover, are chosen from a limited catalogue 
of options--a catalogue well known and available to all 
players. Significant proportions of PAC giving simply 
conform to expectations, e.g., buying tickets to a fund 
raiser is a minor expenditure, yet the penalty for not doing 
so can be severe. This is somewhat analogous to a 
salesperson's picking up the lunch tab. 
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Considered in this light, it becomes clear that PAC 
activity does not necessarily fall under the strategic 
rubric, but may do so. Certainly, as all tactics should, 
PAC activity should support strategy. Just as a market-
oriented strategist may mandate a zero defects policy in 
order to implement a customer retention strategy, the 
politically-oriented strategist may attempt to rally 
stakeholders to effect a regulatory change. In the first 
instance, the strategist does not meddle in the details of 
statistical quality control and, in the second, the 
strategist does not meddle in the details of PAC activity 
aimed at maintaining access to key political figures. These 
are tactical matters and, while important, can be entrusted 
to tacticians. 
Finally, there are the questions of commitment and 
vision. Advocacy advertising, coalition building, 
constituency building, and lobbying--perhaps in that order--
are visible to the world and expensive in money and 
executive energies. Entering into such visible, expensive 
strategies demands commitment, vision and careful 
consideration of corporate goals in the political arena. 
PAC activity, on the other hand, does not cast a long 
shadow. 
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Keim and Baysinger (1988) employ a principal-agent 
model to "specify more clearly the conditions under which 
political activity of different types and levels produce (or 
fail to produce) different kinds of effects" (166). Two 
conditions are considered as the authors evaluate the 
potential effectiveness of various political activities: 
(1) the strength of opposing forces, and (2) the nature of 
the political objective. They contend that lobbying pnd PAC 
activities are easily and readily imitated by competing 
interest groups. Therefore, their use should be restricted 
to issues which generate little or poorly organized 
opposition, or to strategies aimed at the maintenance of a 
status quo objective. Alternatively, influence techniques 
such as advocacy advertising or constituency building of 
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stakeholders should be activated when vigorous opposition is 
anticipated or when corporate political strategists are 
attempting to change the status quo. 
This study supports an earlier Keim, zeithaml and 
Baysinger paper (1984) in which constituency building rather 
than PAC activity is predicted to become the dominant 
influence strategy of the 1980s. In a concurrent paper, 
Baysinger (1984) provides a rationale for this prediction. 
He contends that u. S. firms' increased use of constituency 
building and grass roots lobbying reflects a new corporate 
political objective, domain maintenance, defined as 
protecting managerial autonomy. 
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Baysinger believes that the emergence of domain 
maintenance as a political objective is a corporate reaction 
to the social legislation explosion of the 1970s. He notes 
that, prior to the emphasis on protecting managerial 
autonomy created by the new regulatory environment, 
managements sought to achieve one of two traditional 
political objectives: (1) domain management, the pursuit of 
special favors from government; and (2) domain defense, a 
managerial response to government challenges on the 
corporation's purposes, the tobacco industry being the most 
visible example. 
Baysinger concludes with a discussion on the 
legitimacy of corporate political activities. He contends 
that while domain management is at best a questionable 
business objective, and the legitimacy of domain defense is 
highly situation-specific, domain maintenance objectives are 
legitimate to the extent that some social legislation may be 
illegitimate. 
Some very interesting questions emerge from this work. 
Most certainly, PAC activity is easily imitated, perhaps a 
matter of considerable frustration for the first PAC on the 
scene as its influence is diluted. Nevertheless, emulation 
may be the only way to stay in the race once the process 
begins. A corporation's standing aloof from PAC activity 
may, in many circumstances, be unrealistic--especially in 
the face of strong opposing forces. 
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Even the most dedicated strategist recognizes that (1) 
the enterprise must function from day to day, (2) not all 
issues are major ones and (3) strategies must be 
implemented. Therefore, lobbying and PAC giving--the 
tactics that make strategies operable--are not likely to 
diminish significantly unless legally compelled to do so. 
Domain maintenance seems to speak for, rather than 
against, PAC activity as an ongoing, major element of 
corporate political activity. The very word maintenance 
connotes continuity, the sort of continuity achievable 
through regular contact with key figures in the political 
scene, whether in office or hoping to be. This is the sort 
of continuity that comes from well established, favorably 
regarded PACs as well as coalitions such as the united 
States Chamber of Commerce. 
Achieving legitimacy also seems to speak fer PACs. As 
argued earlier, to the extent that PAC activity responds to 
environmental constraints it is likely to be regarded as 
natural and, therefore, legitimate. 
The Legitimacy Issue 
Suggesting that PAC activity is nothing more odious 
than straightforward reaction to environmental constraints 
may seem imprudent in light of th~ savings and loan scandals 
which involved huge campaign contributions. On the other 
hand, it would be imprudent to suggest that PAC activity, 
alone of all political activity available to corporations, 
is inherently heinous. It is reasonable to suggest that 
legitimate conduct is seldom automatic in human endeavors; 
rather, it generally requires careful stewardship. This 
theme runs through the literature on legitimacy. 
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"Legitimacy: A Critical Issue," the title of chapter 
nine in Epstein's Corporation in American Politics (1969), 
establishes his concern for the legitimacy question. 
Epstein effectively argues from two perspectives that 
business has a right, even an obligation, to involve itself 
in the public policy process. From the internal 
perspective, management possesses the legitimate authority 
to involve the corporation in politics; from the external 
perspective, the corporation as one of many special interest 
groups is entitled to compete in the political arena. 
Epstein cautions, however, that all political participants, 
including business, should be subject to public scrutiny and 
review. He poses a fundamental question which he exhorts 
scholars to consider continuously: "What manner and what 
scope of corporate political activity are acceptable in a 
pluralistic democracy?" (286). 
The legitimacy of corporate political activity was 
considered by Brenner (1979) in a study'which analyzed 1978 
survey results of executive and consumer attitudes toward 
selected corporate political activity issues, and then 
compared these responses to a similar 1968 survey. Two 
trends identified by the author--business's improved skill 
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in corporate political activities and society's heightened 
disapproval of same--is reflected in the differing 
legitimacy views held by each sector. 
Perhaps the most significant finding, the single 
result which business managers should not overlook, is 
that business and society have different views of 
corporate political activity. The former group believes 
it is necessary and proper for its views to be 
effectively and forcefully supported in the governmental 
process. The public seems less sure of and certainly 
less 'comfortable with corporate political activity 
(162) • 
Brenner notes that while the 1978 business sector 
appeared more savvy and able regarding political issues when 
compared to the 1968 sample, a concomitant increase in 
political influence did not ensue. He cautions that if 
managements pursue self-interest goals with no regard for 
the public interest, then business will "likely [become] an 
unwelcome participant in the nation's political processes, 
restricted from involvement in them" (163). 
Resource dependence theory suggests at least a partial 
scenario. As public condemnation of corporate political 
activity has grown, it has become less an annoyance and more 
an environmental constraint. To the extent that corporate 
political activity has begun to factor real or potential 
public censure into the equation, one should begin to detect 
signs of intensified legitimacy-seeking such as expanded 
advocacy advertising; coalitions with highly visible, benign 
entities such as civil rights groups; compromises with 
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traditional opponents such as environmentalists; and 
constituency building among corporate stakeholders. 
Sethi (1982) agrees with Brenner's assessment when he 
contends that 
the paramount issue [in corporate political involvement 
debates] is that of legitimacy or societal acceptance of 
corporate political action and their underlying motives 
(32) • 
Like Epstein, Sethi believes that our pluralistic 
society demands corporate political participation which 
"should ideally be developed in terms of strategic choices 
to meet carefully defined policy objectives" (33). Further, 
these political objectives and strategies should "embody a 
clear notion of the public interest" (34). 
Sethi's conceptual model describes three modes of 
corporate behavior: defensive, accommodative and positive 
activism. He characterizes each mode's external and 
internal environmental conditions, and then recommends the 
political strategy most appropriate for varying 
contingencies. 
Clearly, Sethi's position, along with those of Epstein 
and Brenner, reflects resource dependence. None of these 
scholars argues against the view that political behavior 
results from environmental constraints; rather, they argue 
that dealing with public opinion is a high priority action 
and, in several instances, recommend strategies. 
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The Influence Issue 
In 1977 Salamon and Siegfried tested their hypothesis 
that corporate influence on American politics and corporate 
economic power are positively related. Economic power was 
measured by firm size, industry size, market concentration 
within the industry, profit rate, and degree of geographical 
dispersion. 
Only the firm size variable supported their 
hypothesis; all other economic power variables correlated 
negatively, albeit weakly, with corporate political 
influence. These authors also draw on Olson's thesis to 
explain their results. They note: 
To the extent that political power is reflected in 
such actual policy outcomes we can therefore say 
that larger firm size does indeed seem to yield 
greater political power. Also interesting are the 
findings suggesting that larger industries (as 
opposed to larger firms) are less successful 
politically, which supports the "free rider" 
hypothesis advanced by Mancur Olson [see Olson, 
1965], since larger industries in general have more 
firms than smaller industries. In addition, we 
found evidence that industries which are most 
visible and most fearful of government intervention 
because of their attractive (i.e. concentrated) 
market structure or profitability are more inclined 
to avoid (or are less successful at mounting) 
political influence efforts aimed at reducing their 
tax burdens (1042). 
A major finding in Brenner's 1980 in-depth case study 
of twenty-nine firms, which examined how organizational and 
managerial factors were associated with political influence, 
can be contrasted with the Salamon and siegfried results. 
Brenner's (1980) dependency hypothesis was formulated with 
an important concept introduced by Bauer, Pool and Dexter 
(1963), the concept of self interest: 
The concept of self-interest as defined in the 
Bauer, et al. research is comparable with dependency 
in this study. While self-interest was the most 
natural explanation for businessmen's communications 
with Congress over the tariff, dependency plays that 
role in the case of time-sharing firms (210). 
Based on associations revealed by linkage analysis, 
Brenner concludes that the extent of corporate political 
activity cannot be fully described by economic determinism 
since the critical variable, dependency, was related to 
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smaller firms which are less economically powerful and more 
vulnerable to environmental or governmental action. 
Brenner's results contrast, however, with Bauer, Pool and 
Dexter and Salamon and Siegfried regarding the firm size 
relationship. He notes that these conflicting results are 
owing to the strength of the dependency variable in his 
sample. 
Edwin Epstein (1984) also considers the firm size and 
dependency variables in his article which examined the 
political behavior of corporate PACs and documented their 
growth in numbers and size. Epstein determined that both 
firm size and the extent of economic dependence on 
government decisions influences an individual firm's PAC (or 
nonPAC) activity. He acknowledges that relating PAC 
activity and the actual influence which they exert in 
governmental and electoral activities is a far more 
difficult proposition, yet scholars must come to grips with 
the "crucial issue . • . the implication of corporate PAC 
activity for the political process and American democracy" 
(474). 
Epstein poses the question: liAs a consequence of 
their PAC operations, [do] corporations as an identifiable 
constituency have an excessive impact on the political 
process" (483), and then concludes: 
Although it is not possible to demonstrate the 
effect of specific PAC donations on particular 
public policy outcomes, it is not unreasonable to 
assert that the PAC phenomenon has contributed at 
the macro level to increasing the influence of the 
business·community in the overall public policy 
process during the past several year • . • This does 
not mean, of course, that specific policy outcomes 
conform necessarily to the wishes of particular 
business interests or that the business community, 
perforce, gets its way in all, or even most cases. 
Rather, it suggests that, on the whole, critical 
issues of public policy are resolved in ways 
considered to be appropriate by mainstream business 
leadership (485-486). 
Conclusion 
One must conclude from a review of the management-
related literature on business-government relations that 
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most scholars accept the resource dependence model. Class 
cohesion theory occupies an analogous position in Sociology 
and, to a lesser extent, Political Science. The chapter 
continues with an examination of both theories in the 
context of intercorporate relations. 
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INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS 
The Evolution 
organization theory, in its ongoing attempt to explain 
organization behavior, has evolved from a focus on the 
firm's internal environment (Berle and Means 1932) to a 
recognition that the exigencies of the external environment 
dictate, at the very least, contingency planning (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967). Theories that have only recently entered 
the management literature, such as population ecology, 
suggest that.corporate executives are even constrained in 
contingency planning; rather, they react to environmental 
forces well beyond their control (Aldrich 1979). Thus, 
organization behavior is shaped in a manner analogous to the 
evolution of living organisms. 
Systems theorists' focus was, and is, largely on 
organizations' exchange relationships with external 
environments. Thompson's (1967) seminal work emphasized the 
open systems nature of firms--the environment is the source 
of inputs and the sink for outputs. Katz and Kahn (1978) 
noted the negative entropic nature of organizations 
suggesting that they, like any complex physical system, must 
import and store more energy from the environment than they 
expend--otherwise, they cannot avoid the universal phenomena 
of disintegration and death (McGowan 1980, 86). 
The premise that corporate behavior results from 
exchanges between firm and environment has two pivotal 
implications for organization theory. First, inter-
organizational power is likely to result from these system 
transactions (Pfeffer 1987, 26). Second, the fundamental 
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unit of analysis becomes the relations among organizations--
individual firm behavior is examined within this framework 
(Mizruchi and Schwartz 1987, i). 
A structural approach to the study of business, which 
focuses on intercorporate relations, embraces these two 
pivotal implications. Resource dependence theory and class 
cohesion theory are the two major structural perspectives of 
intercorporate relations. Both attempt to explain 
organization behavior by examining the underlying basis of 
intercorporate relations; each represents an opposing view 
on the extent of cohesion within the business community. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory contends that 
organizational behavior is determined by economic and 
political constraints imposed by interdependent stakeholders 
.. t . . t 1 operat~ng ~n an uncer a~n env~ronmen • First proposed in 
the 1970s (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978), its five basic tenets are (Pfeffer 1987, 26-27): 
1. Organizational behavior can best be understood by 
examining intercorporate relations; this approach dictates 
'Stakeholders capable of constraining a firm and 
affecting its behavior include labor, suppliers, financiers, 
customers, stockholders, and government regulators (Pfeffer 
1987, 35). 
that systems of organizations rather than individual firms 
be the fundamental unit of analysis. 
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2. Environmental constraints and interdependencies 
between a focal corporation and major stakeholders encroach 
upon management's autonomy. 
3. This interdependent and labile environment results 
in an unpredictable future for the focal organization. 
4. To enhance survival and future success, the 
executive team will proactively attempt to manage the 
external environment through cooptation, compromise, or 
persuasion so as to ensure a continuous resource flow and to 
reduce dependencies. Such actions result in a constantly 
changing pattern of intercorporate relationships. 
5. Both interorganizational and intraorganizational 
power are products of organization interdependence; powerful 
organizations, wielding economic and/or political leverage, 
can demand compliant behavior from less powerful, dependent 
organizations. 
Accordingly, managements proactively employ economic 
and political strategies to manage their environment, i.e., 
to reduce uncertainty and enhance the probability of 
achieving corporate objectives. Vertical integration to 
lock in raw material supplies exemplifies economic strategy. 
PAC campaign contributions, directed at government as an 
interdependeIit stakeholder wielding regulatory power, are an 
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example of a political strategy designed to reduce political 
uncertainty. 
various theorists have examined the impact of 
regulatory power on corporate political behavior. Handler 
and Mulkern (1982) maintain 
that there is a variety of regulatory environments 
within which corporations interact with government, 
and that these differing environments constitute the 
most powerful influence in generating PAC strategies 
(29) • 
This pcsition is supported by Burris (1987) whose 
results highlight the degree to which corporate 
political behavior is conditioned by the fiscal and 
regulatory relationship between corporations and the 
state (741). 
Finally, Neustadtl and Clawson's (1988) network 
analysis revealed a large group of corporations united by 
shared conservative beliefs and a similar regulatory 
environment. 
Resource dependence theory suggests, then, that 
corporations (1) facing similar constraints (2) imposed by 
similar stakeholders will (3) employ similar strategies. 2 
2This prediction does not necessarily contradict 
research which demonstrates that firms within the same 
industry exhibit different external affairs strategies (see 
Brenner 1980; Miles 1987). As Pfeffer (1987) notes, 
resource dependence predictions are not "simple or 
unidimensional" (35). The theory acknowledges that firms, 
even within the same industry, can have. varying sources and 
intensity levels of constraint which could override a 
system-wide (e.g., regulatory environment) constraint. PAC 
statistics, however, have revealed a correlation between 
ideological/pragmatic political strategies and 
social/economic regulatory environments (Handler and Mulkern 
1982, 29). 
The resource dependence prediction is that firms 
equally constrained by the same [emphasis in 
original] external agents [e.g. government 
regulators] should operate more or less similarly, 
and, indeed, engage in similar patterns of 
intercorporate relations (Pfeffer 1987, 35). 
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Finally, resource dependence theory suggests that 
political support activities are not coordinated and that 
similarities are spontaneous. A continual jockeying for 
interorganizational power precludes deliberate, uniform 
corporate political strategies (Glasberg and Schwartz 1983, 
314). Madisonian pluralism prevails in the political arena 
much as the invisible hand reigns in the marketplace. 
Class Cohesion Theory 
A 1939 report of the united states National Resources 
Committee first suggested that the corporate class had both 
the motivation and means to unite on economic, social, and 
political issues (Glasberg and Schwartz 1983, 314). 
Class cohesion theory thus challenged the 
managerialist position advanced by Berle and Means (1932). 
In the managerialist model, corporate managements pursue job 
security by avoiding risk, preferring profit satisficing to 
profit maximizing. 
Rather than managerial caution as· a restraint on 
untrammeled competition, class cohesion theory points to a 
coalition of the power elite as a restraining force. 
Members of the elite coalesce to maintain their quality of 
life and bequeath accompanying perquisites to upcoming 
54 
generations. The resulting environment is one in which 
market territories are staked out and respected; injurious 
price competition is avoided; and industry profits are 
maximized (Glasberg and Schwartz 1983, 315). Incentives to 
compete individually are replaced with incentives to unite. 
Various means exist within the corporate class to 
define, transmit, and inculcate a set of common values and 
goals. Upper class socialization, via selected universities 
and social clubs, prepare initiates for power posts in 
corporations, policy planning organizations, interlocking 
directorates and, not incidentally, government itself. 
Domhoff (197~, 1974) maps school ties and membership in 
exclusive social clubs and business associations as the 
basis for a powerful communication network which helps to 
ensure a commonality of classwide interests. Useem (1980) 
notes: "If exclusive social clubs are a source of social 
cohesion, major business policy associations are the 
crucible of political cohesion" (57). Useem (1982) later 
notes that the 
unplanned consequence of • • • interlocking directorates 
is the formation of a communication network that 
inevitably helps a segment of the corporate elite 
identify its members' shared political interests (211). 
While geographic proximity is not a sine qua non of 
the corporate elite communication network, class cohesion 
theorists generally regard it as a variable which should be 
included in stUdies of class cohesion (Mizruchi 1989, 409). 
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The geographic proximity of headquarters locations was one 
of the strongest predictors of similar political behavior 
between firm dyads in the Mizruchi (1989) study. Further, 
the Yankee-Cowboy theory, which hypothesizes political 
differences within the corporate elite along regional lines 
--an old money liberalism versus a new money conservatism 
division--was a primary determinant of political behavior in 
the Burris (1987) study. 
Even though class cohesion theorists agree that this 
corporate elite will exhibit similar political behavior so 
as "to ensure conditions favorable to continued growth of 
company profits" (Useem 1982, 200), there is some 
disagreement as to how classwide interests translate into 
political strategy. A liberal-conservative spectrum is 
useful in illustrating this disagreement. 
, 
At the liberal end of the spectrum, an inner circle of 
corporate elite acknowledges what it perceives as, perhaps, 
an unpleasant reality. Useem (1984) explains that "welfare, 
labor, and other forms of government-managed reforms can be 
costly to individual firms," but that such reforms maintain 
a societal stability and thus "the entire business community 
and the future of the private economy will best prosper if 
it assumes a posture of compromise" (114). 
At the conservative end of the spectrum, perceived 
class interests will dictate an ideological strategy. 
PACs with this orientation are prepared to risk the 
displeasure of powerful incumbents, even if this hurts 
56 
their own company • • • in order to change the character 
of Congress (Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986, 798). 
Class cohesion theorists postulate, regardless of the 
political strategy pursued, that the cohesiveness of this 
corporate elite, whose economic resources exceed many 
nations' GNPs, results in political clout which reduces 
pluralism's chances drastically. 
A synthesis 
Both resource dependence and class cohesion theorists 
acknowledge the reality of intercorporate relations that is 
not entirely in accord with their core theories. Further, 
both sets of theorists point to a need for research that 
could reconcile this divergence. 
Regarding the class cohesion theory, Mizruchi (1989) 
submits: 
Elites in advanced capitalist societies cannot be 
said in the abstract to be either unified or 
fragmented. There are times in which elites act in 
a unified manner and times in which they do not. 
What is needed, therefore, is a study of the 
conditions [emphasis in original] under which elites 
act in a unified manner; in other words, the factors 
that determine whether elites will cohere on a 
particular issue or series of issues (402). 
Regarding resource dependence theory, Pfeffer (1987) 
argues: 
It is possible that organizations have, at once, 
both narrowly parochial interests and broader 
interests in economic stability and macroeconomic 
policies. • • To predict the extent of coordinated 
activity, this [structural] approach would argue 
that examining the patterns and correspondence of 
resource interdependencies and market constraints 
would permit beginning to answer the question of 
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under what circumstances coordinated action is 
likely to occur as opposed to witnessing the pursuit 
of more parochial objectives (50). 
The prospect that corporate political activity could 
be understood by combining aspects of resource dependence 
and class cohesion theories is especially attractive in 
light of some plausible combinations. My research design 
does not preclude finding a cluster of firms that could be 
explained by both theories. For example, my scaling results 
could identify a cluster of firms with characteristics 
associated with both resource dependence (e.g., a common 
regulatory environment) and class cohesion (e.g., high 
incidence of interlocking directorates). 
consider a second example in which a cluster of firms, 
displaying similar political behavior, is found to be linked 
to class cohesion determiners but not by the resource 
dependence determiners, economic and social regulatory 
environments. My research tests the effect of a significant 
macroenvironmental shift in White House philosophy regarding 
business and its regulation. If the cluster's behavior 
shifts as well, then it c.C'uld be defined as resource 
dependent while the cluster itself could be described as 
class cohesive. That is, while linked to a class network, 
these firms would be responding to a perceived environmental 
constraint, again at the macro level. 
Current Research 
Some recent empirical work lays a foundation for my 
research. Four recent studies of the business community's 
political integration have drawn on elements of resource 
dependence and class cohesion theory and utilized PAC 
contributions data as a measure of corporate political 
activity. The following section discusses the data, 
measures, methodologies and results of these four studies, 
and explains how my research was designed to expand upon 
them. Key features of this previous work and its 
relationship to mine are summarized in Table II. 
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Mizruchi and Koenig (1986) tested the pluralist 
argument that "ties of trade will promote opposing or 
different political positions" (484), such ties measured by 
volume of transactions at the industry level;' and the 
class argument that "mechanisms exist that succeed in 
fostering consensus within the business community" (482), 
such mechanisms operationalized as economic leverage and the 
extent of interlocking directorates between industries. 2 
'A later study (Mizruchi 1989) questioned the use of 
volume o~ transactions in the Mizruchi and Koenig (1986) 
model. Two problems were cited: (1) interdependent 
industries are not necessarily politically opposed (e.g., 
automakers and auto parts suppliers) and (2) results which 
revealed a strong, opposite effect between constraint and 
volume of transactions may have been due to collinearity. 
2Economic leverage data were drawn from a 1967 study 
which computed a constraint measure based on the "dependence 
of industry i on sales and purchases from industry j, 
weighted by the concentration of industry j" (Mizruchi and 
Koenig 1986, 485). 
Political consensus was determined by the similarity of 
congressional candidates supported among fourteen 
industries. For each industry, the two largest firms' PAC 
contributions were pooled; a similarity measure then 
determined the extent to which each pair of industries 
contributed to the same candidates in the 1980 elections. 
This similarity measure was regressed onto three variables 
associated with either the pluralist or class theory 
position on business political integration. Twenty-three 
percent of the variation in similar political behavior was 
explained by this regression model. Further, the model 
revealed a negative relationship between similar political 
behavior and both volume of transactions (consistent with 
pluralist model) and direct interlocks (inconsistent with 
class model); economic leverage between industries was 
positively related to the similarity measure (consistent 
with class model). 
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The authors concluded that the lack of political 
consensus associated with increased levels of transactions 
is consistent with the pluralist argument since it implies 
that diverge~t economic interests result in political 
disunity. Further, since class theorists posit that board 
interlocKs mediate political disputes and thus are directly 
related to political unity, these results disaffirm the 
class cohesion position. 
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The results are mixed, however. Class theorists also 
argue that a direct relationship exists between political 
unity and economic leverage citing the capability of the 
latter to enforce political consensus within the business 
community. Mizruchi and Koenig conclude that the positive 
effects of economic leverage indicate that this is an 
important source of class cohesion within the business 
community. These authors called for subsequent researchers 
to examine other sources of class cohesion, specifically, 
social ties and memberships in business associations, two 
class cohesion measures employed in my research. 
Burris (1987) evaluated six theories, all purporting 
to explain the political partisanship of American business. 
He examined the PAC contributions of 443 corporations to 
congressional candidates in the 1982 election. Three 
measures of political partisanship--the percentage of total 
congressional contributions to incumbents, Republicans, and 
New Right candidates--were regressed onto predictor 
variables associated with the six theories. 
Burris found that two theories were supported by his 
data: the Yankee-Cowboy theory of regional political 
differences and the regulatory environment theory which 
posits that government regulation is a primary determinant 
of corporate political activity.3 His twelve-variable 
3The four disconfirmed theories--the core-periphery, 
the inner-circle, the managerialist, and the domestic-
multinational theories--hypothesized that some dominant 
model, however, explained just twenty-two percent of the 
variance in business partisanship, thus it can be faulted. 
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Yet, this work provides a useful step in linking theory with 
empirical research. 
Neustadtl and Clawson (1988) employed clique analysis 
to address: 
One of the central theoretical issues in analyses of 
business political behavior • • . the degree to which 
business is able to unify and act together as an 
effective political block (172). 
The PAC contributions of 230 corporations made during 
the 1980 elections served as Neustadtl and Clawson's measure 
of political activity. They derived a political consensus 
measure from the similarity of candidates supported between 
pairs of firms. Their findings revealed a large clique 
linked by a conservative ideology. 
The authors concluded that the strength and size of 
the conservative clique evidenced stronger support for the 
social class theory rather than pluralism. One wonders, 
however, if this clique might not have been reacting to 
regulatory environment constraints. Economically regulated 
firms were noticeably absent from the conservative clique, 
and thus were exhibiting less conservative political 
activity. Such behavior is consistent with the regulatory 
environment theory of business partisariship and, by 
extension, resource dependence. 
group collectively supports a more liberal agenda so as to 
insure ldng-term stability of the economic system. 
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Neustadtl and Clawson call for future research which 
will consider corporate political groupings over time and 
also for analysis on corporate political strategies observed 
after the "critical election" (185) of 1980. My design 
addresses both of these recommended research directions. 
Finally, Mizruchi's (1989) research was the primary 
catalyst for my study. He employed variables drawn from the 
resource dependence and class cohesion models to examine the 
sources of political similarities among fifty-seven large 
corporations. Similarity, his dependent variable, was 
defined as the extent to which pairs of corporate PACs 
contributed to the same Congressional candidates during the 
1980 elections. This measure was regressed onto eight 
variables associated with either resource dependence or 
class cohesion theory. Seventy-one percent of the variation 
in similar political behavior was explained by this 
regression model. The two strongest predictors directly 
related to similar political behavior were whether firms' 
headquarters were located in the same state and whether 
firms were members of the same primary industry. Also 
significantly related to similar political behavior were 
indirect interlocks and common stockholdings with financial 
institutions, and market constraint. 
Mizruchi concluded that both organizational and social 
network factors influenced political behavior similarity. He 
notes, however, that, regardless of the measures employed in 
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studies of corporate political behavior, future "analysis 
must move to the triadic, cluster, and system-wide levels" 
(420). My research design, enriched by Mizruchi's and 
other scholars' work, moves the study of corporate political 
behavior to the system level. 
Conclusion 
The availability in recent years of reliable data on 
campaign contributions of political action committees has 
spurred empirical research on the sources of business 
political convergence. Yet, despite this, no consensus has 
emerged as to the underlying rationale which drives business 
participation in the U. s. public policy process. 
Prior studies have examined dyadic relations between 
firms or industries as a measure of business political 
consensus. This study subjects dyadic measures to 
multidimensional scaling so that the intercorporate 
structure hidden in the data stands to be revealed. 
A second characteristic of previous studies is their 
emphasis on the relationship between similar political 
behavior and organizational and social network variables 
(such as economic interdependence, interlocking 
directorates, and geographic proximity of headquarters 
locations) which are operationalized as mechanisms by which 
the corporate community can prevent, mediate, and/or resolve 
intercorporate conflict and thus advance a classwide 
political agenda. This study, building on Pfeffer and 
Salancik's (1978) resource dependence proposition which 
associates government regulation and corporate campaign 
contributions, incorporates regulatory environment as a 
predictor of similar political behavior (214). 
64 
Another departure is the use of data associated with 
two off-year Congressional elections. .Prior work tended to 
focus on the 1980 elections since they marked a watershed of 
sorts in national politics, and because corporate PAC 
involvement was cited as influential in the outcomes 
(Ashford 1986). This work examines corporate political 
activity in 1982 which was conducted in the context of a 
Republican-controlled Senate and a House seating thirty-
three new Republican members. A further unique feature of 
this study is the corollary analysis of the 1978 elections 
which permitted a comparison of corporate political activity 
between two disparate White House administrations. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The objective of this thesis was to improve our 
understanding of business-government relations by examining 
corporate political activity within the context of resource 
dependence and class cohesion theories. Consequently, this 
literature review first considered a selection of foundation 
works, classics from the social sciences, upon which 
business-government relations theory is built. This was 
followed by a review of some contemporary research which has 
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studied corporate political activity, its influence, and its 
place in a democratic society. The intercorporate relations 
literature and current empirical research which links 
resource dependence and class cohesion theories to corporate 
political activities was reviewed. In conclusion, it was 
shown how my research design expands on this existing body 
of work. The following chapter presents the specifics of my 
research design. 
TABLE II 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CORPORATE PAC CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND FIRMS- POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
Stud:r: Methodolog:z: Findings 
Mizruchi and Multiple regression, No relationship: 
Koenig (1986); ~ath analysiS; similarity measure with 
puralism vs. 8 firms examined at (1) transactions volume 
class theory industry level; (supsorts pluralism~and dyadic measure of (2) irect interloc 
political similarity; (refutes class model). 
1980 elections. Positive relationship: 
similarit1 measure with economic everage (supports class model). 
Burris, (1987); Multiple regression, Regional theory and 
six theories of discriminant analysis; regulatory environment 
business 443 firms; pro~ortion theory supported. 
partisanship of 1982 PAC do lars 
to incumbents, Refub-
licans, and New R ght. 
Neustadtl and Clique analysis; A large conservative 
Clawson (1988); 230 firms; dyadic cli~ue emerged which 
pluralist/eli te measure of political cou d support class 
theory debate. similarity; 1980. theory. 
Mizruchi P989); Multiple regression; Positive relationshiGs: 
sources 0 57 manufacturing firms; similarity with (1) Q 
political dyadic measure of location, market con-
convergence. ~olitical similarity; straint, common ties 
980 elections. with financial firms (supports class model); (2) membership in same 
primary industry (supports 
resource dependence). 
Mullery (1991); Multidimensional Positive relationshi~: 
resource scaling; 42 industrial similarity with regu a-
dependence vs. and nonindustrial tory environment (sup-
class cohesion. firmsl dyadic measure ports resource depen-
of po !tical dence); no relationship: 
similarity; 1978 and similarity with class 
1982. cohesion. Some support 
for regional model. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
INTRODUCTION 
Epstein (1980) pondered the dearth of corporate 
political activity research in a literature review and 
offered several reasons why this lIintellectual lode ll has 
been IIvirtually unmined by business society scholars II (5). 
One was the "difficulty of obtaining 'hard data' or other 
forms of 'scientifically' verifiable evidence relating to 
the political behavior of business" (4); another was the 
reluctance of business practitioners and public officials to 
"discuss candidly their [political] actions, motivations, 
and ideologies ll (4). 
This research design addresses both the hard data and 
the candor issues. An extensive data bank maintained by the 
Federal Election Commission since 1975 confronts the former 
issue. Substituting observed behavior for self reporting of 
political actions, motivations, and ideologies confronts the 
latter. Finally, this design is tightly focused, thus 
avoiding Epstein's charge that Business in Politics research 
frequently has the "frustrating characteristic of assessing 
everything and nothing" (4). 
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The overarching objective of this research design is 
to effect both theoretical and methodological progress in 
the Business in Politics literature. The research 
incorporates a systematic, empirical analysis formulated to 
confirm or deny several hypotheses. In so doing, it links 
existing theories, resource dependence and class cohesion, 
with empirical corporate political activity research. 
Further, the design's exploratory analysis component 
provides an opportunity to move beyond existing theory and 
contemplate new theory. Finally, this design introduces 
multidimensional scaling, a sophisticated mathematical 
technique used in structural analysis, to the Business in 
Politics literature. 
Chapter III begins with a presentation of the research 
question. It then explicates the six research hypotheses; 
reviews the sampling strategy; identifies the measured 
variables and explains the measurement methods; and, 
finally, discusses the analytical methodology. Appendix A 
provides an overview of this research design. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
Can resource dependence or class cohesion theory 
explain intercorporate patterns of corporate political 
activities, specifically political action committee (PAC) 
campaign contributions? 
HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses have been described as the "working 
instruments of theory," the "[bridge] between theory and 
empirical inquiry" (Kerlinger 1973, 20, 25). As such, the 
following hypotheses have been formulated to propose a 
relationship between a measure of corporate political 
activity, corporate PAC contributions, and measures of 
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intercorporate behavior derived from resource dependence and 
class cohesion theories. The hypotheses, thus, focus the 
inquiry by clarifying those relations which are tested so 
that the applicability of existing theory in predicting 
corporate political activity can be confirmed or denied. 
Five research hypotheses are presented--one resource 
dependence hypothesis and four class cohesion hypotheses. A 
sixth hypothesis considers the stability of political 
strategy over time. 
Resource-Dependence Hypothesis 
As discussed in the previous chapter, resource 
dependence theory argues that corporate behavior results 
from interorganizational constraints which may well override 
such orthodox corporate goals as efficiency and profit 
- , t' , max~m~za ~on. Hypothesis one can be deduced from this 
theory and is supported by previously cited research. 
'A source of interorganizational constraint of 
particular interest for this research is the government 
regulation of business. 
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H1: Firms similarly constrained by government 
regulations will exhibit similar political behavior. 
Class Cohesion Hypotheses 
Chapter II also discussed class cohesion tteory and 
related it to predictions regarding corporate political 
activity. Class cohesion theory's underlying premise is 
that some corporate political behavior results from a 
classwide unity of the power elite, a unity that is achieved 
through exclusive communication networks. 2 Hypotheses two 
through four can be deduced from this theory and are 
supported by the previously cited research. 
H2: Firms' number of interlocking directorates will 
relate directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
H3: Firms' number of associations with certain 
prestigious business policy groups will relate directly to 
similar political behavior among firms. 
H4: Shared educational experience among board 
chairmen and CEOs will relate directly to similar political 
behavior among firms. 
H5: Geographically proximate headquarters will relate 
directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
2Examples of hypothesized networks include 
interlocking directorates, membership in major business 
associations, and social interactions resulting from 
geographic proximity. 
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A Political strategy Hypothesis 
Additional insights regarding business in politics can 
be gained by examining the corporate political strategies 
pursued during two distinct White House administrations, 
Carter's and Reagan's. Therefore, PAC contribution patterns 
associated with two midterm election cycles were studied. 
It is hypothesized that the change between the Carter 
and Reagan administrations was significant enough to affect 
corporate political strategy. For example, a major 
legislative development during the first two years of the 
Carter administration was the tightening of regulations on 
the private sector and the expansion of government 
involvement in energy-related policies which included oil 
price controls (Easterling 1987, 245). In contrast, Reagan, 
during the first thirty days of his administration, 
established a Task Force on Regulatory Relief; froze all 
pending regulations; lifted oil price controls; eliminated 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability; and directed the 
Office of Management and Budget to subject all future 
proposed regulations to a cost-benefit analysis (Miller 
1988, 70). Such dramatic policy changes could encourage 
corporations which had pursued the less risky, pragmatic 
political strategies to more actively support conservative 
challengers and open seat candidates. This line of reasoning 
results in the following research hypothesis: 
H6: The ideology of a sitting White House 
administration will influence corporate PAC contribution 
patterns. 
EXPLORATORY RESEARCH 
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Kerlinger (1973) contends that even when hypotheses 
are not confirmed, valuable research can result since the 
"total universe of ignorance" has been reduced. Further, 
"uncharted hypotheses" can contribute to the "basic aim of 
science • • . [t,:hich is] theory" (26). The exploratory 
analysis component of this research design encourages the 
development of uncharted hypotheses to explain corporate 
political activities. Further, such explorations can 
provide the basis for the development of a new theory which 
might better explain the business-government interface or, 
more generally, interest group behavior in a pluralistic 
democracy. New propositions regarding corporate political 
activity are advanced based on unanticipated patterns 
revealed by the MDS spatial representation of intercorporate 
relations. 
MEASUREMENT 
Measures were developed for each of the research 
question's components: corporate political activity, 
resource dependence theory, and class cohesion theory. 
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Table III summarizes the measured variables. The following 
sections further explain measurement methods. 
corporate Political Activity 
Corporate PAC activity is a widely accepted measure ,of 
corporate political activity. While PAC activity is but one 
category of corporate political behavior, researchers 
generally agree that PAC contributions provide significant 
information about a firm's overall political strategy 
(Clawson, Neustadtl and Bearden 1986, 799; Burris 1987, 732-
733; Mizruchi 1989, 405). Further, as noted by Masters and 
Baysinger (1985), this activity, unlike other political 
activities, is readily interpretable: 
corporations engage in a variety of political 
activities, including lobbying, constituency building, 
and setting up public affairs units . • • PAC activity 
differs from these others in that it is a direct attempt 
to buy access to lawmakers, or influence them, through 
influencing elections (654). 
Finally, PAC contribution records are accessible, 
reliable, and systematically maintained by a federal agency, 
an important characteristic from a scientific perspective 
since it enhances replication of this research. The extent 
to which corporate PACs support the same Congressional 
candidates is the end result of a myriad of factors. Some, 
such as voting records and committee assignments, are 
specific to candidates. Others, such as intensity of 
competition and regulation, are specific to industries. 
still others, such as a CEO's political sophistication and 
leadership a~ilities, are specific to individual firms and 
their PACs. 
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One cannot formulate a hypothesis for each possible 
factor--even if they could all be identified and measured--
and test it. One can, however, utilize observed behavior as 
a proxy variable, a proxy that stands in for an undefined 
set of factors and can be observed without reference to that 
set of factors. Support for a candidate is such a proxy 
variable: It exists or it does not and can be observed 
without reference to candidate-specific, industry-specific, 
or PAc-specific factors. The similarity matrices, central 
to the analysis, are built from these hard data. 
Actual measurement entails two stages. The first 
stage involves the recording of contributions to, on 
average, 650 congressional candidates made by forty-two 
corporate PACs during two separate election cycles which 
span the Carter and Reagan administrations. The second 
stage compares the frequency with which every pair of 
corporate PACs (861 pairs) supported similar congressional 
candidates during each of the two studied election cycles. 
A measure which examines to whom, rather than how 
much, corporate PACs contribute is consistent with the 
research que~tion. If the extent of influence business 
exerts on election outcomes were the research question, then 
measuring the level of PAC contributions would be critical. 
Instead, this research is concerned with patterns of 
75 
activity that are indicative of similar political strategies 
pursued by large, disparate corporations. Therefore, the 
research design controls for the level of dollars expended 
to avoid spurious linkages among PACs. If, for example, two 
PACs contributed different amounts to the same campaign this 
design would count that event as a similarity: a design that 
does not control for dollar amounts could well count that 
same observation as a dissimilarity--a dissimilarity that 
would be spurious for purposes of this study, since similar 
strategy rather than the extent of political influence is 
the operative variable. In short, controlling for the level 
of expenditures ensures linking corporate PACs that support 
similar political agendas, yet differ in their PAC resource 
base (Neustadtl and Clawson 1988, 176).3 
Similarity Measure 
The input data are arranged into two symmetric, square 
matrices, one for each election cycle. Each matrix, with 
rows and columns for each of the forty-two corporate PACs, 
contains the similarity measure for the 861 corporate dyads. 
3The ARCa PAC recorded negligible contributions (under 
twenty-five dollars) to some unlikely democratic candidates 
given the overall pattern of contributions made by this 
sample. For example, only ARca contributed to Wendell Ford, 
John Glenn, and Edward Kennedy, and then in the amounts of 
six, five, and two dollars respectively. This suggests that 
such contributions are more indicative of nonsupport 
gestures rather than sincere support of certain 
congressional candidates. To control for this circumstance, 
all PAC contributions less than twenty-five dollars were 
eliminated. 
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For example, the first matrix column shows the similarity 
measure between corporation one and each of the succeeding 
forty-one corporations. Similarity is defined as the 
relative frequency with which two corporate PACs contributed 
to different congressional candidates. The complete 1977-78 
and 1981-'82 similarity matrices appear in Appendices Band 
C, respectively. 
Specifically, the similarity between corporate PACs i 
and j is defined as follows: 
S (i,j) = s(i,j) / square root of [n(i) * n(j)] 
where S(i,j) is the similarity measure, s(i,j) is the number 
of similar contributions, and n(i) and n(j) are the total 
number of contributions made by PACs i and j, respectively. 
Mathematically, the denominator of the formula controls for 
the number of contributions made by each PAC while the 
numerator provides a measure of behavioral similarity. This 
formula has been used in previous research which examined 
both political consensus and interlocking directorates 
(Mizruchi 1989; Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Mariolis 1975). 
Political Strategy 
The MDS solution generates dimensions, but the 
researcher must establish their meaning. Information 
regarding the ideological bent of PAC contribution patterns 
can facilitate this process. 
Researchers categorize a PAC's political strategy 
based upon its pr~clivity to support incumbents or 
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challengers (see, for example, Handler and Mulkern 1982, 15-
18i Matasar 1986, chapter 4i stern 1988, chapter 3). PACS 
that try to impart a conservative tilt to Congress by 
supporting conservative challengers ov~r liberal incumbents, 
even when faced with supporting a probable loser, are 
labeled ideoiogical. PACS that support incumbents, with 
slight r~gard for ideology, so as to protect their access to 
important congressional leaders and committees, are labeled 
pragmatic (also see definitions, pages 13-14). 
A useful classification system was developed by Burris 
(1987, 735). Three political partisanship measures are 
applied to each firm: the proportion of Congressional PAC 
contributions which supports (1) incumbents, (2) 
Republicans, and (3) New Right candidates. 
contributions to incumbents and Republicans are 
readily determined by examining Federal Election Commission 
documents, but determining contributions to New Right 
candidates requires the application of decision rules. 
Burris (1987, 735) associates this increasingly prominent 
candidate category with the extent of support received from 
New Right PACs. 
Five nonconnected PACs (defined on page 17) are 
labeled New Right based on their identifiable conservative 
political philosophy (Sabato 1984, 21-22), however only four 
of the these five were in existence during the 1977-78 
election cycle. These same New Right ~ACs were ranked in 
78 
the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) "Top 10 Nonconnected 
PACs" category for both election cycles in which they were 
active; and, with the exception of the Fund for a 
Conservative Majority during the 1977-78 election cycle, 
were also ranked in the FEC Top 10 List for all Pac 
Categories (U.S. Federal Election Commission 1979, 1983). A 
listing of these New Right PACs appears in Table IV. 
A ~ew Right candidate is defined as one who received 
contributions from at least three of the five large New 
Right PACs which were active during the 1981-82 election 
cycle, or at least three of the four New Right PACs which 
were active during the 1977-78 election cycle. Sixty-seven 
candidates supported by the sampled corporate PACs qualified 
as New Right during the 1977-78 election cycle; sixty-eight 
qualified as such during the 1981-82 election cycle. 
Burris (1987) contends that the three political 
partisanship measures, while interrelated, reveal different 
aspects of political strategy. The Republican support 
measure "provides a rough index of political conservatism or 
liberalism" (735). The incumbent support measure provides a 
rough index of pragmatism. He notes that the New Right 
measure, a rough index of ideological behavior, proved to be 
the most revealing: 
The New Right PACs, whose choices define these 
candidates, specifically seek to identify those races in 
which their money can have the greatest partisan impact 
--those races with a sharp ideological difference 
between the candidates and where additional funds can 
alter the outcome of a close contest. Corporations that 
contribute disproportionately to these same candidates 
can be assumed to be pursuing a similar political 
strategy, or, in some cases, to be directly following 
the example and advice of the New Right PACs (735). 
Resource Dependence 
New or revitalized government regulations ushered in 
during the politically turbulent 1960s and early 1970s 
resulted in a widely recognized distinction between the 
newer, multi-industry social regulations and the 
traditional, single-industry economic regulations. Social 
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regulation impacts managerial discretion and autonomy and is 
therefore frequently resented, even contested, by business. 
These regulations originate in agencies such as the 
occupational Safety and Health Administration or the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission which control production 
processes and product quality, respectively. 
Alternatively, economic regulation focuses on those 
restraints believed necessary to support capitalism and as 
such are often supported, even initiated, by business. 
These regulations originate in agencies such as the 
Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Communication 
Commission where competitive practices within one industry 
are controlled. 
These two categories' effects are' perceived quite 
differently. Generally, economic regulation is associated 
with industry stability since it protects existing 
competitors; whereas social regulation is associated with 
higher costs and reduced profits which can cut across many 
industries (Bateman and Zeithaml 1990, 257-259).4 
Research has suggested a correlat~on between an 
industry's dominant regulatory environment, social or 
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economic, and its prevailing political strategy, ideological 
or pragmatic (Handler and Mulkern 1982, 29-32; Burris 1987, 
736; Neustadtl and Clawson 1988, 183). That is, firms 
either less constrained by industry-specific regulations or 
more adversely affected by the costs associated with social 
regulations tend toward ideological political strategies 
with the intent of assembling a more business-friendly 
Congress; firms in traditionally regulated industries tend 
I 
toward more pragmatic political strategies so as to maintain 
access and the good will of influential incumbents. The 
aerospace and electronics industries, with substantial ties 
to the Pentagon, also tend toward pragmatic political 
strategies so as to enhance access to those legislators 
sitting on military weapons appropriations committees 
Therefore, the regulatory environment faced by each of 
the sample firms was categorized as either social or 
economic based on its industry category as defined by the 
Fortune index and that industry's dominant regulatory 
environment as defined by prior research. Actual corporate 
patterns, derived from the PAC contributions similarity 
measure, were then compared against those patterns which 
4see pages 14-16 for more complete definitions. 
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resource dependent behavior would predict. Table V 
summarizes the regulatory environment measure. 
Class Cohesion 
As discussed in chapter II, researchers in the power 
elite tradition have attempted to identify those sources of 
class cohesion by which members of the corporate elite can 
exercise control over the economy and society in general 
and, simultaneously, enable the mediation and resolution of 
the intercorporate conflicts which inevitably emerge. 
Examples of class cohesion factors which have been 
hypothesized and studied include kinship, similar 
backgrounds, social club membership, professional 
association memberships, geographic proximity, interlocking 
directorates, the inner group, and government ties. s 
This research hypothesizes a relationship between 
corporate political activity and four sources of class 
cohesion: interlocking directorates, membership in 
professional associations, shared education experience, and 
geographic proximity. These measures were selected based on 
the availability of reliable data and their application in 
recent research as variables associated with collaborative 
corporate political activity.6 
Ssee Mizruchi (1987) for a good review of this 
literature. 
6For example, membership in professional associations 
could be verified in the associations' annual reports or 
membership lists provided by the association. Social club 
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Interlocking directorates. Class theorists have 
identified interlocking directorates as one of several 
mechanisms which foster elite unity (Mizruchi and Koenig 
'h' 7 1986; Mlzruc 1 1989). While a measure of direct 
interlocks is straightforward--a count of firms with which 
the focal firm is directly linked through common board 
membership--the measure of indirect interlocks is more 
complex, since by definition, indirect interlocks (see page 
16) require an intermediate organization to link a firm 
dyad. 
Researchers have dealt with this methodological 
problem a number of ways. Some have used lists of large 
commercial banks and life insurance companies as the 
indirect link between firm dyads due to the repeated 
findings of financial institutions' centrality in networks 
of interlocking directorates (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; 
Mizruchi .1989). Others do not distinguish between direct 
membership is generally collected through numerous 
biographical references (the Marquis' Who's Who series, 
Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and 
Executives, Dun & Bradstreet's Reference Book of Corporate 
Management); however, these data are self-reported, 
frequently incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Whereas 
some CEOs list all past and present memberships in clubs, 
associations, boards, etc., others provide only their title 
and corporate address. 
7It should be noted that resource dependence theorists 
have posited that interlocking directorates are one method 
by which managements attempt to reduce environmental 
uncertainty (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Useem 1983, 41). 
Unlike class cohesion theory, however, resource dependence 
theory does not associate the interlocking directorate 
measure with corporate political activity. 
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and indirect interlocks but rather define interlocks as the 
number of shared board memberships the focal firm has with 
some cross-section of large nonfinancial and financial firms 
(Neustadtl and Clawson 1988; Burris 19~7). still others 
argue that indirect interlocks have little relevance for 
studies of intercorporate relations since the communicative 
benefits of direct interlocks overshadow the benefits of 
, 
indirect interlocks and, further, since other forms of 
indirect access exit between firm dyads (Pennings 1980, 38). 
The united states Senate (U.S. Congress, Senate 1980) 
study, structure of Corporate Concentration, in examining 
one hundred companies which were "among the very largest in 
the nation, and indeed, in the world" (2), took yet another 
approach to counting interlocking directorates. It 
calculated both direct and indirect interlocks, the latter 
by counting all links between the 4,950 company dyads which 
were routed through intermediate firms. In describing this 
extensive study, the report noted that: 
Interlocking [direct and indirect] directorates 
provide a special opportunity for intercompany 
communication and consensus. The linkages at the board 
room table are personal connections by which key 
information can be made and policies formed (5). 
Since this thesis deals specifically with questions of 
"intercompany communication and consensus," it incorporated 
the United states Senate study's method of counting direct 
and indirect interlocks. The sample of forty-two firms is a 
subset of the one hundred firms in the U.S. Senate study 
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(the sampling strategy is described in detail beginning on 
page 88), therefore the Senate study's data were recounted 
to reflect the direct and indirect interlocks between these 
861 firm dyads. 
A final note: The 1980 United States Senate study 
time frame does not match, but is straddled by the two time 
frames of the present study, 1977 to 1978 and 1981 to 1982. 
Research by Mariolis and Jones (1982) indicates that 
corporate interlock measures over a four-year period are 
highly reliable and stable (stability and reliability 
coefficients ranged from .929 to .997 for all corporations). 
Therefore, the 1980 interlock data is reasonable to use. 
Major business associations. Numerous scholars have 
studied the central role which major business associations 
play in providing a forum to discuss, debate, and ultimately 
establish the corporate elite's position on selected public 
policy issues (Domhoff 1970; Useem 1980, 1984; Mizruchi 
1987). These associations, unlike trade associations, 
involve a regionally diverse set of business firms which cut 
across a variety of industrial sectors. The commonality 
among these associations is the credentials of their pOlicy-
setting members--only top-level executives from the nation's 
largest corporations are invited to join. Some restrict 
membership to CEOs and Board Chairmen. 
Useem (1984) identifies five such associations as the 
most powerful and influential in expressing the American 
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business viewpoint to the highest levels of government and 
the media. These include: the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the undisputed corporate voice on foreign policy 
issues; the Conference Board, which conducts research and 
publishes studies on business economics and managerial 
practices; the Committee for Economic Development, whose 
"trustees meet with distinguished academic and business 
experts to develop statements on national policy" (Committee 
for Economic Development 1978); the Business Council, which 
works most closely with the Department of Commerce and 
"hopes to generate greater understanding of major public 
. 
policy issues and to help create the consensus for 
solutions" (Business Council 1990): and, the Business 
Roundtable, generally considered to be the most politically 
powerful business association (Useem 1984), which 
"examine[s) public issues that affect the economy and 
develop[s) positions which seek to reflect sound economic 
and social principles" (Business Roundtable 1990). 
Table VI lists these five business associations and 
the member status which was applied in determining a firm's 
involvement in the organization's policy-setting coterie. 
Thus, this measure of class cohesion is calculated as the 
number of major business associations to which each sampled 
firm belongs. A zero count indicates no representation in 
these five business associations: a five count indicates 
representation in all of the five major business 
associations. 
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Education. Scholars examining the corporate elite 
have identified common schooling at prestigious universities 
as a source of class cohesion (Pierson 1969, 120-122; 
Domhoff 1970, 1974; Useem and Miller 1975, 142). 
Consequently, the number of associations between senior 
executives and selected universities was counted. The 
educational background of all chairmen and presidents from 
the sample firms was collected and compared to the 
university list which appears in Table VII. 
Headquarters location. A reasonable hypothesis is 
that geographic proximity of headquarters and plant 
locations should be associated with similar political 
behavior, since the horne state senatorial or local 
congressional district races should be of particular 
interest to PAC contributors. Alternatively, one could 
argue from two perspectives that geography will play a minor 
role, if any, in the candidate selection process. The 
pragmatic perspective would stress the access and influence 
motives; that is, some corporate PACs are seeking access to 
powerful Congressional leaders and committee members and, 
therefore, favor incumbents regardless of the candidate's 
home state or district. The ideological perspective would 
maintain that some corporate PACs will tend to support 
conservative challengers and open seat candidates in close 
races, again, regardless of where that race is being run. 
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Two studies examined headquarters locations as 
predictors of similar political behavior. One found "no 
relation between having a headquarters ln the same city, 
state, or region and similarity of contributions" (Mizruchi 
and Koenig 1986, 486), while a later study found state 
headquarters location to be a strong predictor of similar 
political behavior yet found no relationship between plant 
locations and contribution patterns (Mizruchi 1989, 412). 
In the latter study, the strong correlation between 
headquarters located in the same state and similar political 
behavior (similarity measured by corporate PAC 
contribu~ions) was at least partially explained by the 
social interaction patterns of top executives who generally 
live near their offices, a class cohesion argument. This 
argument was strengthened by the lack of association found 
between candidates supported and plant locations. 
since headquarters location has been examined in 
previous research which studied the similarity of corporate 
political behavior, it is included in this thesis as a 
variable associated with PAC contribution patterns. Each 
firm's headquarters location was dummy coded by state. 
states which were represented by only one firm were 
classified in an "Other" category. New York and Connecticut 
were combined into one state category since the state 
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boundary line, in this instance, was considered 
inappropriate when social interaction patterns are the 
focus. Table VIII displays the headquarters' location for 
this sample, and the number of firms headquartered in each 
state. 
THE SAMPLING STRATEGY 
The sample for this study is qomprised of forty-two of 
the largest United States corporations, drawn from fourteen 
diverse industrial and nonindustrial sectors, and 
headquartered in eleven different states which span the 
country. Their 1981 Fortune rankings ranged from one to 
8 seventy-seven. The following section details the 
population of interest and the sample selection criteria. 
The composition of the sample appears in Table IX. 
Population 
The population of interest is defined as the one 
hundred corporations selected for the united States Senate 
(u.S. Congress, Senate 1980) study on interlocking 
directorates. That group is described as follows: 
One hundred leading companies have been selected for 
the study, covering the areas of banking, insurance, 
utilities, transportation, retailing, and industrials. 
Their assets total over 20 percent of the assets of all 
8Since Fortune bases its ranking on data from 
preceding years, the 1981 rank was used so that it was more 
comparable to the 1980 United States Senate study's data; 
also, industrials are ranked by sales while nonindustrials 
are ranked by assets. 
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u.s. corporations. Because of the size and power of 
their operations, they have contributed substantially to 
the nation's economy and the standard of living of its 
citizens. • • It is the purpose of this study to set 
forth the organizational data by which corporate 
concentration in American business can be understood and 
evaluated (U.S. Congress, Senate 1980, 1-2). 
A population comprised of large, diverse corporations 
was required for the following reasons: 
1. Large corporations are more likely to form PACs, 
this study's measure for corporate political activity. 
During the 1977-78 election cycle, forty percent of the 
Fortune five hundred industrials had formed PACs compared to 
just eight percent of the second five hundred largest 
industrial firms (Matasar 1986, 27). 
2. The measured variables associated with class 
cohesion theory dictate that the population of interest be 
major corporations. Board members of major corporations are 
more likely to hold multiple directorships and to be invited 
to parti~ipate in major business associations. 
3. The measured variable associated with resource 
dependence theory, regulatory environment, requires that 
sample firms be classified based on their dominant 
regulatory environment, social or economic. The diversity 
of the populations permits a representative sample in both 
categories. 
While other populations would satisfy the "large, 
diverse" criterion, the 1980 United states Senate study's 
population was preferable for two reasons: (1) It includes 
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data on indirect interlocks, with all intermediate 
companies, rather than interlocks based on a cross-sample of 
firms, and (2) its 1980 time frame is compatible with the 
present research design. 
Sample criterion: PAC 
Activity 
The overriding criterion for inclusion in the research 
sample is the existence of an active PAC during both 
election cycles since PAC contributions are the measured 
variable for corporate political activity. Fifty of the one 
hundred firms from the population had active PACs dating 
back to the 1977-78 cycle. 9 
Sample Criterion: Industry 
Dispersion 
Previous research suggests that firms in an industry 
sector will exhibit similar political behavior (Neustadtl 
and Clawson 1988, 173). This research design purposely 
diffuses the extraneous (to this study) effect of industry 
category by incorporating fourteen diverse industrial and 
nonindustrial sectors. 
Given the previously described PAC activity criterion, 
a sample composed of one to four firms ·in each industrial 
sector resulted. The nonindustrial sectors of banking and 
transportation, however, were disproportionately weighted 
9By the 1989-90 election cycle, ninety-three of the 
one hundred firms had PACs. 
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with twelve and six firms respectively. In order to 
maintain a more evenly dispersed sample, the four largest 
transportation service firms (two air carriers and two rail) 
were selected based on Fortune 1981 rankings. Six banks 
(three from the East, one from the Midwest, and two from the 
west) were selected to permit a more geographically 
dispersed representation of the banking industry since it 
plays a prominent role in studies of both resource 
dependence and class cohesion theories. 
Two Election Cycles 
Two election cycles, 1977-78 and 1981-82, are 
purposively selected for analysis to satisfy four 
considerations. 
First, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which 
directly fueled the corporate PAC growth explosion of the 
1970s, was passed in 1971 with subsequent amendments in 1974 
and 1976. The FECA was amended again in 1979, but with no 
direct effect on corporate PACs (Sabato 1984, 7-10). These 
rulings would suggest that a comparative study of corporate 
PAC beha¥ior should not incorporate pre-1976 eras. 
Second, these cycles are compatible with the time 
frame of a comprepensive United states Senate (U.S. 
congress, Senate 1980) study, Structure of Corporate 
concentration, data from which are used to measure 
interlocking directorates. 
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Third, these cycles are comparable in that they each 
monitor the financial activity for midterm elections during 
the first (and, for Carter, the last) term of two 
administrations. 
Finally, these cycles provided an analytically useful 
contrast in two politically and philosophically distinct 
eras of business-government relations. The question as to 
whether changes in political behavior is a corporate 
reaction to perceived changes in the regulatory 
macroenvironment thus can be addressed. 10 
ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY 
This study employs multidimensional scaling to 
systematize the corporate political activity similarity 
measures of the sampled firms. The MDS output is then used 
to (1) test resource dependence and class cohesion theory-
related hypotheses and (2) explore the revealed structure of 
intercorporate relationships so that new propositions can be 
formulated. 
The following describes the fundamentals of 
multidimensional scaling, how it is applied in this 
10While it was not the intent of this research to 
answer the question as to whether the Reagan era was one of 
deregulation, it is generally accepted among analysts that 
the Reagan administration was more "friendly" toward 
business than was Carter's. 
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research, and how its output is used to test hypotheses and 
to conduct an exploratory analysis. 
Multidimensional Scaling 
--the Fundamentals 
Forrest Young (1987), author of numerous MDS books, 
articles, and software, says it best: "Multidimensional 
scaling (MDS) rests on the premise that a picture is worth a 
thousand numbers" (3). This "picture," or the MDS map as it 
is more commonly known, is the distinctive characteristic of 
the various MDS procedures which have been developed to 
satisfy specialized research needs. 
The map is a graphed configuration of points, derived 
from proximity data, which displays spatial relationships 
among objects or stimuli. These observed relationships can 
be subjected to hypothesis testing; but MDS's real strength 
lies in ~ts ability to reveal to the researcher insights 
about a sample's structure of relationships which would 
otherwise be obscured by a mass of data. structure in this 
research is revealed by the configuration of points on the 
MDS-derived map which reflects the similarity of corporate 
political activity among the sampled firms. 
The following gives a brief explanation of how MDS 
works in this study. In so doing, it draws extensively from 
the excellent introductory MDS text authored by Schiffman, 
Reynolds and Young (1981, chapter 1). MDS terminology will 
be introduced as the explanation unfolds. (Other books 
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referenced include Kruskal and wish 1978; Young 1987; SPSS 
. 
Inc. 1988). 
MDS input. The input for an MDS analysis is 
proximities--numbers which indicate how similar or 
dissimilar two objects are. These proximities are collected 
in a data matrix which contains all combinations of dyads 
for a given sample of objects or stimuli. 11 This research 
has forty-two objects, that is, forty-two sampled firms. 
The proximity (or similarity) measure quantifies the 
similarity of corporate PAC contributions for all 
combinations of the forty-two firm dyads--861 
b · t' 12 com lna 10ns. Finally, since the similarity of corporate 
PAC contributions vary from one election to the next, two 
separate data matrices are entered, one for each of the 
studied time frames. 
Measurement level. MDS can perform either metric or 
nonmetric scaling. Metric scaling, which assumes that the 
measurement level of the input data is interval or ratio, 
attempts to model the precise similarities to the distances 
between points on the map. Nonmetric scaling, which assumes 
a nominal or ordinal level of input, attempts to model the 
rank order of. to the distances. Consistent with 
1'Objects are concrete things or events, for example, 
a firm; stimuli are perceptions of objects, for example, an 
individual's ranking of firms along some attribute. 
12see pages 75-76 for a description of the similarity 
measure. 
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measurement properties, the interval or ratio levels can be 
subjected to nonmetric scaling, but the nominal or ordinal 
levels cannot be subjected to metric scaling. 
The similarity measures calculated for the input data 
matrix are at the ratio level; however, nonmetric scaling is 
used for the following theoretical and methodological 
reasons: 
1. The measurement precision associated with metric 
scaling is unwarranted. An objective of this research is to 
examine intercorporate structure based on patterns of 
relationships between and among firms, not their exact 
relationships. Consequently, the nonmetric procedure can be 
a more realistic assumption about the underlying processes 
(Loehlin 1987, 198). 
2. Nonmetric scaling is a better determiner of the 
MDS solution's dimensionality. This is because metric 
scaling can produce misleading error measures owing to its 
greater precision requirements (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 76). 
3. Schiffman, Reynolds and Young (1981) recommend the 
use of nonmetric scaling noting that the "metric-nonmetric 
distinction rarely makes a crucial difference in the outcome 
of the analysis" (74). In a later chapter which describes 
the ALSCAL procedure (the MDS computer program used in this 
analysis), these same authors remark: "Analysis at the 
ratio le~el is not recommended" (171). 
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4. Finally, F. W. Young (1981), a noted MDS 
practitioner and author of the MDS ALSCAL procedure, 
, 
maintains that users of MDS algorithms enjoy great 
flexibility in assumptions regarding the measurement 
characteristics of their data (361). 
MDS/ALSCAL procedure. The ALSCAL procedure, one of 
several MDS computer programs, attempts to fit the 
similarity measures to a derived map such that the distances 
between points on the map (points representing the forty-two 
firms in this research) are in the same rank order as the 
similarity measures used as input. 
Conceptually, the best fit is a result of numerous 
iterations in which the MDS procedure moves the map's points 
to fit the input similarity measures. Each iteration 
produces a possible configuration of points and an error 
measure, SSTRESS. SSTRESS compares the distances between a 
configuration's points and the distances between similarity 
measures of the sampled firms. with each additional 
iteration, SSTRESS generally decreases until there is a very 
small change which halts the procedure. If the final map is 
judged by the researcher as a reasonably good model of the 
input data, based on a low SSTRESS level and a high fit 
measure, RSQ; then interpretation of the map's dimensions 
13 
and other statistical analysis can ensue. 
13RSQ : proportion of variance of the input data (or 
its monotonic transformation referred to as disparities when 
nonmetric scaling is used) accounted for by the MDS model. 
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MDS output/analysis. Interpretation is the stage of 
the analysis where the previous knowledge, judgement, skill, 
and insights of the researcher dominate. It is also the 
stage where theoretical breakthroughs can occur. 
Analysis of an MDS solution set begins with an 
interpretation of the map's dimensions. Dimensions are 
simply the coordinate axes of the derived map; therefore, a 
two dimensional map will be depicted by two perpendicular 
axes. A strength of MDS is that it produces a map with the 
fewest possible dimensions to explain observed similarities. 
In this research, each dimension of the MDS map 
represents a possible explanation for the underlying unity 
or disunity of firms' corporate political activity as 
depicted by the intercorporate structure. Examples of 
possible dimensions that might signal structural divisions 
include geography, industry sector, regulatory environment, 
or communication networks. 
Research employing MDS methodology frequently 
cUlminates with this interpretive, exploratory analysis; 
however, MDS' confirmatory use is increasingly appearing in 
the literature (see Young 1987, chapters 11 and 12). This 
research applies MDS in.a confirmatory sense by testing the 
research hypotheses against the intercorporate structure 
revealed by the MDS map. The following section further 
elaborates on this process. 
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HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The previous section demonstrated how the MDS solution 
lends itself to a visual interpretatio~ of structural 
relationships. This same solution can also be compared to 
theoretical expectations through the application of 
multivar~ate statistical techniques which permit hypothesis 
testing--an objective of this research. 
The following explains the statistical techniques 
which are applied to the MDS results so that the research 
hypotheses can be tested. previously, the hypotheses had 
been stated in substantive language, that is, in terms of 
the expected relation between two or more variables (see 
page 67). This section restates the hypotheses in the form 
which permits scientific testing, that is the null form 
(Kerlinger 1973, 201-203). 
Resource Dependence 
Null Hypothesis 
HO,: There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS Coordinates and its regulatory environment 
classification. 
Alternatively, if there is a significant relationship 
between a firm's regulatory environment and its MDS 
coordinates, then there is evidence for a pattern of 
corporations' exhibiting similar political activity owing to 
regulatory constraints. 
Class Cohesion Null 
Hypotheses 
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H02 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates .and its number of direct or indirect 
interlocks with the set of sampled firms. 
H03 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of associations with 
major business policy groups. 
H04': There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and a shared educational experience 
among Chairmen and CEOs. 
HOS : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its headquarters' location. 
Alternatively, if there is a significant relationship 
between interlocking directorates, memberships, educational 
experience and/or geographic proximity and a firm's MDS 
coordinates, then there is evidence for a pattern of 
corporations' exhibiting similar political activity owing to 
class cohesion networks. 
statistical tests. The null hypotheses are tested 
with multiple regression models. A separate regression 
equation tests each resource dependence and class cohesion 
variable--the dependent variables; the firms' coordinates on 
the dimensions of the MDS map represent the independent 
variables. 
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Each regression equation is first tested for its 
overall significance (F test). If significant, then the 
regression coefficients are examined to determine the 
significance of the MDS solution's dimensions (Student t 
tests). Additional insights are derived from examining the 
zero-order correlations. 
The Political Strateqy 
Null Hypothesis 
H06 : There is no significant change between patterns 
of corporate political spending exhibited during the 1977-78 
I 
election cycle and the 1981-82 election cycle. 
Alternatively, contribution patterns which vary 
significantly provide evidence to support the contention 
that changing business-government relations environments 
will influence PAC strategy. 
A paired difference comparison of contributions to 
three candidate categories (incumbents, Republicans, New 
Right) exhibited during each cycle and a canonical 
correlation between the two sets of contribution patterns 
test null hypothesis six. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter III introduced the research question and 
hypotheses, the data analysis methodology, and the 
statistics employed to test hypothesized relationships. It 
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is hoped that the reader is now prepared for, even curious 
about, what follows. 
The remaining chapters present the analytical results, 
discuss the implications of this research including its 
strengths and weaknesses, point out some managerial 
implications, and suggest future research directions. 
Variable 
Corporate political 
activity 
Resource dependence 
Class cohesion 
TABLE III 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
Measurement 
Similarity scores 
Regulatory environment 
Direct interlocks 
Indirect interlocks 
Memberships 
Education 
Headquarters location 
Level of 
Measurement 
Continuous 
Categorical 
Continuous 
Continuous 
Continuous 
Categorical 
Categorical 
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TABLE IV 
NEW RIGHT PACS 
Citizens for the Republic 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
National Conservative Political Action Committee 
Fund for a Conservative Majority 
National Congressional Club-
flot active during the 1977-78 Election Cycle 
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Regulatory 
Environment 
Classifications 
Social 
Economic/Defense 
TABLE V 
CLASSIFICATIONS AND PREDICTIONS BASED ON 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
Predicted 
Poli tical 
Strategies 
Ideological 
Pragmatic 
Industry 
Groupings· 
Chemicals 
Tobacco 
Metal manufacturing 
Industrial/farm equipment 
Motor vehicles 
Retailing 
Banking 
Insurance 
Diversified financials 
Transportation services 
Utilities 
Electronics 
Aerospace 
~ee Neustadtl and Clawson 1988, 183; Burris 1987, 736; Handler and 
Mulkern 1982, 29-32 for similar industry groupings. 
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TABLE VI 
FIVE MAJOR BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND PARTICIPANTS' STATUS 
Business Roundtable (members) 
Business Council (members) 
Committee for Economic Development (trustees) 
Conference Board (trustees and officers) 
Council on Foreign Relations (trustees and officers) 
Source: Useem 1984, 73 
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Harvard 
Yale 
Princeton 
Columbia 
Cornell 
MIT 
TABLE VII 
TVELVE PROMINENT UNIVERSITIES 
Stanford 
University of California, Berkeley 
University of Illinois 
University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Visconsin 
Note: These twelve prominent schools were identified by Useem (1975, 
142), based on Pierson's work (1969, 120-122) which examined schools 
most often attended by top executives of the largest corporations and 
financial institutions. 
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TABLE VIII 
FREQUENCY OF HEADQUARTERS LOCATION BY STATE 
State Number of Firms 
NY-Connecticut 16 
California 6 
Pennsylvania 5 
Illinois 4 
Michigan 4 
Ohio 3 
Minnesota 1 
Missouri 1 
North Carolina 1 
Texas 1 
N = 42 
1QL 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
TABLE IX 
COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE 
Firm 
ALCOA 
American Electric Power 
American Express 
Arco 
Bethlehem. Steel 
Chrysler 
Citicorp 
Consolidated Edison 
Dow . 
Federated Department Store 
First Chicago 
Ford 
GE 
GM 
GTE 
Goodyear 
Honeywell 
International Harvester 
K Mart 
Lockheed 
LTV 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Mellon 
Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Monsanto 
Pan American 
Penney 
Philip Morris 
RJR 
Rockwell 
Sears 
Securi ty Pacific 
Southern Pacific 
Texaco 
TWA 
Union Carbide 
Union Pacific 
United Air Lines 
USX 
United Technologies 
Wells Fargo 
Westinghouse 
Industry 
Metals Manufacturing 
Utili ty 
Diversified Financials 
Petroleum Refinery 
Metals Manufacturing 
Motor Vehicles 
Banking 
Utili ty 
Chemicals 
Retailing 
Banking 
Motor Vehicles 
Electronics 
Motor Vehicles 
Utili ty 
Rubber 
Electronics 
Farm Equipment 
Retailing 
Aerospace 
Metals Manufacturing 
Banking 
Banking 
Insurance 
Chemicals 
Transportation 
Retailing 
Tobacco 
Tobacco 
Aerospace 
Retailing 
Banking 
Transportation 
Petroleum Re'finery 
Transportation 
Chemicals 
Transportation 
Transportation 
Metals Manufacturing 
Aerospace 
Banking 
Electronics 
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Headquarters 
Location 
PA 
OH 
NY 
CA 
PA 
MI 
NY 
NY 
MI 
OH 
IL 
MI 
CT 
MI 
CT 
OH 
MN 
IL 
MI 
CA 
TX 
NY 
PA 
NY 
MO 
NY 
NY 
NY 
NC 
CA 
IL 
CA 
CA 
NY 
NY 
NY 
NY 
IL 
PA 
CT 
CA 
PA 
CHAPTER IV 
THE 1977-78 ELECTION CYCLE 
Chapter IV presents the results of the 
multidimensional scaling performed on the 1977-78 PAC 
contribution data and the results of testing hypotheses one 
through five. The 1981-82 election cycle results are 
presented in chapter V. Hypothesis six, which compares the 
two election cycles, is discussed in chapter VI. 
INTRODUCTION 
Various mathematical and statistical techniques are 
employed to determine if either resource dependence or class 
cohesion theory can explain patterns of corporate political 
activity as exemplified by the 1977-78 PAC contributions. 
The analysis begins with a nonmetric multidimensional 
scaling of the contribution similarity data. This scaling 
results in configurations, or MDS spaces, which display 
intercorporate structural patterns. These patterns are then 
interpreted by fitting the hypothesized resource dependence 
and class cohesion variables to them. The goodness of fit 
is measured by multiple regression, canonical correlation, 
and chi-square analysis. 
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A Matter of Terminology 
MDS procedures are indifferent between similarity and 
dissimilarity measures, but one term, proximity, designates 
either (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 7). Henceforward, proximity 
replaces both similarity and dissimilarity, except when the 
latter two are used to communicate specific meanings. 
THE NATURE OF THE PROXIMITY DATA 
The distribution of the 1977-78 proximity measures was 
first examined. Table X and Figure 2 display the 
descriptive statistics and frequency distribution histogram 
associated with the proximity data set. 1 The observed 
proximity scores, measured at the ordinal level, ranged from 
2 
.000 to .594 with a median of .199. It should also be 
noted that the distribution exhibits a rather low variance. 
The scores cluster rather tightly around the median; 
approximately thirty-three percent of the range lies between 
quartiles one and three, compared with forty-eight percent 
above the third quartile. 
Extremes 
Extremes in similarity scores were then considered. 
Thirty, or approximately 3.5 percent of the 861 firm dyads, 
1The complete 1977-78 proximity matrix appears in 
Appendix B. 
2See chapter III, pages 93-95, for a discussion on the 
ordinal level of measurement as it applies to the proximity 
data. 
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scored a zero similarity; these extreme scores are presented 
in Table XI. Mellon Bank, which scored a zero in ten 
instances, most frequently exhibits no similarity with other 
firms in terms of candidates supported. 
High similarity scores, defined as exceeding .50, are 
displayed in Table XII. Seventeen, or approximately two 
percent of the 861 firm dyads, exhibited similarity scores 
greater than .50. The General Motors and United 
Technologies dyad, with a similarity score of .594, 
exhibited the maximum consensus in candidates supported. 
Not surprisingly, high similarity scores often characterized 
pairs of firms from the same industry (eight pairs or forty-
seven percent share a common Fortune-defined industry 
grouping whereas just two of the thirty zero-scoring pairs 
share a common industry grouping). 
DETERMINING DIMENSIONALITY 
This section delineates the parameters of the 
multidimensiGnal scaling program and then describes the 
guidelines used to determine the preferred dimensionality 
(the latter draws largely from Kruskal and Wish 1978, 
chapter 3). 
Parameters 
The proximity data were analyzed using the ALSCAL 
procedure available in the SPSS-X package (SPSS Inc. 1988, 
338-364). The following parameters were designated for the 
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ALSCAL program: Scaling model was specified as the 
Euclidean distance model; the measurement level was 
specified as ordinal; measurement process was specified as 
continuous; the number of dimensions was set at one, two, 
three, four, and five; the convergence criterion was set at 
.00001; and the iteration criterion was set at one hundred. 
Dimensionality 
Dimensionality determination began with an examination 
of the five dimensions resulting from a series of unweighted 
classical Euclidean multidimensional scalings. Fit indices 
from each of the five solutions were then compared. 
A model with n dimensions is preferred if the fit of 
the data is only marginally improved at n + 1 dimensions, 
however making this marginality judgment and taking into 
account various complicating factors involve both objective 
and subjective concerns. 
The ALSCAL procedure reports three fit indices: RSQ, 
STRESS, and SSTRESS. These fit measures for the five 
scalings are presented in Table XIII. 
The RSQ measure is the squared multiple correlation 
between the Euclidean distances (distances between the 
points in the MDS space) and the disparities (monotonically 
transformed proximity input data). It is interpreted as the 
proportion of variance of the disparities that can be 
accounted for by the MDS solution. As with any squared 
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correlation measures, RSQ can vary from zero to one, i.e., 
from no f.it to perfect fit. 
STRESS and SSTRESS, goodness-of-fit measures which can 
vary from zero to one, measure unexplained variance, 
therefore lower values indicate better fit. Both STRESS and 
SSTRESS are the square roots of a normalized residual sum of 
squares. STRESS is defined on the Euclidean distance and 
the disparities: SSTRESS is defined on the squared Euclidean 
distances and the squared disparities (Kruskal and wish 
1978, 49: Easterling 1987, 232). 
One way to determine dimensionality is to plot the RSQ 
and STRESS fit indices against the number of dimensions. An 
elbow in the plot, indicative of a sudden rise in RSQ or 
fall in STRESS, signifies that additional dimensions will 
not substantively improve the fit of the model. 
Plots for the 1977-78 proximity data's RSQ and STRESS 
measures appear in Figure 3. While these plots do not 
exhibit the sharp elbow which can denote the preferred 
solution, an examination of the fit indices in Table XIII 
along with the associated graph of Figure 3 provides support 
for a three-dimensional solution. STRESS and RSQ improve by 
.07 as dimensions increase from two to three. The marginal 
improvement is less, approximately .04, as dimensions 
increase·from three to four. While this evidence is less 
than definitive, it provides a starting point. 
The subjective determiners of interpretability and 
ease of use were applied to the 1977-78 scaled solution 
(Kruskal and Wish 1978, 56). Increasing dimensionality 
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should always improve goodness of fit measures. If all 
dimensions are not interpretable, however, then a 
configuration with fewer, but interpretable, dimensions 
should be used. Further, a solution composed of too many 
dimensions adapts to random error in the data, thereby 
invalidating analysis (Kruskal and wish 1978, 57). 
Ease of use and interpretability are somewhat 
complementary considerations. Higher-dimensional 
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configurations can confound comprehension of the MDS space, 
thereby weakening MDS as a data reduction technique. Also, 
the interpretive aspect of the higher-dimensional space may 
duplicate revelations in lower dimensionality. Complex 
configurations should be avoided unless the additional 
dimensions reveal previously obscured relationships. 
While a four-dimensional solution could be supported 
based on the previously discussed determiners, the fourth 
dimension was not interpretable. A statistical and visual 
examination of the fourth dimension did not display any 
recognizable intercorporate pattern. 
Based on the objective determiners of dimensionality 
(the fit indices; correlations between MDS solutions and 
interpretive variables) and the subjective considerations 
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(interpretability; ease of use) a three-dimensional solution 
is selected for further analysis. 
The Final Test 
Given the selection of a three-dimensional solution, 
its corresponding ALSCAL output was further examined to 
ensure that the model is suitable for analysis. Two pieces 
of evidence support its suitability. 
First, the iteration history for the three-dimensional 
solution indicates that the minimum SSTRESS improvement 
level was reached at iteration twenty-three, yet the ALSCAL 
parameter allowed for one hundred iterations (see Table 
XIV). Further, the convergence level parameter was set at a 
high precision level of .00001. This suggests that a true 
or global minimum convergence level was reported rather than 
1 .. 3 a loca m1n1mum. 
Second, the three-dimensional solution's scatter plot 
of the computed distances in the MDS space and the actual 
observations (proximity values) was examined. A central 
3As previously noted, ALSCAL is an iterative algorithm 
which halts the procedure and reports results when 
improvement in SSTRESS reaches some minimum or when a 
maximum number of iterations is exceeded (Young and Lewyckyj 
1979, 45). The SPSS-X default values are a maximum of 
thirty iterations and a minimum SSTRESS improvement 
criterion of .001. Increasing the maximum number of 
iterations and the minimum SSTRESS conyergence value can 
help ensure, first, that a global--as opposed to a local--
minimum goodness of fit value is obtained and, second, that 
convergence is complete. These parameters were set to an 
iteration value of one hundred and a convergence of .00001. 
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premise of multidimensional scaling is that the distances 
between points on the MDS map should correspond to the input 
proximities (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 19). Inspection of the 
scatter diag~am presented in Figure 4 reveals that this 
relationship exists. Since the input data are similarities, 
then the 'computed distances between the map coordinates 
(horizontal axis in Figure 4) should diminish as the degree 
of similarity between firm dyads (vertical axis) 
increases. 4 While Figure 4 reveals a rather large amount 
of scatter, a decreasing function satisfies the relationship 
requirements since nonmetric MDS rank orders proximities 
(Kruskal and Wish 1978, 22). 
Given the preceding evidence and rationale, the three-
dimensional solution is selected for hypothesis testing and 
exploratory analysis. The MDS configurations for the three-
dimensional solution appear in Figures 5, 6, and 7. 
4Distances are calculated by the Pythagorean formula: 
the distance between points i and j in R-dimensional space 
is equal to 
2 2 d ij = square root of [(Xi' - Xj1) + • • • + (X iR - X jR ) ] 
where Xi' equals the point corresponding to the i th firm on 
the first map dimension or axis (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 17). 
Degree of similarity between firms is calculated by 
the similari~y measure presented on page 76. 
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DIMENSION INTERPRETATION AND LABELING 
Interpreting the three dimensions leads rather 
naturally to labeling them and, in the process, makes 
discussing them easier than if each was known only by a 
number. Dimension one reflects the sample firms' regulatory 
environment, social versus economic, and is labeled 
regulatory. Dimension two reflects the sample firms' 
geographic dispersion and, thus, is labeled regional. 
dimension three reflects PAC strategy, pragmatic versus 
ideological, and is labeled strategy. 
Dimension One: Regulatory 
Dimension 
The relationship between regulatory environment and 
similar political activity emerges from an examination of 
the group space in Figure 5. Firms subject to economic 
regulation tend to dominate the negative end of the 
dimension one horizontal axis while those subject to social 
regulation dominate the positive end. 
Further, since the interpretation of MDS is based on 
the distances between points, the median position of a 
coordinate axis can be shifted so long as the orthogonality 
between axes is maintained (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 34). 
Shifting the dimension one median to coordinate .103 permits 
maximal discrimination between the two categories of 
. t 5 regulatory enVlronmen . 
The MOS space in Figure 5 reveals some interesting 
anomalies. It is particularly useful to identify those 
firms in which the hypothesized and observed MOS solution 
differ. Eight firms that are preclassified as subject to 
economic regulation (see Table XXV) are classified as 
subject to social regulation by MOS. 
Four of these eight are in the transportation 
industry: United Air, TWA, Union Pacific, and Southern 
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Pacific. This concentration is especially noteworthy since 
there are just five transportation firms in the entire 
sample. Further, the correctly classified transportation 
firm, Pan American, is positioned at -.1749, close to the 
median of -.103. 
One plausible explanation for the differing 
classifications is regulatory reform. Transportation 
deregulation was initiated by the Carter administration and 
resulted in the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, the 1980 
Motor Carrier Reform Act (directed at the trucking 
industry), and the 1980 Staggers Railroad Act (Schnitzer 
1990, chapter 14).6 
SThis regulatory environment relationship is analyzed 
with chi-square and regression in a later section which 
tests the resource dependence hypothesis. 
6While the rail and trucking acts were not passed 
until 1980, preliminary deliberations establish their 
relevance for the 1977-78 time frame. 
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This legislation phased out the civil Aeronautics 
Board, the regulatory commission which determined fares, 
rates, schedules, and routes, thus ending a forty-year era. 
Similarly, the Motor Carrier and the Staggers Rail Acts of 
1980 removed rate-setting restrictions and other constraints 
which impeded free market competition within the trucking 
and rail industries. An industry which heretofore had been 
governed day-to-day by stable economic regulations found 
itself in transition facing a dynamic regulatory climate. 
The MDS space classified two aerospace firms and one 
electronics firm as subject to social rather than economic 
regulation and placed two others (one aerospace and one 
electronics) quite near the median. Honeywell, Rockwell, 
and united Technologies are squarely on the social side of 
the median while Lockheed and General Electric are barely on 
the economic side. These firms were categorized as subject 
to economic regulation because a high proportion of their 
sales is in defense. This intercorporate pattern suggests 
that defense contractors' regulatory environment is somewhat 
different than that of most firms that are subject to 
industry-specific regulations. One might even suspect that 
defense contractors operate in a third sort of regulatory 
environment--partly economic and partly social. 
Dimension one, the regulatory dimension, certainly 
supports the proposition that there is a systematic 
relationship between the proximity of PAC contributions and 
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a firm's regulatory environment. This dimension taken 
alone, however, does not reveal PAC strategies, the issue of 
dimension three. 
Dimension Three: strategy 
Dimension 
The strategy dimension appears to discriminate quite 
well between pragmatic and ideological PAC strategies. 
Table XV displays significant positive correlation between 
dimension th~ee coordinates and contributions to Republicans 
(r = .63; P < .0001) and New Right candidates ( r = .47; p < 
.0017); further, as expected, it is negatively related to 
contributions to incumbents (r = -.59; p < .0001). 
Regressing dimension three coordinates onto the same three 
candidate types accounts for forty-six percent of its 
variance (p < .0001). 
Pragmatic/Ideological classification. PAC strategy 
classifications are determined in accord with the following 
two-step process which employs aggregate statistics drawn 
from the 1977-78 Federal Election Commission reports: 
First, a firm is labeled ideological based on two 
criteria: (1) its proportion of total PAC dollars 
contributed to Republican candidates must exceed the 
proportion of total corporate PAC dollars (.63) contributed 
to Republicans by all corporate PACs during the 1977-78 
election cycle, and (2) its proportion of total PAC dollars 
contributed to incumbents must be less than the proportion 
of total corporate PAC dollars (.58) contributed to 
incumbents by all corporate PACs' during the 1977-78 
election cycle. The reverse scenario yields a pragmatic 
label. Application of this first step resulted in the 
classification of thirty-three of the forty-two sample 
corporate PACs. 
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The nine unclassified PACs had exceeded the all-
corporate PACs' mean for both candidate types. Therefore, a 
second criterion classified these PACs based on 
contributions to New Right candidates. A PAC is classified 
ideological when its proportion of total PAC dollars 
contributed to New Right candidates exceeds the sample mean 
proportion (.16); if less than the sample mean, then 
pragmatic. Tables XVI and XVII list the ideological and 
pragmatic PACs, respectively. 
MDS map. Dimension three's discrimination between 
strategies is presented visually in Figure 6. This 
dimension tends to position firms pursuing an ideological 
PAC strategy on the positive end of the vertical axis while 
firms pursuing a pragmatic PAC strategy dominate the 
negative end. Again, as previously discussed, since the 
interpretation of MDS is based on distance between points, 
the median can be shifted to better discriminate between 
categories. Positioning the median at -.109 achieves 
maximal discrimination between PAC strategies pursued by the 
sample firms. 
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Chi-square. A chi-square analysis examined the 
relationship between the MDS-classified PAC strategy and the 
actual PAC strategy. Table XVIII displays each firm's 
dimension three coordinate, its actual ~AC strategy, and its 
strategy category as determined by MDS. A firm's coordinate 
greater than -.109 classified its strategy as ideological; 
if less than -.109, then the MDS-determined PAC strategy 
classification is pragmatic. Ten firms were misclassified 
by the MDS solution. 
The contingency table displayed in Table XIX compares 
MDS-determined and actual classifications. The resulting 
chi-square statistic of 14.013 (p < .002) and a value of 
.578 for phi, a derived measure of association strength, 
I 
provide support for a systematic relationship between 
dimension three coordinates and PAC strategy.7 
Dimension Two: Reqional 
Dimension 
The regional dimension can be interpreted from the 
group space displayed in Figure 7. When the axis is 
segmented at .5174 and -.4889, three geographic divisions 
are detectable. California and New York-Connecticut firms 
dominate opposite ends of the horizontal axis; the remaining 
firms gravitate toward the center. These three segments 
have been labeled, from left to right: Frontier 
7phi equals zero when no relationship exists; positive 
1 when a perfect relationship exists. 
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(California), Heartland (Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Minnesota, Missouri), and 
Eastern Establishment (New York-Connecticut). 
Chi-square. To order the data for chi-square, the 
three regions were coded: Eastern Establishment, Ii 
Heartland, 2; and Frontier, 3. Chi-square compares the 
observed distribution of firms along dimension two with the 
one-to-three classification. 
Table XX displays each firm's dimension two 
coordinate, its actual HQ location, its MOS-determined HQ 
location, and those instances when the actual and MOS HQ 
locations did not match. The contingency table (see Table 
XXI) and its ,chi-square statistic (39.491; p < .001) support 
a systematic relationship between the regional dimension and 
actual HQ location. Phi, the measure of association, is 
.97. 
CORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES 
Correlations among variables within two groups are 
computed and presented in Table XXII: the hypothesized 
variables (regulatory environment, direct and indirect 
interlocks, professional associations, education, and 
headquarters location), and PAC characteristics (number of 
donees, total contribution dollar amount, proportion 
contributed to incumbents, Republicans, and New Right 
candidates). To augment the correlation matrix, Table XXIII 
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displays the means and standard deviations of the interva1-
level variables. 
Hypothesized Variables 
Regulatory environment. Table XXII reveals no 
significant correlations between the resource dependence 
variable (regulatory environment) and any of the class 
cohesion variables (direct/indirect interlocks, professional 
associations, schools, and headquarters location). 
Class cohesion variables. Table XXII reveals 
significant correlations among various class cohesion 
variables. 
As expected, the correlation between direct and 
indirect interlocks is high, .74, and significant at the 
.0001 level •. A firm which promotes multiple board 
membership among its directors is likely to be linked, both 
directly and indirectly, with other firms in the sample. 
While the correlation is not as strong, there is also 
a significant relationship between the number of 
professional association memberships and interlocking 
directorates (p < .003 with direct and p < .0006 with 
indirect interlocks). This, again, is reasonable since 
activity on multiple boards is characteristic of the 
corporate executive who would be invited to participate in 
prestigious business associations. 
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PAC Characteristics 
The significant relationships among characteristics of 
PAC activity are consistent with expected patterns. 
Contributions to incumbents, on the one hand, and Republican 
or New Right candidates, on the other, are negatively 
correlated (r = -.80; P < .00001 and r = -.84; p < .0001, 
respectively). This pattern is consistent with the 
likelihood that a pragmatic PAC strategy, which favors 
incumbents, deemphasizes the candidate's party affiliation 
(Burris 1987, 735). 
Two other correlations are also consistent with 
expected patterns. First, the positive correlation between 
contributions to New Right and Republican candidates (r = 
.82; P < .0001) reflects the predomina~t party affiliation 
of New Right candidates. Second, the positive correlation 
between total dollars contributed and number of candidates 
supported (r = .84; P < .0001) quite reasonably suggests 
that firms with larger PAC coffers will support more 
candidates. 
Regulatory Environment and 
PAC Characteristics 
To this point, the discussion of Table XXII has 
focused on correlations within the two categories--
hypothesized variables and PAC characteristics. One 
correlation that crosses between these categories' 
boundaries is of interest because it reflects current 
theory. 
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Regulatory environment is negatively correlated with 
proportion of contributions going to Republicans and New 
Right candidates (r = -.33; p < .03; r = -.40; p < .008, 
respectively). As previously explained, regulatory 
environment was coded "1" for economic environment and "0" 
for social environment. Therefore, social environment is 
directly associated with Republican/New Right contributions. 
This pattern agrees with the theory which holds that 
firms will favor an ideological PAC strategy when faced with 
greater social rather than economic regulatory pressures 
(see page 80). The next section, which examines the 
resource dependence component of the research question, 
expands on this preliminary finding. 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
This section addresses the research question: Can 
resource dependence theory explain intercorporate patterns 
of corporate political activity, specifically political 
action committee (PAC) campaign contributions? 
The Hypothesis Test 
Research Hypothesis: Firms similarly constrained by 
government regulations will exhibit similar political 
behavior. 
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Null Hypothesis: There is no significant relationship 
between a firm's MDS coordinates and its regulatory 
environment classification. 
Regulatory Dimension. Dimension one, the regulatory 
dimension, provides a direct test of the hypothesis. The 
sample firms are positioned along the horizontal axis 
according to their similarities (Figure 5). Therefore, if 
groupings are coincident with regulatory environment, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and the research hypothesis 
supported. Three tests were employed to ascertain whether 
this coincidental condition holds. 
Multiple regression. The resource dependence 
hypothesis was first tested with multiple regression. The 
independent variables are the sample firms' coordinates on 
the three-dimensional MDS solution, each coordinate serving 
as a distinct representation of corporate political activity 
as measured by similar PAC contributions. The dependent 
variable is a firm's regulatory environment classification--
social or economic (Table V, page 103). The regression 
model, which attempts to predict a firm's regulatory 
environment classification based on its position in the MDS 
space, is: 
REG ENV = Bo + B1 (DIM1) + B2 (DIM2) + B2 (DIM3) + error 
This model results in a multiple correlation 
coefficient of .45, and a significant coefficient of 
determination of .20 (p <.05). The bulk of this 
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relationship is accounted for by the regulatory dimension, 
dimension one: b = -.19625, P < .01i r =.425, p < .01 (see 
Table XXIV, equation (1». 
Therefore, based on multiple regression analysis, the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between regulatory environment and patterns of PAC activity 
is rejected. 
Discriminant analysis. A discriminant analysis not 
only reinforced the regression results but also provided the 
means to determine the number of firms which are correctly 
classified by their MDS coordinates. Tables XXV and XXVI 
present a discriminant classification summary and the 
identity of the eight firms which were incorrectly 
classified based on their MDS coordinates. 
The model is statistically significant with a squared 
canonical correlation of .20 and a Wilks' lambda of .80 (F = 
3.146i P < .04). As expected, given the regression results, 
the structure coefficient for dimensio~ one is a high .95, 
while dimensions two and three structure coefficients are 
.38 and -.01 respectively. This indicates that 90 percent 
of the variance of dimension one is being accounted for by 
the discriminant function. 
Chi-square. The chi-square test is useful because it 
does not require interval data and therefore is a 
conservative test of significance when interval data are 
redefined as ordinal or nominal. It can be applied in this 
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instance because the regulatory environment classification 
resulted in mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories and 
in independent observations which can be reduced to a 
nominal-level variable. Dimension one provides a good 
measure of regulatory environment, so its coordinates serVe 
to assign each firm into one of two nominal values of the 
observed regulatory environment; the predicted environment 
uses each firm's hypothesized classification. Chi-square 
tests the relationship between the predicted and observed 
regulatory environment classifications. 
The chi-square statistic, 12.78, is significant at the 
.0001 level, thereby supporting the research hypothesis. 
This support is confirmed by the measure of association, 
phi, at .55. Therefore, based on chi-square analysis, the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between regulatory environment and patterns of PAC activity 
is rejected (see Tables XXVII and XXVIII.) 
Discussion 
This support for the research hypothesis carries with 
it SUbstantial theoretical and pragmatic consequences • 
. 
First, an important question that has been discussed 
extensiv~ly in the literature is confirmed, i.e., resource 
dependence and political action are related. Second, by 
analyzing a firm's pattern of PAC contributions, the policy 
maker can determine whether that firm's behavior conforms to 
that expected because of its regulatory environment. If 
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not, one would be prompted to examine other similar firms in 
search of a trend. 
Previous research supported. Quadrants II and IV in 
Figure 6 represent the environment/strategy combinations 
suggested by earlier research (Handler and Mulkern 1982; 
Burris 1987; Neustadtl and Clawson 1988). This research 
posits that firms subject to social rather than economic 
regulations are inclined to pursue an ideological PAC 
strategy (quadrant II); firms subject to economic regulation 
are inclined toward pragmatic PAC strategy (quadrant IV). 
Firms positioned in quadrants II and IV in Figure 6 
generally support this research. six of the eight firms in 
quadrant IV (economic/pragmatic) and twelve of the nineteen 
firms located in quadrant II (social/ideological) are 
correctly mapped. possible explanations for the incorrectly 
mapped defense contractors and transportation services firms 
have been proposed (see pages 118-119). 
Previous research extended. The structure of firms 
mapped into quadrants I and III is more interesting, because 
it extends previously reported research rather than simply 
confirming it. Quadrant I (economic/ideological) contains 
eight firms and quadrant III (social/pragmatic) contains 
seven. 
Six of the eight firms positioned in quadrant I 
(economic/ideological) are commercial banks, one is an 
insurance corporation, and one represents the aerospace 
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industry. Financial institutions are subject to industry-
specific regulations and therefore, according to previously 
reported research, inclined toward pragmatic political 
strategies. 
To a greater or lesser extent, four of the six banks 
employed strategies counter to theory. Mellon and Security 
Pacific pursued a highly ideological strategy.8 First 
Chicago and Manufacturers Hanover Trust pursued what could 
be described as a mixed PAC strategy--they both supported 
incumbents, but favored Republican over Democratic 
incumbents (both their Republican support and incumbent 
support patterns exceeded the all-corporate PACs' means). 
Citicorp and Wells Fargo are classified as pragmatic with 
above-average incumbent support and below-average Republican 
support; however, Wells Fargo's New Right contribution 
pattern (thirteen percent contributed to New Right 
candidates) is relatively high for a pragmatic PAC. 
Quite obviously, the PAC contribution behavior of the 
banks in this sample does not neatly conform to patterns 
previously reported in the literature. Neustadtl and 
Clawson (1988) noted that 
[industry-specific] regulated industries are so heavily 
dependent on the specifics and details of Congressional 
8Mellorr National and Security Pacific each contributed 
thirty percent of their PAC dollars to New Right candidates 
(sample mean was sixteen percent). 
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legislation that they pay a higher than usual cost for 
opposing incumbents. Hence, whatever their personal 
preferences, they are less likely to join others in 
conservative ideological.strategies (183). 
Similarly, Burris (1987) reported that the traditionally-
regulate~ industries and defense contractors exhibited the 
lowest contribution patterns to Republicans and New Right 
candidates (736). 
This apparent divergence from prior research suggests 
two considerations. First, a criterion for this research 
sample was inclusion of diverse industries. Consequently, 
anyone industry is represented by a small number of firms. 
Therefore, the sample size precludes projection to the 
population, at least with any meaningful level of 
confidence. Nevertheless, since four of the six banks in 
this sample exhibited PAC contribution patterns which did 
not neatly conform to prior research (and a fifth exhibited 
some predilection for New Right candidates), further 
consideration is warranted. 
Second, given the above proviso, pending deregulation 
is a credible explanation for the divergence. The 
deregulation pendulum was given a push from three sources 
during the late 1970s. Technological advances in electronic 
communication radically changed a financial institution's 
potential geographic scope; consumer advocates argued that 
regulated interest ceilings discriminated against small 
savers; and the Federal Reserve's attempts to combat double-
digit inflation resulted in skyrocketing interest rates--
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banks were placed at a competitive disadvantage against 
their unregulated competitors such as money market or 
private pension funds. These pressures culminated in the 
landmark Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (1980) followed by the Depository Institution 
Act (1982,). This legislation removed interest rate ceilings 
on deposits, authorized interest-bearing checking accounts 
nationwide, and facilitated interstate banking (Schnitzer 
1990, chapter 15). 
Larger financial institutions benefit most from an 
extended geographic market. Thus, the large commercial 
banks would be expected to lobby for deregulation and 
support these lobbying efforts with pragmatic PAC 
strategies. Nevertheless, it is also quite reasonable to 
argue that major banks would have attempted to improve the 
chances of deregulation by supporting Republican and New 
Right challengers in an effort to move Congress to the 
right. 
Seven firms are mapped in quadrant III 
(social/pragmatic). Two, R. J. Reynolds and Philip Morris, 
represent the tobacco industry, the very existence of which 
is threatened by social, political, and legal forces 
(Business Week 1987). Both firms have undertaken vigorous 
activity in two arenas subject to adverse federal scrutiny--
aggressive acquisition programs (FTC and the Justice 
Department) and aggressive promotion of cigarettes overseas, 
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especially in lesser developed nations (Department of 
Commerce and Department of state). Given such conditions, 
it is not surprising that a PAC contribution analysis would 
position these firms uniquely. 
GTE is also curiously positioned in quadrant III. 
Theoretically, GTE should exhibit pragmatic tendencies given 
its economic regulatory environment--yet its actual 
contributions patterns are more indicative of an ideological 
strategy. The apparent inconsistencies might be explained 
by the dynamic environment confronting the 
telecommunications industry at that time. AT&T was in the 
midst of landmark antitrust proceedings which spanned 1974 
through 1982. Since AT&T's breakup would open new markets 
to GTE, it could reasonably be argued that GTE management 
might practice contribution patterns which deviated from the 
norm with its sights set on the potential spoils from the 
demise of AT&T's monopoly power. 
Two transportation firms, Southern Pacific and TWA, 
are also positioned in quadrant III. As previously stated, 
this unpredicted mapping (theoretically, these two firms 
should be positioned with the economically regulated firms, 
that is, on the left side of the horizontal axis) could be 
attributed to the regulatory upheaval which was occurring in 
the transportation segment (see pages 118-119). 
summary of Resource Dependence 
Hypothesis Testing 
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Analysis of the 1977-78 PAC contribution data supports 
the hypothesis that firms similarly constrained by 
government regulations will exhibit similar political 
behavior, but it does not always support the prevalent 
theory concerning the nature of this behavior, i.e., the 
economic/pragmatic and social/ideological pairings. 
Some explanations for this divergence from prior 
research 'were posited. These included the deregulation of 
transportation services and banking which occurred in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s; the unique social, political, 
and legal pressures on the tobacco industry; and the 
potential impact of the ongoing, landmark antitrust AT&T 
case. Also, the inconsistent pattern among firms within the 
electronics and aerospace industry (equally divided on both 
social and economic domain and the ideological-pragmatic 
continuum) suggests that this particular industry segment is 
pursuing eclectic political strategies and should be 
researched separately. 
CLASS COHESION 
This section addresses the research question: Can 
class cohesion theory explain intercorporate patterns of 
corporate political activity, specifically political action 
committee (PAC) campaign contributions? 
The Hypothesis Tests 
Class cohesion theory is tested with four research 
hypotheses--H2 through H5. These hypotheses and their 
associated null hypotheses are presented below: 
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H2: Firms' number of interlocking directorates will 
relate directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
H02 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of direct or indirect 
interlocks with the set of sampled firms. 
H3: Firms' number of associations with certain 
prestigious business policy groups will relate directly to 
similar political behavior among firms. 
H03 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of associations with 
major business policy groups. 
H4: Shared educational experience among Board 
Chairmen and CEOs will relate directly to similar political 
behavior among firms. 
H04 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and a shared educational experience 
among Chairmen and CEOs. 
H5: Geographically proximate headquarters will relate 
directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
HOs: There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its headquarters' location. 
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Multiple regression. The class cohesion hypotheses 
were tested with five regression models in which 
intercorporate networks (dependent variable) are predicted 
by MDS coordinates (independent variables). The respective 
intercorporate networks, or dependent variables, for each of 
the five models are: the number of direct interlocks 
(hypothesis 2); the number of indirect interlocks 
(hypothesis 2); the number of professional associations 
(hypothesis 3); a dummy-coded variable.representing the 
chairman and/or president's education (hypothesis 4); and a 
dummy-coded variable indicating location of corporate 
headquar~ers (hypothesis 5). 
Table XXIV (equations 2 through 6) displays the 
regression, canonical, and correlation coefficients for each 
of the three coordinates from the MDS solution as it relates 
to the determinants of class cohesion theory. Also reported 
are the coefficients of determination and wilks' lambda 
(where applicable), and associated F values for each model. 
Asterisks indicate significance levels. 
Null hypotheses two, three and four cannot be 
rejected. There is no apparent relationship between 
corporate political activity as measured by the proximity of 
PAC contributions and the extent of a corporation's 
interlocking directorates, its number of professional 
associations, or its president's and CEO's educational 
9 background. 
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The multiple regression analysis offers some support 
for the geographic proximity model of class cohesion. A 
significant Wilks lambda of .388 (F = 2.08; p < .01) calls 
for rejection of the null hypothesis, thereby supporting the 
model. As discussed in the next section, however, the 
support does not hold up under further examination. 
Discussion 
Discriminant analysis fails to support a model of 
political behavior driven by class cohesion. Logically, 
same-state headquarters should be more conducive to social 
cohesive~ess among executives than headquarters spread over 
a multi-state region. Accordingly, if the geographic 
proximity model of class cohesion holds, one would expect 
discriminant analysis to perform fairly well in assigning 
firms to their correct states. On the contrary, the data in 
Table XXIX show that discriminant analysis misclassified 
twenty-five of the forty-two firms. 
There is support for a regional model, both visually in 
the MDS map (Figure 7) and statistically. Eastern and 
western firms are positioned at opposite ends of the 
regional dimension, with Heartland firms positioned in the 
9Equation two of Table XXIV indicates a weak 
association between dimension one's regression coefficient 
and direct interlocks; however the overall model is not 
significant. 
middle. Second, the chi-square test (Table XXI) shows a 
significant relationship between the eastern firms' 
pragmatic political behavior and the western firms' 
ideological political behavior. Further, the correlation 
between dimension two and the regional clusterings is 
significant (p <.002) (Table XXII). 
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Regional theory. Various regional theories of 
business partisanship emerged in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The so-called Yankee-Cowboy theory has been advanced 
as an explanation for the emergence of the New Right as a 
political force. This theory argues that managements of the 
booming Sun Belt industries (defense, oil, agribusiness, 
textiles, construction) tended to be more conservative and 
ideological and thus were more likely to support New Right 
candidates. Adherents argue that these new Cowboys 
overshadowed the more politically moderate eastern 
industries (the Yankees). As a consequence, the 1980s saw 
the Republican right wing gain power, resulting in a decade 
of business hegemony in American politics (Dye 1976, 178-
186; Sale 1976, 89-152; Crawford 1980, 78-110; Davis 1981, 
39-43; Burris 1987, 734). 
Burris' (1987) recent research, which examined the 
similarity of PAC contributions among corporations during 
the 1981-82 election cycle, supports the Yankee-Cowboy 
theory, but his conclusions are cautious. He suggests that 
this regional dichotomy may be too simplistic to capture the 
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nuances of regional variation in business political 
partisanship. Burris reports that Sun Belt industries did 
disproportionately support Republican and New Right 
candidates, but that there were notable exceptions. 
Similarly, defense contractors were not uniformly more 
conservative. Burris ponders the possible influence of the 
Sun Belt's distinctive political institutions and cultures 
or the impact of old family money versus new entrepreneurial 
money in affecting political attitudes but concludes that 
the underlying causes of regional differences in business 
political partisanship are still unknown. 
Summary of Class Cohesion 
Hypothesis Testing 
Analysis of the 1977-78 PAC contribution data provides 
some support for one hypothesis associated with the class 
cohesion theory: Firms with geographically proximate 
headquarters will exhibit similar behavior. New York-
Connecticut and California headquartered firms are 
positioned at opposite ends of dimension two on the MDS map 
which scales similar corporate PAC contributions; but no 
other pattern of headquarters clustered by state emerged. 
The observed intercorporate pattern lends more support to a 
regional than to a class cohesion theory of business 
partisanship. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Four major conclusions have resulted from this 
structural analysis of the 1977-78 PAC contribution 
proximity data. 
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1. The research question, can resource dependence 
theory explain intercorporate patterns of corporate 
political activity as measured by PAC campaign 
contributions, is answered in the affirmative. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at high confidence levels. 
Therefore, it can be concluded, in support of resource 
dependence, that firms similarly constrained by government 
regulations exhibited similar political behavior. 
2. Minimal support emerged for the complementary 
research question which advanced class cohesion theory as an 
explanation for patterns of political consensus among 
corporate executives. No significant relationship was 
discovered between a firm's MDS coordinates and three 
determiners of a corporate network: Interlocking 
directorates, professional associations, and educational 
experience. The null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relationship between a firm's MDS coordinates 
and its headquarters location is rejected, however. There 
is an apparent relationship between geographically proximate 
headquarters locations and the selection of corporate PAC 
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contribution recipients. A regional model of business 
partisanship rather than a class cohesion model emerges from 
the intercorporate structure. 
3. Classes of firms are identified which deviate from 
prior research regarding expected regulatory environment. 
The observed pattern of intercorporate relations revealed by 
structural analysis suggests explanations for this 
divergence. These included the deregulation of banking and 
transportation services, the potential fall-out from the 
landmark AT&T antitrust proceedings, and the unique social, 
political, and legal pressures on the tobacco industry. 
4. Finally, no clear pattern emerged for firms which 
are highly dependent on government contracts. This suggests 
that the corporate political activity for this segment is 
eclectic. Consequently, further research which focuses 
strictly on this segment is recommended. 
TABLE X 
DISTRIBUTION OF 1977-78 SIMILARITY MEASURES 
OUARTILES AND INTEROUARTlLE RANGE 
Ouartiles 
Maximum 
03 
Median 
01 
Minimum 
Interquartile range 
Values 
0.594 
0.308 
0.199 
0.110 
o 
0.197 
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Firm 
2. American Electric Power 
7. Ci ticorp 
8. Consolidated Edison 
11. First Chicago 
15. GTE 
16. Goodyear 
17. Honeywell 
23. Mellon 
28. Pan American 
29. RJR 
32. Security Pacific 
33. Southern Pacific 
35. TVA 
36. Union Carbide 
37. Union Pacific 
41. 'Vells Fargo 
TABLE XI 
FIRM DYADS EXHIBITING ZERO POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
1977-78 ELECTION 
-1!. 15 16 .l1. 23 28 29 JZ. 33 
0 0 0 0 
0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
Notes: 0 marks the 30 firm dyads which exhibit zero political consensus. 
35 36 37 41 
0 
0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
Mellon Bank, with ten instances of zero political consensus, exhibited the greatest frequency of 
dissimilar behavior. 
..-
.s:-
.s:-
Firm 
4. Arco 
7. Citicorp 
12. Ford 
13. GE 
14. GM 
19. K Mart 
20. Lockheed 
21. LTV 
22. Manufacturers Hanover 
27. Penney 
31. Sears 
32. Security Pacific 
34. Texaco 
35. United Technologies 
41. VeIls Fargo 
TABLE XII 
FIRM DYADS EXHIBITING HIGH POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
1977 - 78 ELECTION 
JL J2...- JL ~ ....1L ...JL ~ 
.515 
.527 .537 .505 
.508 
.515 
.528 
.528 
.520 
.527 
.545 
~ ~ 
.549 
.594 
.530 
.542 
.574 
.561 
Note: Matrix cells identify the 34 dyads exhibiting high political consensus, defined as similarity 
scores greater then .50. 
..... 
~ 
l/I 
TABLE XIII 
FIT INDICES FOR FIVE EUCLIDEAN MODELS 
1977-78 SIMILARITY DATA 
HDS 
Dimensionality Stress SStress --MQ. 
1 .374 .460 .652 
2 .240 .322 .781 
3 .170 .240 .851 
4 .132 .185 .891 
5 .111 .153 .910 
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TABLE XIV 
ITERATION HISTORY FOR THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Iteration 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
SStress 
0.457 
0.291 
0.259 
0.250 
0.247 
0.245 
0.244 
0.243 
0.242 
0.242 
0.241 
0.241 
0.241 
0.241 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
0.240 
Improvement 
0.166 
0.032 
0.009 
0.003 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: Iterations stopped because SStress improved less than 0.000010 
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TABLE y:.J 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIMENSION THREE COORDINATES AND CANDIDATE TYPE 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Dimension 3 Incumbent Republican New Right 
Dimension 3 1.000 -0.589 0.634 0.469 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Incumbent 1.000 -0.801 -0.840 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Republican 1.000 0.821 
0.000 0.000 
New Right 1.000 
0.000 
TABLE XVI 
IDEOLOGICAL PAC CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Proportion of Dollars Donated to 
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Firm Incumbent Republican New Right 
ALCOA 
Arco 
Dow 
Ford 
GM 
GTE 
Goodyear 
Honeywell 
International Harvester 
K Mart 
Mellon 
Rockwell 
Sears 
Security Pacific 
Texaco 
Union Carbide 
United Air Lines 
USX 
United Technologies 
.574 
.579 
.314 
.586 
.687 
.551 
.448 
.182 
.622 
.425 
.385 
.808 
.514 
.489 
.413 
.670 
.693 
.596 
.592 
.657 
.743 
.909 
.717 
.701 
.650 
.875 
.944 
.773 
.738 
.597 
.653 
.755 
.667 
.844 
.706 
.644 
.624 
.769 
Note: Categories overlap, e.g., a candidate can be a Republican 
incumbent. 
.214 
.223 
.460 
.191 
.177 
.067 
.323 
.338 
.178 
.298 
.298 
.206 
.298 
.241 
.406 
.168 
.164 
.212 
.214 
TABLE XVII 
PRAGMATIC PAC CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Proportion of Dollars Donated to 
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Firm Incumbent Republican New Right 
American Electric Power 
American Express 
Bethlehem Steel 
Chrysler 
Citicorp 
Consolidated Edison 
Federated ~epartment Store 
First Chicago 
GE 
Lockheed 
LTV 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Monsanto 
Pan American 
Penney 
Philip Morris 
RJR 
Southern Pacific 
TVA 
Union Pacific 
Vells Fargo 
Vestinghouse 
.765 
.878 
.693 
.649 
.771 
.760 
.825 
.657 
.701 
.810 
.693 
.721 
.786 
.744 
.866 
.628 
.787 
.730 
.754 
.799 
.640 
.746 
.677 
.392 
.403 
.594 
.555 
.504 
.290 
.309 
.651 
.476 
.519 
.358 
.636 
.455 
.521 
.360 
.591 
.436 
.502 
.364 
.317 
.462 
.535 
.493 
Note: Categories overlap, e.g., a candidate can be a Republican 
incumbent. 
.118 
.015 
.218 
.123 
.069 
.043 
.024 
.048 
.097 
.107 
.050 
.075 
.053 
.106 
.036 
.191 
.181 
.120 
.091 
.020 
.144 
.132 
.115 
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TABLE XVIII 
ACTUAL AND MDS-GENERATED STRATEGY CATEGORIES 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Dimension StrateBI Categor~ 
J]L Firm Three Actual MDS 
1 ALCOA 0.866 Ideological Ideological 
2 American Electric Power -2.524 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
3 American Express -0.214 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
4 Arco 0.159 Ideological Ideological 
5 Bethlehem Steel -1. 700 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
6 Chrysler 0.144 Pragmatic Ideological-
7 Citicorp 0.031 Pragmatic Ideological-
8 Consolidated Edison -0.719 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
9 Dow 1.657 Ideological Ideological 
10 Federated Department Store -0.865 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
11 First 'Chicago 1.501 Pragmatic Ideological-
12 Ford 0.239 Ideological Ideological 
13 GE -0.180 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
14 GM -0.109 Ideological Ideological 
15 GTE -1.404 Ideological Pragmatic-
16 Goodyear 0.921 Ideological Ideological 
17 Honeywell 1.935 Ideological Ideological 
18 International Harvester 1.198 Ideological Ideological 
19 K Mart 0.600 Ideological Ideological 
20 Lockheed 0.321 Pragmatic Ideological-
21 LTV -0.634 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
22 Manufacturers Hanover 0.621 Pragmatic Ideological-
23 Mellon 1.563 Ideological Ideological 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance 0.913 Pragmatic Ideological-
25 Monsanto -0.222 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
26 Pan American -0.762 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
27 Penney 0.211 Pragmatic Ideological-
28 Philip Morris -1.903 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
29 RJR -1.423 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
30 Rockwell -0.066 Ideological Ideological 
31 Sears 0.356 Ideological Ideological 
32 Security Pacific 0.606 Ideological Ideological 
33 Southern Pacific -0.612 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
34 Texaco 0.252 Ideological Ideological 
35 TYA -1.438 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
36 Union Carbide 0.160 Ideological Ideological 
37 Union Pacific -0.087 Pragmatic Ideological-
38 United Air Lines 0.128 Ideological Ideological 
39 USX -0.070 Ideological Ideological 
40 United Technologies 0.071 Ideological Ideological 
41 Yells Fargo 0.705 Pragmatic Ideological'" 
42 Yestinghouse -0.228 Pragmatic Pragmatic 
'Hisclassified 
Actual 
Chi-square 
TABLE XIX 
ACTUAL AND HDS-GENERATED STRATEGY CATEGORIES 
CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY TABLE 
1977 -78 ELECTION 
HDS 
Frequency 
Expected : Ideological Pragmatic Total 
-----------:------------- -----------I 
I 
Ideologic : 18 1 19 
: 12.2 6.8 
-----------:------------- -----------I 
I 
Pragmatic : 9 14 23 
: 14.8 8.2 
-----------:------------- -----------
Total 27 15 42 
Statistic 
.m:. Value Prob 
1 14.013 0.000 
Continuity adj. chi-square 1 11.695 0.001 
Fisher's exact test (2-tail) 0.000 
Phi 0.578 
Sample size = 42 
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TABLE XX 
ACTUAL AND MDS-GENERATED HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Dimension Headguarters 
lQt. Firm Two Actual MDS 
1 ALCOA 0.517 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
2 American Electric Power -0.264 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
3 American Express 0.649 NY-CT NY-CT 
4 Arco -0.700 CALIF CALIF 
5 Bethlehem Steel 0.158 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
6 Chrysler 0.624 CENTRAL NY-CT-
7 Citicorp 0.775 NY-CT NY-CT 
8 Consolidated Edison 2.429 NY-CT NY-CT 
9 Dow 0.437 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
10 Federated Department Store -0.497 CENTRAL CALIF-
11 First Chicago -0.457 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
12 Ford -0.307 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
13 GE -0.118 NY-CT CENTRAL-
14 GM 0.016 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
15 GTE 2.245 NY-CT NY-CT 
16 Goodyear 0.172 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
17 Honeywell -0.033 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
18 International Harvester 0.392 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
19 K Mart 0.037 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
20 Lockheed -0.489 CALIF CALIF 
21 LTV -0.344 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
22 Manufacturers Hanover 1.175 NY-CT NY-CT 
23 Mellon 0.121 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance 1.174 NY-CT NY-CT 
25 Monsanto 0.517 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
26 Pan American -0.135 NY-CT CENTRAL-
27 Penney -0.337 NY-CT CENTRAL-
28 Philip Morris 0.937 NY-CT NY-CT 
29 RJR 0.506 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
30 Rockwell -1.218 CALIF CALIF 
31 Sears -0.244 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
32 Securi ty Pacific -2.461 CALIF CALIF 
33 Southern Pacific -1. 789 CALIF CALIF 
34 Texaco 0.571 NY-CT NY-CT 
35 TVA -0.630 NY-CT CALIF-
36 Union Carbide 1.167 NY-CT NY-CT 
37 Union Pacific -1.232 NY-CT CALIF-
38 United Air Lines -0.820 CENTRAL CALIF-
39 USX -0.155 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
40 United Technologies 0.200 NY-CT CENTRAL-
41 Yells Fargo -2.454 CALIF CALIF 
42 Yestinghouse -0.134 CENTRAL CENTRAL 
11isclassified 
Actual 
TABLE XXI 
ACTUAL AND MDS-GENERATED HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY TABLE 
Frequency 
Expected 
CALIF 
----------
CENTRAL 
----------
NY-CT 
1977-78 ELECTION 
MDS 
CALIF CENTRAL 
6 0 
1.4 3.1 
----------- -------------
2 18 
5.0 11.0 
----------- -------------
2 4 
3.6 7.9 
NY-CT 
0 
1.4 
-----------
1 
5.0 
-----------
9 
3.6 I 
---------- ----------- -------------
-----------: TOTAL 10 22 10 
Statistic DF Value Prob 
Chi-square 4 39.491 0.000 
Cramer's V 0.686 
Sample size = 42 
154 
Total 
6 
21 
15 
42 
TABLE XXII 
CORRELATIONS BETUEEN MDS COORDINATES AND INTERPRETIVE VARIABLES 
2 3 4 5 6 _7 ___ 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Dimension 1 .101 -.094 -.313 -.214 .Q8 .234 .283 -.270 .370 .334 .425 .061 .382 
p < .044 .016 .031 .005 
2. Dimension 2 - .116 -.010 .110 .293 -.158 -.147 - .017 .028 - .090 .169 .056 .662 
p < .002 
3. Dimension 3 .091 - .062 .099 -.025 .039 -.589 .634 .469 .008 .058 .441 
p < .000 .000 .002 
4. Direct interlocks .743 .445 .060 -.041 .327 -.163 -.314 .109 .059 .316 
p < .000 .003 .035 .043 
5. Indirect interlocks .507 .348 .242 .491 -.284 - .471 .056 .010 .447 
p < .001 .024 .001 .002 
6. Professional associations .128 .207 .013 .188 -.013 .203 .108 .463 
7. Donees .844 .060 .024 .032 .230 .011 .226 
p < .000 
8. $ Contributions - .063 .104 .091 .216 .182 .317 
9. Incumbent proportion - .801 -.840 .247 .120 .435 
p < .000 .• 000 
10. Republican proportion .821 -.332 .031 .413 
p < .000 .032 
11. New Right proportion -.405 .137 .432 
p < .008 
12. Regulatory environment .009 .526 
13. Education .290 
14. Headquarters 
Note: Probability displayed only when p < .05. 
..... 
VI 
VI 
TABLE XXIII 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INTERVAL LEVEL VARIABLES 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Variable 
Direct interlocks 
Indirect interlocks 
Professional associations 
Donees 
$ contributions 
Incumbent proportion 
Republican proportion 
New Right proportion 
Mean 
5.619 
166.405 
2.357 
91.976 
37,300.330 
0.648 
0.587 
0.163 
Std Dev 
3.723 
90.929 
1.394 
64.411 
30,435.530 
0.154 
0.169 
0.106 
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Equation 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
TABLE XXIV 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND CLASS COHESION VARIABLES 
~EGRESSED AGAINST MDS COORDINATES 
1977 - 78 ELECTION 
Indeoendent Variables 
Deoendent Variables Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 ~ F 
Resource Dependence Hypothesis 
Regulatory environment 
Class Cohesion Hypotheses 
Direct interlocks 
Indirect interlocks 
Professional associations 
Education 
Headquarters location 
-.196** 
(.425) 
-1.075* 
(-0.313) 
-19.824 
(-0.214) 
.159 
(0.136) 
-.034 
(.0612) 
-.011 
-.068 
(.170) 
.108 
( -0.010) 
11.579 
(0.110) 
.419 
(0.293) 
.029 
(.0561) 
1.17590 
-.024 
(.000) 
.249 
(0.091) 
-6.486 
(-0.062) 
.207 
(0.099) 
-.030 
(.0581) 
- .415 
.200 3.15* 
.446 
.102 .25 
.319 
.068 .93 
.261 
.118 .18 
.344 
.011 .14 
.105 
.388 2.08** 
Note: the first cell entry under the three dimensions for the first five equations is that model's 
unstandardized regression coefficient; the second, parenthetical, entry is the model's zero-order 
correlations. The sixth equation required canonical analysis; therefore, the unstandardized canonical 
coefficients are reported in the first three columns, and Vilks' lambda in the fourth column. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
.... 
VI 
-...J 
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TABLE XXV 
ACTUAL AND DISCRIMINANT-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CATEGORIES 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Categor:t Coefficient 
.mt. Firm Actual Classified Economic Social 
1 ALCOA Social Social 0.149 0.851 
2 American Electric Power Economic Social 0.268 0.732-
3 American Express Economic Economic 0.935 0.065 
4 Arco Social Social 0.489 0.511 
5 Bethlehem Steel Social Social 0.366 0.634 
6 Chrysler Social Social 0.165 0.835 
7 Citicorp Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
8 Consolidated Edison . Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
9 Dow Social Social 0.036 0.964 
10 Federated Department Store Social Economic 0.700 0.300-
11 First Chicago Economic Economic 0.999 0.001 
12 Ford Social Social 0.192 0.808 
l3 GE Economic Social 0.201 0.799-
14 GM Social Social 0.160 0.840 
15 GTE Economic Economic 0.988 0.012 
16 Goodyear Social Social 0.046 0.954 
17 Honeywell Economic Social 0.030 0.970-
18 International Harvester Social Social 0.051 0.949 
19 K Mart Social Social 0.107 0.893 
20 Lockheed Economic Social 0.296 0.704-
21 LTV Social Social 0.286 0.714 
22 Manufacturers Hanover Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
23 Mellon Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance Economic Economic 0.961 0.039 
25 Monsanto Social SOcial 0.155 0.845 
26 Pan American Economic Social 0.225 0.775-
27 Penney Social Social 0.230 0.770 
28 Philip Morris Social Social 0.497 0.503 
29 RJR Social Social 0.395 0.605 
30 Rockwell Economic Economic 0.960 0.040 
31 Sears Social Social 0.167 0.833 
32 Security Pacific Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
33 Southern Pacific Economic Economic 0.999 0.001 
34 Texaco Social Social 0.177 0.823 
35 TVA Economic Economic 0.836 0.164 
36 Union Carbide Social Social 0.296 0.704 
37 Union Pacific Economic Economic 0.942 0.058 
38 United Air Lines Economic Economic 0.583 0.417 
39 USX Social Social 0.171 0.829 
40 United Technologies Economic Social 0.153 0.847-
41 Vells Fargo Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
42 Vestinghouse Economic Social 0.274 0.726-
1Usc1assHied 
TABLE XXVI 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
FOR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Number of Observations and 
From Percents Classified into 
Regulatory Regulator~ Environment 
Environment Economic Social Total 
Economic 15 7 22 
68.18 31.82 100.00 
Social 1 19 20 
5.00 95.00 100.00 
Total 16 26 42 
Percent 38.10 61.90 100.00 
Priors 50.00 50.00 
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TABLE XXVII 
ACTUAL ~D MDS-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CATEGORIES 
1977-78 ELECTION 
Dimension Categor::i 
llt. Firm One Actual MDS 
1 ALCOA 0.416 Social Social 
2 American Electric Power -0.614 Economic Economic 
3 American Express -1.102 Economic Economic 
4 Arco 0.550 Social Social 
5 Bethlehem Steel -1.021 Social Economic-
6 Chrysler 0.449 Social Social 
7 Citicorp -2.121 Economic Economic 
8 Consolidated Edison -1.560 Economic Economic 
9 Dow 1.060 Social Social 
10 Federated Department Store -1.654 Social Economic-
11 First Chicago -2.129 Economic Economic 
12 Ford 0.587 Social Social 
13 GE -0.011 Economic Economic 
14 GM 0.197 Social Social 
15 GTE 1.606 Economic Social-
16 Goodyear 1.715 Social Social 
17 Honeywell 1.350 Economic Social-
18 International Harvester 0.933 Social Social 
19 K Mart 0.521 Social Social 
20 Lockheed 0.102 Economic Economic 
21 LTV 0.355 Social Social 
22 Manufacturers Hanover -1.590 Economic Economic 
23 Mellon -2.668 Economic Economic 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance -0.274 Economic Economic 
25 Monsanto 0.422 Social Social 
26 Pan American -0.175 Economic Economic 
27 Penney 0.127 Social Social 
28 Philip Morris 1.292 Social Social 
29 RJR 1.505 Social Social 
30 Rockwell 0.637 Economic Social-
31 Sears 0.463 Social Social 
32 Securi ty Pacific -1.220 Economic Economic 
33 Southern Pacific 0.272 Economic Social-
34 Texaco 0.348 Social Social 
35 TVA 0.797 Economic Social-
36 Union Carbide 0.830 Social Social 
37 Union Pacific 0.347 Economic Social-
38 United Air Lines 0.267 Economic Social-
39 USX 0.350 Social Social 
40 United Technologies 0.212 Economic Social-
41 Vells Fargo -1.203 Economic Economic 
42 Vest~nghouse -0.365 Economic Economic 
'Hisclassi fied 
Actual 
TABLE XXVIII 
ACTUAL AND MDS-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CATEGORIES 
CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY TABLE 
1977-78 ELECTION 
MDS 
Frequency 
Expected·: Economic Social Total 
-----------:------------- -----------I 
I 
Economic l 14 8 22 
: 8.4 13.6 
-----------l------------- -----------I 
I 
Social: 2 18 20 
l 7.6 I 12.4 
-----------:-------------1-----------
Total 16 26 42 
Statistic OF Value Prob 
Chi-square 1 12.780 0.000 
Continuity adj. chi-square 1 10.607 0.001 
Fisher's exact test (2-tail) 0.000 
Phi 0.552 
Sample size • 42 
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TABLE XXIX 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
FOR HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
1977-78 ELECTION 
From Number of Observations and Percents Classified into Hg 
HO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
1 8 0 1 0 2 5 1 17 
47.06 0.00 5.88 0.00 11.76 29.41 5.88 100.00 
2 1 2 1 0 1 °1 0 6 
16.67 33.33 16.67 0.00 16.67 16.67 0.00 100.00 
3 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 5 
0.00 0.00 60.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 0.00 100.00 
4 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 4 
0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 
5 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 25.00 25.00 100.00 
6 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00' 0.00 0.00 100.00 
7 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 100.00 
Total 10 3 5 1 8 12 3 42 
Percent 23.81 7.14 11.90 2.38 19.05 28.57 7.14 100.00 
Priors 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Scores 
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of the 1977-78 similarity measures. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE 1981-82 ELECTION CYCLE 
Chapter V takes the same analytical approach as that 
of the previous chapter which deals with 1977-78 PAC 
contribution data. Similarly, chapter V presents the 
results of multidimensional scaling and hypothesis testing 
performed on the 1981-82 PAC data set. Consequently, the 
explanations "in chapter IV regarding the use of various 
statistical techniques and decision rules are applicable to 
the 1981-82 data analysis and, therefore, are not repeated. 
Chapter IV may be consulted for details regarding the 
analytical model. 
THE NATURE OF THE 1981-82 PROXIMITY DATA 
Table XXX and Figure 8 display the descriptive 
statistics and frequency distribution histogram associated 
with the 1981-82 proximity data set.' The observed 
proximity scores, measured at the ordinal level, ranged from 
2 
.000 to .624 with a median of .251. It should also be 
'The complete 1981-82 similarity matrix appears in 
Appendix C. 
2see chapter III, pages 93-95, for a discussion on the 
ordinal level of measurement as it applies to the similarity 
data. 
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noted that the distribution exhibits a rather low variance. 
The scores cluster rather tightly around the median; less 
than thirty percent of the range lies between quartiles one 
and three, compared with forty-five percent above the third 
quartile. 
Extremes 
Tables XXXI and XXXII, respectively, display the four 
corporate dyads that scored a zero similarity and the 
twenty-seven corporate dyads that exhibited high (greater 
than .50) similarity scores. The comparable results from 
the 1977-78 data set are thirty zero-scoring dyads and 
seventeen high-scoring dyads. This opening examination of 
the 1981~82 data set reveals that more firms exhibited 
similar congressional support patterns and fewer exhibited 
unique patterns during the 1981-82 election cycle. 
Two patterns do carryover between the two election 
cycles, however. First, Mellon Bank consistently exhibits 
the most frequent zero similarity with other firms. 
Second, while high similarity scores often 
characterize pairs of firms from the same industry, the 
pattern is not entirely consistent. 3 For example, the 
Security Pacific and Wells Fargo dyad, with a similarity 
score of .624, exhibited the maximum consensus in candidates 
3Eight of twenty-seven (thirty percent) high-
similarity pairs share a common Fortune-defined industry 
grouping in 1981-82, as compared with six of seventeen 
(thirty-five percent) in 1977-78. 
supported during the 1981-82 election cycle while another 
banking dyad, Mellon and Wells Fargo, scored a zero 
similarity. 
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Such discrepancies could be a reflection of the 
ideological expression of a strong corporate leader, despite 
Handler and Mulkern's 1982 research. Their conclusion was 
that, even when a CEO is active in PAC governance, the 
general direction of PAC contributions follows what would be 
expected "given the nature of the firm and the regulatory 
environment which it inhabits" (77). Yet, the extreme 
dissimilarity exhibited by Mellon and Wells Fargo suggests 
that, in an instance such as this, the personal ideologies 
of corporate executives should be explored for an 
explanation. 
DETERMINING DIMENSIONALITY 
Table XXXIII displays the fit measures resulting from 
a series of classical Euclidean multidimensional solutions 
scaled at one through five dimensions. The plotted fit 
measures are presented in Figure 9. As was true for the 
1977-78 data set, the sharp elbow which can denote the 
preferred solution is not apparent. As expected, STRESS and 
RSQ improve as dimensionality increases, however, the level 
of improvement between the two- and three-dimensional and 
the three- and four-dimensional solutions is scarcely 
perceptible. A more marked improvement is noted between the 
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one- and two-dimensional solution. The two-dimensional 
solution's STRESS and RSQ levels are troublesome, however--a 
.775 squared multiple correlation and .237 unexplained 
variance suggests a less than fully satisfactory model fit. 
Consequently, additional dimensionality determination 
techniques were applied to the data. 
The subjective determiners of interpretability and 
ease of use were applied to the 1981-82 scaled solutions 
(Kruskal and Wish 1978, 56). The two-dimensional solution 
was readily interpretable; however, as previously discussed, 
this solution was eliminated due to its high STRESS and RSQ. 
Dimensions one and two of the three-dimensional solution are 
significantly correlated with hypothesized variables, thus 
are interpretable, but this was not the case for dimension 
three. Expioratory analysis, however, reveals some 
interesting corporate patterns along the dimension three 
I 
axis. Therefore, the three-dimensional solution, with a 
STRESS of .181 and a RSQ of .837, is selected for further 
analysis. 
The Final Test 
Given the selection of a three-dimensional solution, 
its corresponding ALSCAL output was further examined to 
ensure that the model is suitable for analysis. Two pieces 
of evidence support its suitability. 
First, the iteration history for the three-dimensional 
solution indicates that the minimum SSTRESS improvement 
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level was reached at iteration thirty, yet the ALSCAL 
parameter allowed for one hundred iterations (see Table 
XXXIV). Further, the convergence level parameter was set at 
a high precision level of .00001. This suggests that a true 
or global minimum convergence level was reported rather than 
a local minimum. 
Second, the three-dimensional solution's scatter plot 
of the computed distances in the MDS space and the actual 
observations (proximity values) was examined. A central 
premise of multidimensional scaling is that the distances 
between points on the MDS map should correspond to the input 
proximities (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 19). Inspection of the 
scatter diagram presented in Figure 10 reveals that this 
relationship exists. Since the input data are similarities, 
then the computed distances between the map coordinates 
(horizontal axis in Figure 10) should diminish as the degree 
of similarity between firm dyads (vertical axis) 
increases. 4 While Figure 10 reveals a rather large amount 
of scatter, a decreasing function satisfies the relationship 
4Distances are calculated by the Pythagorean formula: 
the distance between points i and j in R-dimensional space 
is equal to 
2 2 1/2 d ij = [(Xi1 - xj1) + • • • + (XiR - x jR ) ] 
where xi1 equals the point corresponding to the i th firm on 
the first map dimension or axis (Kruskal and Wish 1978, 17). 
Degree of similarity between firms is calculated by 
the similarity measure presented on page 75. 
requirements since nonmetric MDS rank orders proximities 
(Kruskal and Wish 1978, 22). 
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Given 'the preceding evidence and rationale, the three-
dimensional solution is selected for hypothesis testing and 
exploratory analysis. The MDS configurations for the three-
dimensional solution appear in Figures 11, 12, and 13. 
DIMENSION INTERPRETATION AND LABELING 
As with the 1977-78 data analysis, the three 
dimensions associated with the 1981-82 MDS solution are 
labeled to facilitate discussion. Dimension one correlates 
with two hypothesized variables: Regulatory environment and 
PAC strategy. It is therefore labeled the 
Environment/Strategy dimension. Dimension two correlates 
with the headquarters hypothesized variable; thus, it is 
labeled Regional. As previously noted; dimension three does 
not correlate with any hypothesized variables. 
Nevertheless, the pattern of firms along dimension three 
suggests 'that it is identifying those firms which exhibited 
zero similarity with another firm(s) within the sample (see 
Table XXXI). Dimension three also segments firms which 
contributed to fewer candidates (or "donees"). Therefore, 
it is labeled Outliers/Donees. 
Dimension One: Environment/strategy 
Dimension 
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Environment. The MDS group space displayed in Figure 
11 reveals a division between firms in social and economic 
regulatory environments. Those firms more subject to 
economic regulations are clearly grouped on the negative 
side of the horizontal dimension one axis while those more 
subject to social regulations dominate the positive side. 
Maximal discrimination between the two regulatory 
environment categories is achieved by shifting the 
dimension one axis to coordinate .12. 5 
Misclassification common to both data sets. A 
comparison of the 1977-78 and 1981-82 environment dimensions 
supports the research model's reliability. First, the two 
regulatory environment dimensions are correlated at the .51 
level (p < .0006), an indicator that they are measuring the 
same phenomenon. Further, the 1977-78 MDS solution 
misclassified ten corporations on the environment dimension 
and the 1981-82 misclassifiednine with five firms in common 
(see Table XXXV). Bethlehem Steel, Federated Department 
stores, GTE, Honeywell, and united Technologies were 
misclassified in both election cycles. 
This reliability, while not conclusive evidence, 
implies that the regulatory environment indicated by the MDS 
5This regulatory environment relationship is analyzed 
with chi-square and regression in a later section which 
tests the resource dependence hypothesis. 
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coordinates is more likely to resemble the "true" regulatory 
environment than to be just an artifact of the data and, at 
the very least, that the misclassification is not random. 
First, the difference in the number of misclassified firms 
is only one. Second, and more compelling, is the five-firm 
commonality. 
Misclassification unique to 1981-82 data set. MDS 
misclassified four firms in the 1981-82 data set that it had 
classified correctly in the 1977-78 set. Three are 
manufacturing firms and one is a retailer, J. C. Penney. 
That one is a retailer supports the argument that a category 
in addition to social and economic is needed (Burris 1987, 
736). Of the three retailers included in the sample, MDS 
places two (Federated Department Stores and J. C. Penney) 
into the economic category, a category usually reserved for 
defense contractors and firms that operate under industry-
specific regulation. Informed judgement, on the other hand, 
places retailers in the social regulatory environment in 
recognition of the affirmative action pressure experienced 
by large retailers when the enforcement authority of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was enhanced in 1972 
(Schnitzer 1990, 275). 
The third sample retailer, Sears, was correctly mapped 
as social in both election cycles, but a strong case could 
be made for a hypothesized economic classification. A new 
CEO took over in 1978 and restructured the organization to 
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the exte~t that, in 1981, Sears enlarged its financial 
services portfolio with the acquisition of Coldwell Banker 
and Dean witter Reynolds, largest and fifth-largest in their 
respective fields (Telling 1986). 
International Harvester, a 1981-82 misclassified firm, 
also experienced radical changes. In 1982, on the verge of 
bankruptcy, IH was taken over by a new management team which 
sold off unprofitable operations, including its farm 
equipment business (Potts and Behr 1987, 36-37). These 
management upheavals may account for its changing pattern of 
PAC contributions from 1977-78 to 1981-82. 
Finally, two of the three metal manufacturers are 
misclassified as economic in 1981-82: Bethlehem Steel and 
LTV. The early 1980s were particularly hard on the steel 
industry as domestic demand for steel, battered by a global 
recession, was filled largely by a flood of high-quality, 
low-cost Japanese steel (Gilbert 1989). A reasonable 
conjecture is that the adverse economic and foreign 
competitive forces which confronted the sagging steel 
industry heralded a new business-government environment; a 
regulatory environment that was once preoccupied by costly 
social regulations evolved into one in which government 
interven~ion was sought. 
The third metal manufacturer, united States Steel, 
maintained the social regulatory environment classification 
during both election cycles. It is notable, however, that 
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it acquired the Marathon oil Company in the early 1980s and 
subsequently changed its federal industry classification 
from steel to petroleum refining (Bateman and Zeithaml 1990, 
193). Since petroleum refining is also classified as 
social, united states Steel's hypothesized and MDS 
classified social regulatory environment is reinforced. 
strategy. Dimension one can be examined from the PAC 
strategy perspective as well as that of the regulatory 
environment. Table XXXVI displays significant positive 
correlations between dimension one coordinates and 
contributions to Republicans and New Right candidates (r = 
.59 and .51, respectively; p < .0001); further, as expected, 
it is negatively related to contributions to incumbents (r = 
-.57; P < .0001). Regressing dimension one coordinates onto 
the same three candidate types accounts for forty percent of 
its variance (p < .0001). 
Pragmatic/Ideological classification. PAC strategy 
classifications are determined in accord with the following 
two-step process which employs aggregate statistics drawn 
from the 1981-~2 Federal Election Commission reports. 
First, a firm is labeled ideological based on two 
criteria: (1) its proportion of total PAC dollars 
contributed to Republican candidates must exceed the 
proportion of total corporate PAC dollars (.65) contributed 
to Republicans by all corporate PACs during the 1977-78 
election cycle, and (2) its proportion of total PAC dollars 
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contributed to incumbents must be less than the proportion 
of total corrorate PAC dollars (.73) contributed to 
incumbents by all corporate PACs' during the 1977-78 
election cycle. The reverse scenario yields a pragmatic 
label. Application of this first step resulted in the 
classification of thirty-three of the forty-two sample 
corporate PACs. 
Eight unclassified PACs had exceeded the all-corporate 
PACs' means for both candidate types; one unclassified PAC 
fell below the all-corporate PACs' means for both candidate 
types. Therefore, a second criterion classified these PACs 
based on contributions to New Right candidates. A PAC is 
classified ideological when its proportion of total PAC 
dollars contributed to New Right candidates exceeds the 
sample mean proportion (.14); if less than the sample mean, 
then pragmatic. Table XXXVII displays the proportion each 
PAC contributed to each candidate category, and Tables 
XXXVIII and XXXIX list the ideological and pragmatic PACs, 
respectively. 
Dimension Two: Regional 
Dimension 
The Regional Dimension can be interpreted from the 
group space displayed in Figure 12. All firms headquartered 
in California appear below the -.75 vertical coordinate. 
Moving up the vertical axis, a cluster of Michigan-Missouri 
headquartered firms emerge between coordinates 
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-.59 and -.29. Next, four Pennsylvania-Ohio firms are 
clustered between coordinates -.06 and .17. Finally, six 
New York-Connecticut firms have a vertical coordinate of .24 
or highe~. Based on this visual inspection, the MDS map was 
segmented at -.75, -.25, and .18 resulting in four regional 
divisions. 
Chi-square. To order the data for chi-square, the 
sample firms' headquarters locations were coded into the 
observed four regions. Seven firms are labeled "Other" and 
are not included in the chi-square analysis since MDS did 
not assign a regional classification. Three of the "other" 
firms are the sole representatives of their respective 
states: North Carolina, Texas, and Minnesota. The 
remaining four are based in a single state, Illinois, but 
are not grouped on the dimension two axis. 
Chi-square compares the observed distribution of 
firms along dimension two with actual headquarters 
locations. Table XL displays each firm's actual HQ regional 
location, its MDS-classified HQ location, and those 
instances in which the two did not match. The contingency 
table (see Table XLI) and its chi-square statistic (43.659; 
p < .0001) support a systematic relationship between the 
Regional Dimension and actual HQ location. Cramer's V, a 
measure of association, is .645. 6 
6cramer's V statistic, a statistic comparable to phi, 
is more suitable for larger contingency tables (SPSS Inc. , 
1988, 436). 
Dimension Three: Outlier/Donees 
Dimension 
As previously noted, dimension three does not 
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correlate with any hypothesized variable. Nevertheless, an 
inspection of the group space displayed in Figure 13 
(dimension three appears on the vertical axis) suggests two 
possible interpretations for the dimension three 
intercorporate pattern of firms. 
Outliers. First, an outlier pattern is evident. Most 
firms are clustered toward the center of the plane defined 
by dimension two and dimension three. In contrast, four 
firms (Mellon, Wells Fargo, LTV, and Consolidated Edison) 
are so far removed from the dominant cluster that their MDS 
location exceeded the boundaries of the computer-generated 
map. These same four firms were identified earlier in a 
list of five firms which exhibited zero consensus during the 
1981-82 election cycle (see Table XXXI). The fifth firm of 
that zero consensus group, Honeywell, is also positioned 
apart from the dominant cluster. Therefore, zero consensus 
appears to be a factor which is influencing the 
configuration of firms along the dimension three axis. 
Donees. A second pattern emerged when the number of 
candidates (termed donees) to whom PACs contributed was 
considered. Table XLII displays descriptive statistics on 
the donee variable. The research sample distribution 
exhibits a moderately high level of dispersion (range-to-
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standard deviation ratio = 3.75), with a range from 18 to 
288, a mean of 122, and a standard deviation of 72. 
The donee distribution's four quartiles were 
subsequently used to segment the group space displayed in 
Figure 13. Labeling sample firms according to their 
respective quartiles reveals a division at both the high and 
. 
low ends of the vertical axis (dimension three). Firms 
which contributed to a low number of candidates (low defined 
by quartile one), appear at the positive and negative 
extremes of dimension three; firms which contributed to an 
average to high number of candidates (defined by quartiles 
two through four) are clustered in the middle range of 
dimension three. 
Chi-square. A chi-square test measured the extent of 
the association between number of candidate contributions 
and the three identified MDS segments. Firms were coded low 
or average-high according to the quartile representing their 
candidate contributions, and quartile one firms were further 
classified positive or negative as determined by a positive 
or negative dimension three coordinate (Table XLIII). When 
the actual number-of-donee contribution pattern was compared 
with the MDS generated contribution pattern, a significant 
chi-square statistic of 57.00 (p < .0001) resulted; the chi-
square derived measure of association (Cramer's V) is .824. 
Therefore, dimension three is labeled the 
outlier/Donee dimension. The outlier label is indicative of 
the MDS map's demarcation of those firms which exhibited 
zero political consensus. The dimension's interpretation 
derived from number of candidate contributions is 
represented by the donee label. 
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Identification of the outlier dimension could point' to 
a future research direction. A reasonable assumption is 
that the personal ideology of a strong corporate leadership 
is influencing the atypical behavior of the outlier group. 
As was previously discussed, future research should examine 
the relationship between top management's personal and 
corporate political ideology. 
CORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES 
Correlations among variables within two groups are 
computed and presented in Table XXXVI: The hypothesized 
variables and PAC characteristics. To augment that 
correlation matrix, Table XLIV displays the means and 
standard deviations of the interval-level variables. 
Hypothesized Variables 
Regulatory environment. Table XXXVI reveals no 
significant correlations between the resource dependence 
variable (regulatory environment) and any of the class 
cohesion variables (direct/indirect interlocks, professional 
associations, schools, and headquarters location). 
Class cohesion variables. Table XXXVI reveals 
significant correlations among class cohesion variables. 
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These relationships follow the same pattern revealed in the 
1977-78 data set. 
As expected, the correlation between direct and 
indirect interlocks is high, .74, and significant at the 
.0001 level. While the correlation is not as strong, there 
is also a significant relationship between the number of 
professional-association memberships and interlocking 
directorates (p < .005 with direct and p < .0005 with 
indirect interlocks). As previously discussed, these 
correlations suggest that corporations which encourage 
direct or indirect multiple board linkages also promote 
participation in prestigious business associations. 
PAC Characteristics 
The expected significant relationships among 
characteristics of PAC activity which were revealed in the 
1977-78 data set are evident again in the 1981-82 data set. 
contributions to incumbents, on the one hand, and Republican 
or New Right candidates, on the other, are negatively 
correlated (r = -.81; p < .00001 and r = -.90; p < .0001 
respectively). This pattern is consistent with the 
likelihood that a pragmatic PAC strategy, which favors 
incumbents, deemphasizes the candidate's party affiliation 
(Burris 1987, 735). 
Two other correlations are also consistent with 
expected patterns. First, the positive correlation between 
contributions to New Right and Republican candidates 
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(r = .87; P < .0001) reflects the predominant party 
affiliation of New Right candidates. Second, the positive 
correlation between total dollars contributed and number of 
candidates supported (r = .84; P < .0001) quite reasonably 
suggests that firms with larger PAC coffers will support 
more candidates. 
Regulatory Environment and 
PAC Characteristics 
As in the 1977-78 data set, this correlation analysis 
supports the resource dependence contention which holds that 
firms in economic regulatory environments will favor a 
pragmatic PAC strategy. Regulatory environment is 
correlated with percentage of contributions targeted to 
7 incumbents (r = -.33; P < .03). The next section, which 
examines the resource dependence component of the research 
question, expands on this preliminary finding. 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
The 1981-82 intercorporate patterns are subjected to 
the same sort of hypothesis testing as the were the 1977-78 
patterns. The results are then applied to the research 
question: Can resource dependence theory explain 
7Since regulatory environment was dummy-coded 1 for 
economic environment and 0 for social environment, a social 
regulatory environment is negatively associated with 
incumbent contributions; and, conversely, firms with 
economic regulatory constraints are positively associated 
with contributions to incumbent candidates. 
intercorporate patterns of corporate political activity, 
specifically political action committee (PAC) campaign 
contributions? 
The Hypothesis Test 
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Research Hypothesis: Firms similarly constrained by 
government regulations will exhibit similar political 
behavior. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no significant relationship 
between a firm's MDS coordinates and its regulatory 
environment classification. 
Regulatory dimension. Dimension one, the regulatory 
dimension, provides a direct test of the hypothesis. The 
sample firms are positioned along the horizontal axis 
according to their similarities (Figure 11). Therefore, if 
groupings are coincident with regulatory environment, the 
null hypothesis is rejected and the research hypothesis 
supported. Three tests were employed to ascertain whether 
this condition holds. 
Multiple regression. The resource dependence 
hypothesis was first tested with multiple regression. The 
independent variables are the sample firms' coordinates on 
the three-dimensional MDS solution, each coordinate serving 
as a distinct representation of corporate political activity 
as measured by similar PAC contributions. The dependent 
variable is a firm's regulatory environment classification--
social or economic (Table V, page 104). The regression 
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model, which attempts to predict a firm's regulatory 
environment classification based on its position in the MDS 
space, is: 
REG ENV = Bo + B1 (DIMl) + B2 (DIM2) + B2 (DIM3) + error 
This model results in a multiple correlation 
coefficient of .53, and a significant coefficient of 
determination of .28 (p < .005). The bulk of this 
relationship is accounted for by the regulatory dimension; 
dimension one: b = -.2443; P < .001; r =-.503; p < .001 
(see Table XLV). 
Therefore, based on multiple regression analysis, the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between regulatory environment and patterns of PAC activity 
is rejected. 
Discriminant analysis. A discriminant analysis not 
only reinforced the regression results but also provided the 
means to determine the number of firms which are correctly 
classified by their MDS coordinates. Tables XLVI and XLVII 
present a discriminant classification summary and the 
identity of the twelve firms which were incorrectly 
classified based on their MDS coordinates. 
The model is statistically significant with a squared 
canonical correlation of .29 and a Wilks' lambda of .71 (F = 
5.066; p < .005). As expected, given the regression 
results, the structure coefficient for dimension one is a 
high .94, while dimensions two and three structure 
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coefficients are -.04 and -.33 respectively. This indicates 
that eighty-eight percent of the variance of dimension one 
is being accounted for by the discriminant function. 
chi-square. The chi-square test is useful because it 
does not require interval data and therefore is a 
conservative test of significance when interval data are 
redefined as ordinal or nominal. It can be applied in this 
instance because the regulatory environment classification 
resulted in mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories and 
in independent observations which can be reduced to a 
nominal-leve} variable. Dimension one provides a good 
measure of regulatory environment, so its coordinates serve 
to assign each firm into one of two nominal values of the 
observed regulatory environment; the predicted environment 
uses each firm's hypothesized classification. Chi-square 
tests the relationship between the predicted and observed 
regulatory environment classifications. 
Since the chi-square analysis utilizes dimension 
one, the dimension that best classified firms in the 
discriminant model, one might expect that the confounding 
effect of the other two dimensions is removed. Such appears 
to be the case, because the chi-square contingency table and 
table of misclassified firms show nine firms as 
misclassified, compared with the eleven misclassified by the 
discriminant model (see Tables XLVIII and XLIX). 
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The chi-square statistic, 13.65, is significant at the 
.0001 level, thereby supporting the research hypothesis. 
This support is confirmed by the measure of association, 
phi, at .57. Therefore, based on chi-square analysis, the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship· 
between regulatory environment and patterns of PAC activity 
is rejected. 
Discussion 
A comparison of the 1981-82 and 1977-78 hypothesis 
test results reveals a striking correspondence between these 
two independent data sets. Both analyses provide support 
for the resource dependence model and exhibit a pronounced 
commonality between the sets of firms which were 
misclassified in each election cycle (see pages 175-176 
for discussion on misclassified firms.) 
Table L compares some relevant coefficients and 
statistics for the two data sets. This table suggests that 
the relationship between political activity and resource 
dependence as exemplified by similar regulatory environments 
not only persisted from one election cycle to the other but, 
indeed, strengthened. 
Coincident results. Three observations, two of which 
contradict current thinking, are bolstered by the 
coincidence between results from the 1977-78 and 1981-82 
data sets. 
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Three banks (Mellon, security Pacific, and Wells 
Fargo) exhibit behavior which runs counter to expectations. 
All are traditionally associated with a single-industry, 
economic regulatory environment but exhibit ideological 
behavior. This finding strongly suggests that conventional 
wisdom regarding the banking industry's political behavior 
needs to be reexamined. 
Rockwell, Honeywell, and United Technologies also 
exhibited unexpected behavior. These three large defense 
contractors contributed well over the median to Republicans 
and New Right candidates, yet pragmatic behavior by firms 
which generate a significant portion of revenue from 
government sales is anticipated. As with the banking 
industry, this research calls for a reexamination of 
corporate political activity patterns exhibited by defense 
. 
contractors and other corporations dependent upon government 
sales. 
Finally, as was the case in 1977-78, the sample's two 
representatives from the tobacco industry displayed 
pragmatic political behavior, both contributing well over 
the median to Democratic candidates (although R. J. Reynolds 
did support a large number of New Right candidates). This 
would seem to support the prior contention that the extreme 
social and political pressures on the tobacco industry have 
fostered a need to take the lower-risk strategy of 
supporting incumbents to enhance access to powerful 
legislators, as opposed to the riskier strategy of 
attempting to change the overall composition of Congress. 
CLASS COHESION 
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This section addresses the research question: Can 
class cohesion theory explain intercorporate patterns of 
corporate political activity, specifically political action 
committee (PAC) campaign contributions? 
The Hypothesis Tests 
Class cohesion theory is tested with four research 
hypotheses--H2 through H5. These hypotheses and their 
associated null hypotheses are presented below: 
H2: Firms' number of interlocking directorates will 
relate directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
H02: There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of direct or indirect 
interlocks with the set of sampled firms. 
H3: Firms' number of associations with certain 
prestigious business policy groups will relate directly to 
similar political behavior among firms. 
H03 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of associations with 
major business policy groups. 
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H4: Shared educational experience among Board 
Chairmen and CEOs will relate directly to similar political 
behavior. 
H04 : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MOS coordinates and a shared educational experience 
among Chairmen and CEO's. 
H5: Geographically proximate headquarters will relate 
directly to similar political behavior. 
HOs : There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MOS coordinates and its headquarters' location. 
Multiple regression and canonical discriminant. The 
class cohesion hypotheses were tested with four regression 
models and one canonical discriminant model in which 
intercorporate networks (dependent variable) are predicted 
by MOS coordinates (independent variables). The respective 
intercorporate networks for each of the five models are the 
number of direct interlocks (hypothesis 2); the number of 
indirect interlocks (hypothesis 2); the number of 
professional associations (hypothesis 3); a dummy-coded 
variable representing the chairman and/or president's 
education (hypothesis 4); and a dummy-coded variable 
indicating location of corporate headquarters (hypothesis 
5) • 
Table XLV displays regression, canonical, and 
correlation coefficients for each of the three coordinates 
from the MOS solution as it relates to the determinants of 
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class cohesion theory. Also reported are the coefficients 
of determination, squared canonical correlations, Wilks' 
lambda (where applicable), and associated F values for each 
model. Asterisks indicate significance levels. 
Analytical results for the 1981-82 data set closely 
parallel the results for the 1977-78 data set. First, no 
apparent relationship was revealed between corporate 
political activity as measured by the proximity of PAC 
contributions and the extent of a corporation's interlocking 
directorates, its number of professional associations, or 
its president's and CEO's educational background. Second, 
there is only modest support for the fifth class cohesion 
hypothesis that firms with geographically proximate 
headquarters will exhibit similar political behavior. 8 
Discussion 
The geographic proximity model argues that corporate 
elites are bound together because their offices are 
proximate. Logically, then, proximity's effect should be 
more pronounced among state groupings of firms than among 
regional 'groupings. Indeed, this contention is supported by 
the clustering of New York metropolitan area firms at one 
end of the MDS map in Figure 12 and California firms at the 
other end. 
8The significant statistics from each of the two 
election cycle data sets, as they relate to HQ location, 
reveal a striking correspondence. These comparative 
statistics appear in Table LI. 
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The argument is weakened considerably, however, when 
the entire sample is subjected to a state-by-state analysis. 
State by state, discriminant analysis misclassifies fifty 
percent of the sample (see Table LII), suggesting a regional 
interpretation of the MDS map 
The regional configuration is imperfect, but its 
general outline is clear. The only truly western firms in 
the sample, those in California, occupy the negative end of 
dimension two, and firms located in New York and Connecticut 
occupy the positive end. Thus, the two coastal regions are 
established. A central clustering encompasses firms located 
from Missouri in the west to Pennsylvania in the east. 
As stated, the alignment is imperfect, but it is 
supported statistically. Some New York firms are positioned 
close to the Michigan set, and First chicago Corporation is 
positioned with the East. Despite these departures, the 
correlations and chi-square statistics indicate a 
significant relationship. 
The final support for the regional model over the 
class cohesion. model is to be found in contributions to 
categories of candidates. Table XXXVI reveals significant 
negative ,correlations between dimension two, the Regional 
Dimension, and contributions to Republicans (r = -.45; p < 
.003) and New Right candidates (r = -.52; p < .0003); 
further, as would be expected, dimension two is positively 
related to contributions to incumbents (r = .49; p < .0009). 
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These correlations, combined with the regional mapping, 
suggest that eastern-based firms are contributing more PAC 
dollars to incumbents, while California firms are 
contributing more to Republican and New Right candidates. 
Indeed, five of the six sample firms based in California 
were previously labeled ideological, and eleven of the 
fifteen firms based in New York/Connecticut were labeled 
pragmatic. 
This mapping lends additional support to Burris's 
(1987) research which considered the influence of culture 
and lineage on political attitudes. The 1981-82 
intercorporate structure of similar corporate PAC 
contributions reveals a tendency for the "Eastern 
Establishment" to be more progressive or at least 
politically moderate, while the "Western Cowboys" are 
generally more conservative and ideological. 
Politics and geography. These analyses suggest an 
extension of my research and potentially fruitful research 
directions. PAC contributions to "horne boy" candidates 
competing in national races can be factored out, thus 
isolating political activity in support of candidates from 
states other than the firms' headquarters location. 
Further, whether home-state and out-of-state strategies are 
consistent could be of considerable interest. For example, 
home-state incumbents may be targeted to enhance access 
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opportunities, while conservative challengers in tight out-
of-state races may receive the balance of PAC funds. 
Summary of Class Cohesion 
Hypothesis Testing 
Analysis of the 1981-82 PAC contribution data provides 
some evidence to support only one hypothesis associated with 
the class cohesion theory: Firms with geographically 
proximate headquarters will exhibit similar behavior. New 
York and California headquartered firms are positioned at 
opposite ends of dimension two on the MDS map which scales 
similar corporate PAC contributions. But a state-by-state 
discriminant analysis misclassified fifty percent of the 
sample, thus a regional rather than a class cohesion theory 
of busin~ss partisanship better explains the intercorporate 
structure. The regional theory hypothesis is strengthened 
by the significant relationship which was exhibited between 
regional headquarters' location and candidate-type 
contribution patterns. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The structural analysis of the 1981-82 data set 
supports three of the four conclusions from the analysis of 
1977-78 data in chapter IV and draws a further conclusion 
not reached in the earlier analysis. The two analyses show 
commonalities that suggest the model's reliability. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Both analyses support the contention that resource 
dependence theory, defined as similar patterns of 
intercorporate behavior emanating from a common set of 
constraints (a common regulatory environment) can explain 
intercorporate patterns of corporate political activity 
(patterns of PAC campaign contributions). 
Class Cohesion Theory 
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Neither analysis supports the complementary contention 
which advanced class cohesion theory as an explanation for 
patterns of political consensus among corporate executives; 
that is, no significant relationship was discovered between 
a firm's pattern of PAC contributions and its number of 
interlocking directorates, professional associations, and 
educational background. 
Regional Theory 
Both analyses provide some support for a regional 
theory of. business partisanship. There is an apparent 
relationship between regionally proximate headquarters 
locations and the selection of corporate PAC contribution 
recipients. 
Regulatory Environment/strategy 
Relationship 
Both the 1977-78 and 1981-82 results lend support to 
previous research regarding the relationship between PAC 
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strategy and regulatory environment. The conjecture that 
economically regulated firms will tend to pursue pragmatic 
PAC strategies, and socially regulated firms will tend to 
support ideological PAC strategies is supported. 
Nevertheless, both election cycles identified firms 
linked to the defense industry as deviating from expected 
patterns. An economic environment evoking pragmatic PAC 
behavior is expected, yet inconsistent patterns emerged. 
Reliability 
Finally, the comparison of the 1977-78 and 1981-82 
results provides support for the research model's 
reliability. Specifically, while some firms' regulatory 
environment was not correctly classified by the MOS model, a 
striking commonality among the misclassified firms was 
observed. This suggests that the regulatory environment 
indicated by the MOS coordinates is more likely to resemble 
the "true" regulatory environment rather than a random 
misclassification. Further support is evidenced from the 
correlation between election cycles on the regulatory 
environment dimension (r = .51; P < .0006). 
TABLE XXX 
DISTRIBUTION OF 1981-82 SIMILARITY MEASURES 
OUARTILES AND INTEROUARTlLE RANGE 
Ouartiles 
Maximum 
03 
Median 
01 
Minimum 
Interquartile range 
Values 
0.624 
0.341 
0.251 
0.157 
o 
0.184 
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Mellon 
Honeywell 
TABLE XXXI 
FIRM DYADS EXHIBITING ZERO POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Can Ed 
o 
.m 
o 
o 
Ve1ls Fargo 
o 
Note: 0 marks the four firm dyads which exhibited zero political 
consensus. 
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TABLE XXXII 
FIRM DYADS EXHIBITING HIGH POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
1981-82' ELECTION 
Firm --L _5_ _7_ _8_ 
-1..2- .J.L J.L --1L 
1. Arco .518 
2. Dow .510 
3. Ford .535 
4. GE 
5. GM .554 
6. GTE .532 
7. K Mart 
8. Lockheed .605 
9. Penney .522 
10. Philip Morris .508 
11. RJR .526 
12. Rockwell .533 .590 
13. Sears .544 .523 
14. Security Pacific 
IS. Texaco .522 
16. Union Pacific .535 .537 .514 
17. USX .547 .512 .516 
18. United Tech. .577 .534 .562 .516 .503 
19. llells Fargo .624 
20. llestinghouse .563 
Notes: Matrix cells identify the 27 dyads exhibiting high 
political consensus, defined as similarity scores greater than 
.50. 
TABLE XXXIII 
FIT INDICES FOR FIVE EUCLIDEAN MODELS 
1981-82 SIMILARITY DATA 
MDS 
Dimensionality Stress SStress ...l\§.Q. 
1 .400 .504 .592 
2 .237 .348 .775 
3 .181 .256 .837 
4 .131 .193 .895 
5 .106 .155 .921 
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TABLE XXXIV 
ITERATION HISTORY FOR THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Iteration 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
SStress 
0.459 
0.306 
0.281 
0.272 
0.267 
0.264 
0.262 
0.261 
0.261 
0.260 
0.260 
0.259 
0.259 
0.258 
0.258 
0.257 
0.257 
0.257 
0.257 
0.257 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
0.256 
Improvement 
0.153 
0.025 
0.009 
0.005 
0.003 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: Iterations stopped because SStress improved less than 0.000010 
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TABLE XXXV 
FIRMS FOR WHICH HYPOTHESIZED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CLASSIFICATION 
DIFFERED FROM THE HDS CLASSIFICATION 
1977-78 
Bethlehem Steel" (E) 
Federated Department Store (E) 
GTE (S) 
Honeyvell {S) 
Rockwell (S) 
Southern Pacific (S) 
TWA (S) 
Union Pacific (S) 
United Air Lines (S) 
·United Technologies (S) 
1981-82 
American Electric Power (S) 
Bethlehem Steel (E) 
Federated Department Store (E) 
GTE (S) 
Honeywell (S) 
International Harvester (E) 
LTV (E) 
Penney (E) 
United Technologies (S) 
Note: HDS classification is in parentheses. E = Economic, S = Social 
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TABLE XXXVI 
CORRELATIONS BETVEEN HDS COORDINATES AND INTERPRETIVE VARIABLES 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 _1_1_ 12 13 14 
1. Dimension 1 -.060 .003 -.249 -.265 .149 .193 .082 -.578 .599 .517 -.504 .550 -.258 
P < .000 .000 .001 .001 .038 
2. Dimension 2 .000 .024 .141 .120 -.261 -.246 .494 -.452 -.529 .024 .691 .117 
P < .001 .003 .000 .001 
3. Dimension 3 .058 -.069 -.133 - .117 -.017 -.131 .247 .215 .178 .438 .256 
4. Direct interlocks .743 .421 .169 .155 .245 -.176 -.115 .109 .326 -.105 
P < .000 .006 
5. Indirect interlocks .513 .354 .231 .461 -.340 -.353 .056 .490 -.186 
p < .001 .021 .002 .028 .022 
6. Professional associations .387 .374 .253 -.115 -.174 -.273 .456 -.051 
p < .011 .015 
7. Donees .840 .011 - .018 -.057 - .072 .358 -.260 
p < .000 
8. S Contributions 
-.030 .007 .031 .121 .406 -.279 
9. Incumbent proportion 
- .817 -.904 -.332 .541 .205 
p < .000 .000 .032 .047 
10. Republican proportion .870 -.250 .408 - .182 
P < .000 
11. New Right proportion 
-.187 .526 - .190 
12. Regulatory environment 
.471 .169 
13. Headquarters 
.273 
14. Education 
Note: Probability displayed only when p < .05. N 
0 
VI 
206 
TABLE XXXVII 
PAC CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Proeortion of Dollars Donated to 
l!2t. Firm Incumbent Reeublican New Right 
1 ALCOA .715 ".740 .167 
2 American Electric Power .770 .654 .153 
3 American Express .962 .389 .035 
4 Arco .746 .659 .183 
5 Bethlehem Steel .945 .457 .065 
6 Chrysler .793 .520 .104 
7 Citicorp .818 .539 .158 
8 Consolidated Edison .893 .415 .101 
9 Dow .464 .964 .354 
10 Federated Department Store .875 .418 .104 
11 First Chicago .919 .380 .041 
12 Ford .843 .609 .131 
13 GE .931 .520 .061 
14 GM .806 .755 .145 
15 GTE .844 .550 .082 
16 Goodyear .843 .619 .115 
17 Honeywell .718 .876 .248 
18 International Harvester .867 .598 .032 
19 K Mart .584 .912 .314 
20 Lockheed .793 .531 .140 
21 LTV .734 .575 .126 
22 Manufacturers Hanover .898 .570 .134 
23 MellGm .774 .681 .161 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance .906 .529 .060 
25 Monsanto .734 .720 .223 
26 Pan American .981 .492 .019 
27 Penney .885 .425 .062 
28 Philip Morris .735 .445 .083 
29 RJR .809 .533 .163 
30 Rockwell .841 .659 .165 
31 Sears .632 .778 .206 
" 32 Security Pacific .554 .784 .359 
33 Southern Pacific .697 .578 .146 
34 Texaco .600 .811 .288 
35 TVA .938 .511 .039 
36 Union Carbide .652 .819 .271 
37 Union Pacific .822 .674 .136 
38 United Air Lines .902 .537 .087 
39 USX .823 .687 .172 
40 United Technologies .757 .672 .208 
41 Vells Fargo .687 .740 .277 
42 Vestinghouse .878 .471 .100 
All Corporate PACs .730 .650 
Sample .790 .610 .140 
7ederal Election Commission 
TABLE XXXVIII 
IDEOLOGICAL PAC CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Proportion of Dollars Donated to 
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Firm Incumbent Republican New Right 
ALCOA .715 .740 .167 
American Electric Power .770 .654 .153 
Arco .746 .659 .183 
Dow .464 .964 .354 
GM .806 .755 .145 
Honeywell .718 .876 .248 
K Mart .584 .912 .314 
Mellon .774 .681 .161 
Monsanto .734 .720 .223 
Rockwell .841 .659 .165 
Sears .632 .778 .206 
Security Pacific .554 .784 .359 
Southern Pacific· .657 .578 .146 
Texaco .600 .811 .288 
Union Carbide .652 .819 .271 
Union Pacific .822 .674 .136 
USX .823 .687 .172 
United Technologies .757 .672 .208 
Wells Fargo .687 .740 .277 
Note: Categories overlap, e.g. , a candidate can be a Republican 
incumbent. 
~deological leaning 
TABLE XXXIX 
PRAGMATIC PAC CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
1981-82 ELECTION 
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Proportion of Dollars Donated to 
Firm Incumbent Republican New Right 
American Express 
Bethlehem Steel 
Chrysler 
Citicorp· 
Consolidated Edison 
Federated Department Store 
First Chicago 
Ford 
GE 
GTE 
Goodyear 
International Harvester 
Lockheed· 
LTV 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Pan American 
Penney 
Philip Morris 
RJR 
TWA 
United Air Lines 
Westinghouse 
.962 
.945 
.793 
.818 
.893 
.875 
.919 
.843 
.931 
.844 
.843 
.867 
.793 
.734 
.898 
.906 
.981 
.885 
.735 
.809 
.938 
.902 
.878 
.389 
.457 
.520 
.539 
.415 
.418 
.380 
.609 
.520 
.550 
.619 
.598 
.531 
.575 
.570 
.529 
.492 
.425 
.445 
.533 
.511 
.537 
.471 
Note: Categories overlap, e.g., a candidate can be a Republican 
incumbent. 
~ragmatic leaning 
.035 
.065 
.104 
.158 
.101 
.104 
.041 
.131 
.061 
.082 
.115 
.032 
.140 
.126 
.134 
.060 
.019 
.062 
.083 
.163 
.039 
.087 
.100 
TABLE XL 
ACTUAL AND HDS-GENERATED HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Firm 
ALCOA 
American Electric Power 
American Express 
Arco 
Bethlehem Steel 
Chrysler 
Citicorp 
Consolidated Edison 
Dow 
Federated Department Store 
Ford 
GE 
GH 
GTE 
Goodyear 
K Hart 
Lockheed 
Hanufacturers Hanover 
Hellon 
Hetropolitan Life Insurance 
Honsanto 
·Pan American 
Penney 
Philip Horris 
Rockwell 
Sears 
Security Pacific 
Southern Pacific 
Texaco 
TVA 
Union Carbide 
Union Pacific 
USX 
United Technologies 
Yells Fargo 
Yes tinghouse 
1Usclass i fied 
Dimension 
Two 
-0.061 
1.442 
0.821 
-1.323 
1.000 
-0.364 
0.473 
1.799 
-0.428 
-0.041 
-0.295 
0.061 
0.097 
-0.567 
0.944 
-0.594 
-0.879 
2.030 
1.182 
0.242 
-0.418 
0.053 
-0.458 
0.469 
-0.752 
-0.380 
-1. 713 
-1.230 
-0.798 
-0.377 
0.162 
-0.254 
0.069 
-0.223 
-2.962 
0.171 
Headquarters 
Actual HDS 
PA-OH 
PA-OH 
NY-CT 
CALIF 
PA-OH 
HI-HO 
NY-C'l' 
NY-CT 
HI-HO 
PA-OH 
HI-HO 
NY-CT 
HI-HO 
NY-CT 
PA-OB 
HI-HO 
CALIF 
NY-CT 
PA-OH 
NY-CT 
HI-HO 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
CALIF 
IL 
CALIF 
CALIF 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
PA-OB 
NY-CT 
CALIF 
PA-OH 
PA-OH 
NY-CT-
NY-CT 
CALIF 
NY-CT-
HI-HO 
NY-CT 
NY-CT 
HI-HO 
PA-OH 
HI-HO 
PA-OH-
PA-OH-
HI-HO-
NY-CT-
HI-HO 
CALIF 
NY-CT 
NY-CT-
NY-CT 
HI-HO 
PA-OB-
HI-HO-
NY-CT 
CALIF 
HI-HO-
CALIF 
CALIF 
CALIF-
HI-HO-
PA-OB-
HI-HO-
PA-OB 
PA-OB-
CALIF 
PA-OB 
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Actual 
Statistic 
Chi-square 
Cramer's V 
TABLE XLI 
ACTUAL AND MDS-GENERATED HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY TABLE 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Frequency 
Expected CALIF 
--------- -------
CALIF 6 
1.2 
--------- -------
HI-HO 0 
1.2 
---------1-------
1 
1 
NY-CT 1 1 I 
I 3.0 I 
---------:-------I 
I 
PA-OH I 0 I 
I 1.6 I 
---------:-------Total 7 
9 
MDS 
MI-HO NY-CT PA-OH 1 1 
------- -------
- ______ 1 
0 0 0 
1.5 1.7 1.5 
------- ------- -------
5 0 1 
1.5 1.7 1.5 
------- ------- -------
4 6 4 
3.9 4.3 3.9 
------- ------- -------
r 
0 4 I 4 I 
2.1 2.3 I 2.1 I 
-------:-------:-------9 
Value 
43.66 
0.65 
10 9 
0.000 
Total 
6 
6 
15 
8 
35 
Effective sample size = 35 
Note: A significant chi-square of 30.156 (p < .0001) results when HO 
locations labeled nothern'are included. 
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TABLE XLII 
NUMBER OF DONEES TO VHOM PACS CONTRIBUTED 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Interval Level Statistics 
Sample Size 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
42 
122.024 
72.511 
Quartiles 
Maximum 
03 
Median 
01 
Minimum 
288 
193 
118 
57 
18 
211 
212 
TABLE XLIII 
ACTUAL AND MDS-GENERATED CATEGORIES 
FOR NUMBER OF DONEES 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Dimension Categor~ 
llt. Firm Three Donees Actual MDS 
1 ALCOA 0.330 130 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
2 American Electric Power -0.398 42 LOW AVG-HIGHA 
3 American Express 0.869 80 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
4 Arco -0.220 149 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
5 Bethlehem Steel 0.205 81 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
6 Chrysler 0.024 126 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
7 Citicorp 0.235 157 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
8 Consolidated Edison -2.169 45 LOW LOW 
9 Dow 0.213 69 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
10 Federated Department Store -0.057 124 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
11 First Chicago 1.437 22 LOW LOW 
12 Ford -0.193 144 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
13 GE -0.085 288 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
14 GM 
-0.037 200 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
15 GTE -0.009 221 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
16 Goodyear -0.019 65 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
17 Honeywell 1.623 53 LOW LOW 
18 International Harvester 0.098 58 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
19 K Mart 0.068 118 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
20 Lockheed -0.311 208 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
21 LTV -3.135 31 LOW LOW 
22 Manufacturers Hanover 0.264 53 LOW AVG-HIGHA 
23 Mellon 3.394 18 LOW LOW 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance -0.822 121 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
25 Monsal7:to -0.521 97 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
26 Pan American -1.203 43 LOW LOW 
27 Penney -0.143 170 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
28 Philip Morris -0.391 214 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
29 RJR -0.488 107 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
30 Rockwell 0.068 207 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
31 Sears 0.225 263 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
32 Security Pacific 1.415 55 LOW LOW 
33 Southern Pacific -0.111 118 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
34 Texaco -0.796 140 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
35 TWA -0.439 60 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
36 Union Carbide 0.854 73 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
37 Union Pacific -0.165 237 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
38 United Air Lines -0.033 84 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
39 USX 0.370 190 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
40 United Technologies -0.658 217 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
41 Wells Fargo 0.513 42 LOW AVG-HIGHA 
42 Westinghouse 0.200 205 AVG-HIGH AVG-HIGH 
'Hisclassified 
TABLE XLIV 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INTERVAL LEVEL VARIABLES 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Variable 
Direct interlocks 
Indirect interlocks 
Professional associations 
Donees 
$ Contributions 
Incumbent proportion 
Republican proportion 
New Right proportion 
Mean 
5.619 
166.405 
2.524 
122.024 
76,853.950 
0.794 
0.614 
0.148 
Std Dev 
3.722 
90.929 
1.330 
72.511 
57,931.490 
0.119 
0.146 
0.087 
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TABLE XLV 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND CLASS COHESION VARIABLES 
REGRESSED AGAINST HDS COORDINATES 
1981-82 ELECTIQN 
Inde~endent Variables 
Equation De~endent Variables Dimension 1 Dimension 2 'Dimension 3 R2 F 
Resource Dependence Hypothesis 
(1) Regulatory environment -.244** -.003 .092 .286 5.07* 
(-.504) (.024) (.178) 
Class Cohesion Hypotheses 
(2) Direct interlocks -.886 .033 .224 .065 .89 
(-.249) (.024) (.058) 
(3) Indirect interlocks -22.419 11. 348 -6.345 .091 1.26 
(-.264) (.141) (-.069) 
(4) Professional associations .200 .171 -.181 .057 .76 
(.149) (.120) (-.133) 
(5) Education -.115 .048 .125 .143 2.11 
(-.258) (.117) (.256) 
(6) Headquarters location .249 1.262 -.063 .485 
.290 2.86** 
Note: The first cell entry under the three dimensions for the first five equations is that model's 
unstandardized regression coefficient; the second, parenthetical, entry is the model's zero-order 
correlations. The sixth equation required canonical analysis; therefore, the unstandardized canonical 
coefficients are reported in the first three columns, and the squared canonical correction and Wilks' 
lambda in the fourth column. 
* p < .005 
** p < .001 N 
-~ 
TABLE XLVI 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
FOR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Number of Observations and 
From Percents Classified into 
Regulatory RegulatorI Environment 
Environment Economic Social Total 
Economic 16 6 22 
72.73 27.27 100.00 
Social 6 14 20 
30.00 70.00 100.00 
Total 22 20 42 
Percent 52.38 47.62 100.00 
Priors 50.00 50.00 
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TABLE XLVII 
ACTUAL AND DISCRIMINANT-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CATEGORIES 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Categorl! Coefficient 
1M Firm Actual Classified Economic Social 
1 ALCOA Social Social 0.086 0.914 
2 American Electric Power Economic Economic 0.643 0.357 
3 American Express Economic Economic 0.907 0.093 
4 Arco Social Economic 0.501 0.499 
5 Bethlehem Steel Social Economic 0.634 0.3668 
6 Chrysler Social Social 0.134 0.867 
7 Citicorp Economic Economic 0.725 0.275 
8 Consolidated Edison Economic Economic 0.989 0.011 
9 Dow Social Social 0.013 0.987 
10 Federated Department Store Social Economic 0.625 0.3758 
11 First Chicago Economic Economic 0.998 0.002 
12 Ford Social Social 0.136 0.864 
13 GE Economic Social 0.250 0.7508 
14 GM Social Social 0.175 0.825 
15 GTE Economic Social 0.225 0.7768 
16 Goodyear Social Social 0.174 0.826 
17 Honeywell Economic Economic 0.951 0.050 
18 International Harvester Social Economic 0.716 0.2848 
19 K Mart Social Social 0.042 0.958 
20 Lockheed Economic Economic 0.524 0.476 
21 LTV Social Economic 0.821 0.1798 
22 Manufacturers Hanover Economic Economic 0.954 0.046 
23 Mellon Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance Economic Social 0.263 0.7378 
25 Monsanto Social Social 0.062 0.938 
26 Pan American Economic Economic 0.704 0.296 
27 Penney Social Economic 0.609 0.3918 
28 Philip Morris Social Social 0.240 0.760 
29 RJR Social Social 0.147 0.853 
30 Rockwe1l Economic Economic 0.593 0.407 
31 Sears Social Social 0.133 0.867 
32 Security Pacific Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
33 Southern Pacific Economic Economic 0.924 0.077 
34 Texaco Social Social 0.120 0.880 
35 TWA Economic Economic 0.902 0.099 
36 Union Carbide Social Social 0.063 0.937 
37 Union Pacific Economic Social 0.244 0.7568 
38 United Air Lines Economic Economic 0.754 0.246 
39 USX Social Social 0.295 0.706 
40 United Technologies Economic Social 0.189 0.8118 
41 We1ls Fargo Economic Economic 1.000 0.000 
42 Westinghouse Economic Social 0.342 0.6598 
8Misclassified 
TABLE XLVIII 
ACTUAL AND HDS-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONHENT CATEGORIES 
CHI-SQUARE CONTINGENCY TABLE 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Actual 
Frequency 
Expected 
Economic 
-----------
Social 
HDS 
Economic 
18 
12.0 
-------------
5 
11.0 
Social 
4 
10.0 
-----------
15 
9.0 
----------- -------------1-----------
Total 23 19 
Statistic OF Value 
Chi-square 1 13.652 
Continuity adj. chi-square 1 11.455 
Fisher's exact test (2-tail) 
Phi 0.570 
Sample size = 42 
Total 
22 
20 
42 
Prob 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
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TABLE XLIX 
ACTUAL AND MDS-CLASSIFIED REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT CATEGORIES 
1981-82 ELECTION 
Dimension Categor:i 
.!Qt. Firm One Actual MDS 
1 ALCOA 1.046 Social Social 
2 American Electric Power 1.829 Economic Social· 
3 American Express -1.141 Economic Economic 
4 Arco 0.428 Social Social 
5 Bethlehem Steel -0.667 Social Economic· 
6 Chrysler 0.694 Social Social 
7 Citicorp -1.109 Economic Economic 
8 Consolidated Edison -0.133 Economic Economic 
9 Dow 2.323 Social Social 
10 Federated Department Store -0.932 Social Economic· 
11 First Chicago -1.296 Economic Economic 
12 Ford 0.601 Social Social 
13 GE 0.038 Economic Economic 
14 GM 0.383 Social Social 
15 GTE 0.419 Economic Social· 
16 Goodyear 1.685 Social Social 
17 Honeywell 0.449 Economic Social· 
18 International Harvester -0.444 Social Economic· 
19 K Mart 1.563 Social Social 
20 Lockheed -0.175 Economic Economic 
21 LTV -0.960 Social Economic· 
22 Manufacturers Hanover -0.967 Economic Economic 
23 Mellon -0.508 Economic Economic 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance -0.182 Economic Economic 
25 Monsanto 1.352 Social Social 
26 Pan American -2.288 Economic Economic 
27 Penney -0.661 Social Economic· 
28 Philip Morris 0.124 Social Social 
29 RJR 0.981 Social Social 
30 Rockwell -0.212 Economic Economic 
31 Sears 0.773 Social Social 
32 Security Pacific -1.075 Economic Economic 
33 Southern Pacific -0.721 Economic Economic 
34 Texaco 0.993 Social Social 
35 TllA -1.943 Economic Economic 
36 Union Carbide 1.460 Social Social 
37 Union Pacific 0.110 Economic Economic 
38 United Air Lines -1.257 Economic Economic 
39 USX 0.150 . Social Social 
40 United Technologies 0.214 Economic Social· 
41 llells Fargo -0.841 Economic Economic 
42 llestinghouse -0.105 Economic Economic 
TABLE L 
A COMPARISON OF TEST STATISTICS 
1977-78 AND 1981-82 DATA 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
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Dependent Variaple: Regulatory Environment 1977-78 1981-82 
Multiple correlation coefficient .446 .534 
Coefficient of determination .200 .285 
Dimension one regression coefficient -.196 -.244 
Dimension one correlation coefficient -.425 -.503 
Dimension one structure coefficient .953 .942 
Chi-square (dimension one) 12.780 13.652 
Phi (associated with chi-square) .552 
Note: The regression and canonical discriminant models' dependent 
variable is regulatory environment; the independent variables are 
dimensions one, two, and three from the MDS solution. 
.570 
TABLE LI 
A COMPARISON OF TEST STATISTICS 
1977-78 AND 1981-82 DATA 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE 
Dependent Variable: Headquarters 1977-78 
Wilks' lambda .38 
F value 2.08* 
Squared caI'lonical correlation .47 
Structure coefficient .• 95 
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1981-82 
.29 
2.86** 
.48 
.97 
Note: The independent variables are dimensions one, two, and three from 
the MDS solution. Structure coefficients are reported on the first 
discriminant function and dimension two for both data sets. 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
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TABLE LII 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
FOR HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 
1981-82 ELECTION 
From Number of Observations and Percents Classified into Hg 
HO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
NY-CT 7 0 0 3 1 1 4 16 
43.75 0.00 0.00 18.75 6.25 6.25 25.00 100.00 
CALIF 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 6 
16.67 33.33 16.67 16.67 16.67 0.00 0.00 100.00 
PA 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 5 
0.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 
IL 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 4 
25.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
MI-MO 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 25.00 100.00 
OH 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 
33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00· 66.67 0.00 100.00 
OTHER 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 100.00 
Total 10 2 6 6 7 4 7 42 
Percent 23.81 4.76 14.29 14.29 16.67 9.52 16.67 100.00 
Priors 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29 
Scores Freauency 
0.00 **** 22 
0.06 ************************** 128 
0.12 ************************************************* 244 
0.18 **************************************************** 260 
0.24 ******************************************************************* 336 
0.30 ************************************************** 248 
0.36 ************************************************ 242 
0.42 ***************************** 146 
0.48 ********* 46 
0.54 ******** 42 
0.60 ** 8 
----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 
Figure 8. Frequency distribution of the 1981-82 similarity scores. 
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Figure 10. Scatter plot of nonlinear fit for the three-
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observations on the horizontal axis, 1981-82 election. 
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environments, 1981-82 elections. For definitions see pages 
14-16. See Table XLIX for firm legend. 
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elections. Outliers are firms which exhibited zero 
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See Table X~III for firm legend. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TWO ELECTION CYCLES COMPARED 
Chapters IV and V examined the intercorporate 
structure revealed by patterns of corporate PAC 
contributions expended during the 1977-78 and 1981-82 
election cycles, respectively. Chapter VI presents the 
results of testing hypothesis six which compares, across two 
election cycles, the proportion of each PAC's contributions 
directed toward incumbents, Republicans, and New Right 
candidates (see Table LIII). 
THE POLITICAL STRATEGY HYPOTHESIS 
Research Hypothesis: The ideology of a sitting White 
House administration will influence corporate PAC 
contribution patterns. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no significant change 
between patter~s of corporate political spending exhibited 
during the 1977-78 election cycle and the 1981-82 election 
cycle. 
Three statistical tests are employed to determine 
whether the null hypothesis should be rejected. The first 
is a paired difference comparison which computes a Student's 
t statistic for testing the hypothesis that the mean of the 
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difference between percentage contributions to each 
candidate type (incumbent, Republican, New Right) in the two 
election cycles is equal to zero. The second test is a 
canonical correlation which tests the predictive strength 
between the two sets of data; that is, can the proportion of 
contributions directed toward incumbent, Republican, and New 
Right candidates by each PAC during the 1977-78 election 
cycle predict the corresponding 1981-82 contribution 
pattern. Finally, differences between the two cycles are 
tested using critical values of the normal distribution in 
order to identify PACs that deviate significantly from the 
group. 
Paired Difference Experiment 
The Student t statistic tested the null hypothesis 
that contributions to candidate type did not change between 
election 'cycles; that is, the mean difference between 
percentage contributions to candidate type is equal to zero. 
The mean of three paired differences, one for each 
candidate type, was first calculated.' The Student t 
'For example, mean difference for incumbent 
contributions is equal to: 
where, 
MID = 
Inc78 = 
Inc82 = 
n = 
MID = (Inc78 - Inc82)/n 
Mean incumbent difference 
Percentage contributions to incumbents during 
1977-78 election cycle 
Percentage contribution to incumbents during 
1981-82 election cycle. 
Number of observations (forty-two firms). 
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statistic was then calculated for each candidate category to 
test the null hypothesis that the differences' mean is equal 
to zero (SAS Institute Inc. 1985b, 795-799). Table LIV 
displays the results. The null hypothesis can be rejected 
for the incumbent category (t = -7.34; p < .0001); however, 
it cannot be rejected for the Republican or New Right 
categories. 
These results support the contention that the 
proportion of PAC dollars contributed to incumbents did 
exhibit change between the two election cycles. 
contributions to Republican and New Right candidates did not 
significantly change between the two examined election 
cycles. 
canonical Correlation Analysis 
A canonical correlation analysis explores the power to 
predict 1981-82 values from 1977-78 data. Accordingly, the 
1977-78 data set is designated as the independent variable 
and the 1981-82 set the dependent variable. 
Carionical correlation is somewhat analogous to the 
multiple regression model. The latter attempts to explain 
variance in the lone dependent variable by finding the best 
linear combination of the independent variables. The 
canonical model seeks the best linear combination of the 
dependent set of multiple variables as well as the 
independent set. In short, the best pair of linear 
combinations is sought since multiple variables appear on 
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both sides of the equal sign. Further, it reiterates the 
process in successive attempts to explain residual variance. 
canonical analysis, then, finds the linear 
combinations (termed canonical variates) which maximize the 
correlation between the paired linear combinations. If this 
canonical correlation is significant, then a canonical 
redundancy analysis provides a measure of the predictive 
strength between the two sets of variables, i.e., how 
effectively one is able to predict a value in the dependent 
set if the corresponding value in the independent set is 
known (Pedhazur 1982, 722-743; SAS Institute Inc. 1985b, 
139-153). 
Table LV displays the results from the canonical 
analysis. The first section in the table displays the 
correlation between the two data sets and provides a direct 
test of the hypothesis. The remaining sections present 
correlational details that serve to enrich the analysis. 
The first canonical correlation (subsequent iterations 
did not produce significant results) of .7634 is significant 
at the .0001 l~vel and explains about fifty-eight percent of 
the variance; The null hypothesis of no correlation is 
rejected and the alternative is supported • 
. 
The second section in Table LV presents the 
correlations between categories of recipients from the 1977-
78 cycle to the 1981-82 cycle. The correlations in this 
matrix are all in the expected direction. Correlations are 
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high between proportions of contributions going to each 
category of recipients in the two cycles: .58 for 
incumbents, .66 for Republicans, and .65 for New Right 
candidates. Positive correlations are also found between 
contributions to Republicans and New Right candidates, while 
correlations between incumbents and the other two categories 
are negative. 
Within-set correlations are presented in the third 
section of Table LV. Again, all correlations are high and 
in the expected direction. 
The structure coefficients (analogous to factor 
loadings in factor analysis) for each set of variables and 
its corresponding linear combination, or canonical variate, 
are presented in the fourth section of Table LV. When 
squared, these loadings indicate the proportion of variance 
accounted for by the canonical variate. For example, the 
1981-82 loadings indicate that the variance of contributions 
to incumbent, Republican, and New Right accounted for by the 
canonical variate is approximately seventy-six percent 
(.872), ninety-seven percent (-.982), and seventy-three 
percent (-.852), respectively. 
The final section in Table LV presents the redundancy 
analysis. Of particular interest is that almost half, 
forty-eight percent, of the variance in the 1981-82 variable 
set is predictable from the linear combination of the 1977-
78 variables. Also notable is that approximately eighty-two 
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percent of the variance of the 1977-78 set, and eighty-four 
percent of the variance of the 1981-82 set of variables is 
accounted for by the canonical variates. 
In summary, the results from this canonical analysis, 
specifically the significant canonical correlation, the high 
between-set correlations, the high predictive variance as 
measured by the redundancy index, and the high variance 
accounted for by the canonical variates, support the 
contention that there is a significant relationship between 
the 1977-78 and 1981-82 contribution patterns. 
Patterns and Anomalies 
Results from the paired comparison test and canonical 
correlation analysis provide evidence regarding patterns of 
change for the set of sample firms, but the two neither 
identify PACs that bucked the trend nor provide insight into 
the pattern of change exhibited within the three candidate 
categories. Further analysis reveals that ten of the forty-
two firms exhibited significantly different behavior in the 
1981-82 cycle and that the New Right category exhibited the 
least consistency in the direction of change (eighteen firms 
increased contributions to New Right candidates, twenty-two 
decreased, and two exhibited no change). 
The test utilizes computed Z scores to compare the 
difference between the proportions of contributions that 
each PAC directed to each candidate type. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference (the difference is 
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equal to zero) in the proportion contributed to each 
candidate category--for example, a PAC contributed the same 
proportion to incumbents in 1981-82 as in 1977-78. Its 
purpose is to identify those firms which exhibited a 
significant difference in contributions between the election 
cycles, not to infer to a population. The test statistic is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between a 1977-78 
and a 1981-82 value (Xi) to the standard deviation (S) of 
the array of-forty-two differences: Z = (xi - O)/S. If 
this calculated value exceeds the critical value of 1.96 
(alpha = .05), the null hypothesis of zero difference is 
rejected and that value of xi is regarded as diverging from 
the norm. 
Table LVI lists each firms' calculated z scores for 
the three candidate types. As expected, given prior 
results, the incumbent category reveals a larger proportion 
of the sample firms diverging from the critical value. Nine 
firms' contribution patterns diverge from the norm in the 
incumbent category; three in the Republican category; and 
one in the New.Right category. That one firm, Goodyear, 
also diverged from the norm in the other two categories. 
DISCUSSION 
The 1978 election is identified by PAC researchers as 
a turning point for corporate political strategy. Prior to 
1978, corporate PACs overwhelmingly supported incumbents, 
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complying with the progressive and rational-choice 
perspectives which argue that a corporate PAC's primary 
objective in candidate selection is access to lawmakers, 
regardless of the candidate's ideology. The 1978 election 
candidate-support decisions, however, were marked by a tilt 
toward Republicans and conservative challengers, a 
bellwether to the Republican triumph of 1980 (Handler and 
Mulkern 1982, chapter two; Eismeier and Pollock 1988, 
chapter five). 
Eismeier and Pollock (1988), in their discussion of 
the role played by the corporate PAC sector in the pivotal 
1980 election, note: 
By all accounts the 1980 election was a partisan 
cataclysm. Not only was an incumbent president 
turned out of office in a landslide but Republicans 
captured thirty-three new House seats and a Senate 
majority for the first time in a generation. Among 
the several proximate causes of the upheaval in 
congressional elections was the unprecedented 
pouring of PAC money, especially that of corporate 
PACs, into the campaigns of Republican challengers 
and candidates for open seats (84). 
Corporate PACs' Republican partisanship in the 1980 
election carried over to some extent to the midterm 1982 
election, but was mitigated by economic and political 
factors. The 1982 recession and intensified efforts by 
Democrats to market themselves to corporate PACs resulted in 
less risk-taking by corporate PACs. Business increased its 
spending on Republican incumbents, but its proportion of 
spending on conservative challengers was sharply curtailed. 
In 1982, more than two-thirds of all corporate PACs who had 
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targeted challengers in 1980 had redirected their spending 
to incumbents (Eismeier and Pollock 1988, 87). 
The spending patterns displayed in Tables LIII and LVI 
generally support these aggregate statistics. Thirty-five 
of the forty-two sampled firms increased their proportion of 
spending on incumbents. The nine firms identified as 
anomalies display significant increases in support for 
incumbents from 1978 to 1982. 
The Eismeier and Pollock finding that contributions to 
New Right challengers were "sharply curtailed" is not 
reflected in Table LVI. Most firms show no significant 
change, and what change there is almost evenly divides 
itself between increases and decreases. The one firm that 
diverges from the majority shows decreased support for 
conservative challengers. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY' 
These data lead to rejection of a hypothesis 
originally formulated for this study, add a dimension to a 
major conclusion reached in chapters IV and V, and address 
prior research on contributions to incumbents. 
First, the hypothesis that PAC contribution patterns 
will vary with ideologically disparate White House 
administrations is rejected. While incumbent contribution 
patterns exhibited change between the election cycles, 
canonical correlation analysis revealed no significant 
change in the overall pattern of contributions. The 
implication is that a more or less business-friendly 
presence in the White House is not a major driving force 
behind corporate-PAC-contribution strategies. 
Second, the data lead to the conclusion that the 
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influence of regulatory environment on corporate political 
activity is strong and stable. Its strength is evidenced by 
the probability of incorrectly rejecting the first null 
hypothesis--less than one in one hundred (p < .01; see 
Tables XXIV and XLV)--considerably better than the critical 
value for rejection of .05. 2 Stability 'is evidenced by the 
probability of incorrectly accepting the sixth null 
hypothesis--less than one in ten thousand (p < .0001; see 
Table LV, section 1).3 
Finally, the direction of change observed in the 
incumbent category agrees with previous research which 
examined aggregate corporate PAC statistics. 
2HO,: There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its regulatory environment 
classification. 
3H06 : rhere is no significant change between patterns 
of corporate political activity spending exhibited during 
the 1977-78 election cycle and the 1981-82 election cycle. 
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TABLE LIII 
CANDIDATE-TYPE CONTRIBUTION PROPORTIONS 
1977-78 AND 1981-82 ELECTIONS 
Incumbent Re~ublican New Right 
Firm 77-78 81-82 77-78 81-82 77-78 81-82 
ALCOA 0.57 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.21 0.17 
American Electric Power 0.76 0.77 0.39 0.65 0.12 0.15 
American Express 0.88 0.96 0.40 0.39 0.02 0.03 
Arco 0.58 0.75 0.74 0.66 0.22 0.18 
Bethlehem Steel 0.69 0.95 0.59 0.46 0.22 0.07 
Chrysler 0.65 0.79 0.55 0.52 0.12 0.10 
Citicorp 0.77 0.82 0.50 0.54 0.07 0.16 
Consolidated Edison 0.76 0.89 0.29 0.41 0.04 0.10 
Dow 0.31 0.46 0.91 0.96 0.46 0.35 
Federated Department Store 0.83 0.88 0.31 0.42 0.02 0.10 
First Chicago 0.66 0.92 0.65 0.38 0.05 0.04 
Ford 0.59 0.84 0.72 0.61 0.19 0.13 
GE 0.70 0.93 0.48 0.52 0.10 0.06 
GM 0.69 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.18 0.15 
GTE 0.55 0.84 0.65 0.55 0.07 0.08 
Goodyear 0.45 0.84 0.88 0.62 0.32 0.12 
Honeywell 0.18 0.72 0.94 0.88 0.34 0.25 
International Harvester 0.62 0.87 0.77 0.60 0.18 0.03 
K Mart 0.42 0.58 0.74 0.91 0.30 0.31 
Lockheed 0.81 0.79 0.52 0.53 0.11 0.14 
LTV 0.69 0.73 0.36 0.57 0.05 0.13 
Manufacturers Hanover 0.72 0.90 0.64 0.57 0.07 0.13 
Mellon 0.39 0.77 0.60 0.68 0.30 0.16 
Metropolitan Life Insurance 0.79 0.91 0.45 0.53 0.05 0.06 
Monsanto 0.74 0.73 0.52 0.72 0.11 0.22 
Pan American 0.87 0.98 0.36 0.49 0.04 0.02 
Penney 0.63 0.88 0.59 0.42 0.19 0.06 
Philip Morris 0.79 0.73 0.44 0.44 0.18 0.08 
RJR 0.73 0.81 0.50 0.53 0.12 0.16 
Rockwell 0.81 0.84 0.65 0.66 0.21 0.17 
Sears 0.51 0.63 0.76 0.78 0.30 0.21 
Security Pacific 0.55 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.24 0.36 
Southern Pacific 0.76 0.70 0.36 0.58 0.09 0.15 
Texaco 0.41 0.60 0.84 0.81 0.41 0.29 
TWA 0.80 0.94 0.32 0.51 0.02 0.04 
Union Carbide 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.82 0.17 0.27 
Union Pacific 0.65 0.82 0.46 0.67 0.14 0.14 
United Air Lines 0.69 0.90 0.64 0.54 0.16 0.09 
USX 0.60 0.82 0.62 0.69 0.21 0.17 
United Technologies 0.59 0.76 0.77 0.67 0.21 0.21 
Yells Fargo 0.73 0.69 0.53 0.74 0.13 0.28 
Westinghouse 0.68 0.88 0.49 0.47 0.12 0.10 
Variable 
Incumbent 
Republican 
New Right 
TABLE LIV 
CHANGES IN PROPORTIONS OF DOLLAR CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO TYPES OF CANDIDATES 
1977-78 TO 1981-82 
Standard Error 
Mean of Mean t 
-0.145 0.020 -7.34 
-0.026 0.020 -1.30 
0.015 0.013 1.20 
239 
Probabili ty 
0.0001 
0.2013 
0.2373 
TABLE LV 
CANONICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION PATTERNS 
FOR TVO ELECTION CYCLES 
1977.-78 AND 1981-82 
Section 1: Correlation between the 1977-78 and 1981-82 data sets 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Squared Canonical 
Correlation 
_F_ 
5.197 
Probabil1 ty 
0.763 0.583 0.0001 
Section 2: Correlations between the 1981-82 and 1977-78 contribution 
patterns 
Incumbent 81-82 
Republican 81-82 
New Right 81-82 
Incumbent 77-78 
0.580 
-0.690 
-0.566 
Section 3: Yithin set correlations 
Incumbent 81-82 
Republican 81-82 
New Right 81-82 
Incumbent 77-78 
Republican 77-7~ 
New Right 77-78 
Incumbent 81-82 
1.000 
-0.817 
-0.904 
Incumbent 77-78 
1.000 
-0.806 
-0.841 
Section 4: Structure Coefficents 
Republican 77-78 
-0.474 
0.665 
0.520 
Republi can 81-82 
-0.817 
1.000 
0.870 
Republican 77 -78 
-0.806 
1.000 
0.821 
Ne .... Right 77-78 
-0.669 
0.743 
0.655 
New Right 81-82 
-0.904 
0.870 
1.000 
New Right 77-78 
-0.841 
0.821 
1.000 
Correlations between the canonical variates and contribution patterns 
Incumbent 81-82 
Republican 81-82 
New Right 81-82 
CV 81-82 
0.870 
-0.986 
-0.852 
Incumbent 77-78 
Republitan 77-78 
Ne .... Right 77-78 
Section 5: Canonical Redundancy Analysis 
CV 77-78 
0.915 
-0.850 
-0.988 
Standardized variance of the 1981-82 contribution pattern explained by 
the 1981-82 canonical variate: .819; the 1977-78 canonical variate: 
.477. 
Standardized variance of the 1977-78 contribution pattern explained by 
the 1977-78 canonical variate: .845; the 1981-82 canonical variate: 
.493. 
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TABLE LVI 
STANDARDIZED SCORES FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPORTIONS 
CONTRIBUTED TO CANDIDATE CATEGORIES 
1977-78 AND 1981-82 
Categor::t 
1.Q!. Firm Incumbent Republican New Right 
1 ALCOA 1.097 0.612 -0.486 
2 American Electric Power 0.079 1.989* 0.364 
3 American Express 0.627 -0.077 0.121 
4 Arco 1.332 -0.612 -0.486 
5 Bethlehem Steel 2.038* -0.995 -1.822 
6 Chrysler 1.098 -0.230 -0.243 
7 Ci ticorp 0.392 0.306 1.093 
8 Consolidated Edison 1.019 0.918 0.729 
9 Dow 1.176 0.383 -1.336 
10 Federated Department Store 0.392 0.842 0.972 
11 First Chicago 2.038* -2.·066* -0.121 
12 Ford 1.959* -0.842 -0.729 
13 GE 1.803 0.306 -0.486 
14 GM 0.941 0.383 -0.364 
15 GTE 2.273* -0.765 0.121 
16 Goodyear 3.057* -1.989* -2.429* 
17 Honeywell 4.232* -0.459 -1.093 
18 International Harvester 1.959* -1.300 -1.822 
19 K Mart 1.254 1.300 0.121 
20 Lockheed -0.157 0.077 0.364 
21 LTV 0.314 1.607 0.972 
22 Manufacturers Hanover 1.411 -0.536 0.729 
23 Mellon 2.978* 0.612 -1. 700 
24 Metropolitan Life Insurance 0.941 0.612 0.121 
25 Monsanto -0.078 1.530 1.336 
26 Pan American 0.862 0.994 -0.243 
27 Penney 1.959* -1.301 -1.579 
28 Philip Horris -0.470 0.000 -1. 214 
29 RJR 0.627 0.230 0.486 
30 Rockwell 0.235 0.077 -0.486 
31 Sears 0.941 0.153 -1.093 
32 Securi ty Pacific 0.000 0.842 1.457 
33 Southern Pacific -0.470 1.683 0.729 
34 Texaco 1.489 -0.230 -1.457 
35 TWA 1.097 1.454 0.243 
36 Union Carbide -0.157 0.842 1.214 
37 Union Pacific 1.332 1.607 0.000 
38 United Air Lines 1.646 -0.765 -0.850 
39 USX 1.724 0.536 -0.486 
40 United Technologies 1.332 -0.765 0.000 
41 Wells Fargo -0.314 1.607 1.822 
42 Westinghouse 1.568 -0.153 -0.243 
* p < .05 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter serves two purposes. First, 
it furnishes the reader a summary of the preceding chapters 
by highlighting some previous research, the research design, 
and hypothesis tests' results. Second, it deals with 
limitations, implications, and directions for future 
research. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ideologically, debates aplenty remain concerning whether 
"business"--that collective of diverse institutions and 
interests--enhances or detracts from the quality of 
American democracy. 
Epstein, 1980 
While business continues to become increasingly active 
in the political process (Post et ale 1982; Maitland 1986; 
Keim and Baysinger 1988), "debates aplenty remain" regarding 
the extent to which this activity is organized. A major 
motive of this research was the belief that a structural 
analysis of PAC campaign contributions, augmented with 
rigorous hypothesis testing of the resulting intercorporate 
patterns, would reveal the relationship between political 
activity and corporate objectives--that is, whether such 
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contributions are driven by self-serving business interests, 
as resource dependence would argue, or the overarching goals 
of a cohesive corporate elite, a position supported by class 
cohesion theorists. The purpose of this research was to 
address this fundamental issue by examining PAC behavior as 
a measurable indicator of corporate political strategy 
within the context of the two major competing perspectives 
on intercorporate relations--resource dependence and class 
cohesion. 
The availability in recent years of reliable data on 
campaign contributions of political action committees has 
spurred empirical research on the sources of business 
political convergence. Yet, despite this, no consensus has 
emerged as to the underlying rationale which drives business 
participation in the United states public policy process. 
Prior studies have examined dyadic relations between firms 
or industries as a measure of business political consensus. 
This study subjected dyadic measures to multidimensional 
scaling so that the intercorporate structure hidden in the 
data was revealed. 
A second characteristic of previous studies is their 
emphasis on the relationship between similar political 
behavior and organizational and social network variables 
(such as.economic interdependence, interlocking 
directorates, and geographic proximity of headquarters 
locations) which are operationalized as mechanisms by which 
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the corporate community can prevent, mediate, and/or resolve 
intercorporate conflict and thus advance a classwide 
political agenda. This study, building on Pfeffer and 
Salancik's (1978, 214) resource dependence proposition, 
which associates government regulation and corporate 
campaign contributions, incorporated regulatory environment 
as a predictor of similar political behavior. 
Another departure was the use of data associated with 
two off-year Congressional elections. Prior work tended to 
focus on the 1980 elections since they marked a watershed of 
sorts in national politics, and because corporate PAC 
involvement was cited as influential in the outcomes 
(Ashford 1986). This work examined corporate political 
activity in 1982 which was conducted in the context of a 
Republican-controlled Senate and a House seating thirty-
three new Republican members. A further unique feature of 
this study was the corollary analysis of the 1978 elections 
which permitted a comparison of corporate political activity 
between two disparate White House administrations. 
FINDINGS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Empirical research into the business community's 
political integration has evaluated sources of political 
consensus. Key features of three recent studies which laid 
the foundation for my work are reviewed briefly in this 
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section and summarized in Table II which also displays the 
relationship of previous work and my research. 1 
Burris.(1987) constructed three measures of business 
political partisanship--the percentage of total dollars 
contribu~ed to incumbent, Republican, and New Right 
candidates--for each of 443 corporate PACs active during the 
1982 Congressional elections. He then regressed these 
measures onto twelve variables which were associated with 
six business partisanship theories. 
Burris found that two theories were supported by his 
data: the Yankee-Cowboy theory of regional political 
differences and the regulatory environment theory which 
posits that government regulation is a primary determinant 
of corporate political activity. His twelve-variable model 
explained just twenty-two percent of the variance in 
business partisanship, thus it can be faulted. Yet, this 
work provides a useful step in linking theory with empirical 
research. 
Neustadtl and Clawson (1988) employed clique analysis 
in an effort to resolve the pluralist-class theory debate as 
it relates to business involvement in the political arena. 
They examined the PAC behavior of 230 corporations which had 
1An earlier work, Mizruchi and Ko~nig (1986), also 
used similar methodology in examining sources of corporate 
political consensus and is included in Table II. Mizruchi's 
(1989) study is a refinement of this earlier work and is 
therefore more applicable to current research. It is 
discussed in this summary. For a review of the 1986 
research, consult the literature review in chapter II. 
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contributed to the 1980 elections to determine if an 
otherwise fragmented business community is capable of 
uniting for political action. Their data, analyzed at the 
dyadic level (similarity of contributions between pairs of 
corporations was measured), revealed a large corporate 
clique linked by a conservative ideology. 
The authors concluded that the strength and size of 
the conservative clique evinced stronger support for the 
social class theory rather than pluralism. One wonders, 
however, if this clique might not have been reacting to 
regulatory environment constraints. Economically regulated 
firms were noticeably absent from the conservative clique, 
and thus were exhibiting less conservative political 
activity. This behavior is consistent with the regulatory 
environment theory of business partisanship, and by 
extension, resource dependence. 
Mizruchi's (1989) research was the primary catalyst 
for my study. He employed resource dependence and class 
cohesion concepts to examine the sources of similar 
political behavior among fifty-seven large corporations. 
The extent to which pairs of PACs contributed to the same 
Congressional candidates during the 1980 elections was 
measured and regressed onto eight variables associated with 
either resource dependence or class cohesion theory. 
seventy-one percent of the variation in similar political 
behavior was explained by this multiple regression model. 
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The two strongest predictors were whether firms' 
headquarters were located in the same state and whether 
firms were members of the same primary industry. 
Mizruchi concluded that both organizational and social 
network factors influenced political behavior similarity. 
He notes, however, that regardless of the measures employed 
in studies of corporate political behavior, future "analysis 
must move to the triadic, cluster, and system-wide levels" 
(420). 
My research, enriched by Mizruchi's and other 
scholars' work, moved the study of corporate political 
behavior to the system level by subjecting dyadic measures 
to multidimensional scaling. 
HYPOTHESES 
The resource dependence and class cohesion positions 
on corporate political involvement in politics were the 
sources for generating testable hypotheses. As noted by 
Pfeffer (1987): 
It is in this domain [public policy and politics] in 
which resource dependence and the intraclass [class 
cohesion] perspective make different predictions, since 
the intraclass perspective hypothesizes a fundamentally 
unified set of business interests not tied to patterns 
of transactions (47). 
Resource dependence contends that organizational 
behavior is determined by economic and political constraints 
imposed by interdependent stakeholders operating in an 
uncertain environment. For example, corporations can be 
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dependent on one stakeholder, government, for purchases, 
subsidies, or regulation (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 214). 
Thus, PAC contributions can exemplify a political strategy 
formulated to reduce political uncertainty. Hypothesis one 
was derived from this theory and is supported by previous 
research (Handler and Mulkern 1982; Burris 1987; Neustadtl 
and Clawson 1988): 
Hypothesis 1: Firms similarly constrained by 
government regulations will exhibit similar political 
behavior. 
Conversely, class cohesion argues that corporate 
political behavior is premised on a classwide unity that 
supersedes the parochial goals of individual firms and even 
industries. This unity is achieved through a social 
structure of corporate elites facilitated by such mechanisms 
as interlocking directorates, memberships in prestigious 
business associations, and old school ties (Domhoff 1970, 
1974; Useem 1980). Further, some theorists contend--albeit 
with mixed results (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Mizruchi 
1989)--that the geographic proximity of headquarters 
locations facilitates social interaction among elites. 
Consequently, hypotheses two through five tested class 
cohesion theory and are supported by previous research: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms' number of interlocking 
directorates will relate directly to similar political 
behavior. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms' number of associations with 
certain prestigious business associations will relate 
directly to similar political behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: Shared educational experience among 
Board Chairmen and CEOs will relate directly to similar 
political behavior. 
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Hypothesis 5: Geographically proximate headquarters 
locations will relate directly to similar political 
behavior. 
Finally, I believed additional insights regarding 
corporate political activity could be gained by examining 
PAC contributions during two disparate White House 
administrations. I hypothesized that the business-
government environment changed enough between the Carter and 
Reagan administrations to affect corporate political 
activity. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6: The ideology of a sitting White House 
administration will influence corporate PAC contribution 
strategies. 
Figure 14 summarizes these six research hypotheses. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample 
The population was defined as corporations included in 
the Senate (U.S. Congress 1980) study on interlocking 
directorates. This study provided reliable data on direct 
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and indirect interlocks among corporations, a key variable 
associated with class cohesion theory. Further, this 
population satisfied three sampling criteria: Large 
corporations from diverse industry sectors examined during a 
time frame compatible with my research. To assure a sample 
that was evenly dispersed among industry sectors, a maximum 
of four firms, and only those with active PACs dating back 
to 1977, were selected from anyone industry classification. 
Forty-two of the largest United states corporations 
constituted the sample. They represented fourteen 
industrial and nonindustrial sectors, headquartered in 
eleven state5, active in both election cycles studied, 1977-
78 and 1981-82. 
Measure of similar Political Behavior 
Similar political behavior was determined by comparing 
lists of congressional candidates supported by all pairs of 
firms (861 pairs) during the two election cycles. The 
degree of similarity between two firms was measured by the 
following formula: 
1/2 S· . = s· ./[ (n. * n.)] 1, J 1, J 1 J 
where Si,j is the similarity measure, Si,j is the number of 
similar contributions made by PACs i and j, and ni and nj 
are the total number of contributions made by PAC i and j, 
respectively. Mathematically, the denominator of the 
formula controls for the number of contributions made by 
each PAC while the numerator provides a measure of 
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behavioral similarity. This formula has been used in 
previous research which examined both political consensus 
and interlocking directorates (Mariolis and Jones 1982; 
Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Mizruchi 1989). 
Measure of Resource Dependence 
Firms in the sample were placed into either of two 
widely recognized regulatory categories in which the 
environmental constraints differ. The economic regulatory 
environment is traditional and industry-specific, while the 
social regulatory environment is a more recent development 
. d t' 2 and cuts across 1n us r1es. Accordingly, the regulatory 
environment faced by each firm was categorized as either 
social or economic, based on its industry category as 
defined hy the Fortune index and that industry's dominant 
regulatory environment as defined by prior research. 
The essential difference between economic and social 
regulation has been aptly characterized as conferring 
stability in the first instance and limiting profits in the 
second (Marcus 1987, 102-103). This distinction prompts 
one to suggest that stability is produced by regulatory 
activity reflecting traditional economic policy through 
selective enhancement or restriction of competition. A 
policy of enhancing competition is administered by the 
Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department in policing 
2Also see pages 14-16 for definitions of economic and 
social regulation. 
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mergers and acquisitions, as one example. A policy of 
restricting competition is administered by industry-specific 
agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission. 
social regulatory activity reflects political 
sensitivity to social needs and impacts profitability. 
First, social regulation demands compliance with frequently 
costly regulations--for example, those associated with 
employee safety, health care, and benefits. Second, the 
very industries most likely to be socially rather than 
economically regulated (steel, autos, general metals 
manufacturing) are often least able to pass along these 
compliance costs because of general competitive conditions 
and the market's price sensitivity. 
Considerations such as these presumably underlie 
Marcus's (1987) general rule: 
A qeneral rule is that firms in industries where 
economic (industry specific) regulation dominates will 
do better than firms in industries where social (health 
and safety) regulation dominates (102). 
Associated political activity. Resource dependence 
theory associates distinct political responses with the two 
categories of constraints. The political activity 
associated with an economic regulatory environment is termed 
pragmatic, and that associated with a social regulatory 
environment is termed ideological. Firms competing in 
industries subject to economic regulation (and those with 
sUbstantial economic ties to the Department of Defense) can 
be expected to value access to key legislators because 
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regulatory agencies ultimately must look to Congress for 
funding and oversight. Such firms' political activity, 
then, would likely disregard a key legislator's politics in 
favor of maintaining an avenue of influence. 
Firms competing under conditions in which the effects 
of social regulation outweigh those of economic regulation 
are likely to perceive the political world differently. 
Since social regulations encroach upon managerial autonomy 
rather directly, e.g., restrictions on plant closings, some 
managers' perception of Congress as anti-business is 
understandable. Therefore, political activity is likely to 
be directed at changing the ideological nature of Congress 
by helping to elect candidates likely to be more sympathetic 
to business's interests and politically courageous enough to 
resist the spread of social regulation: 
Measures of Class Cohesion 
Four class cohesion variables were operationalized: 
Interlocking directorates, membership in major business 
associations, educational background of top executives, and 
headquarters location. 
The number of direct and indirect interlocks between 
each corporate dyad was derived from the 1980 Senate study 
on interlocking directorates (U.S. Congress 1980). Each 
firm's associations in 1978 and 1982 with the Business 
Council, Business Roundtable, Committee for Economic 
Development, Conference Board, and Council on Foreign 
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Relations were counted. Also counted were the number of 
associations between twelve prestigious universities 
(related to the corporate elite by prior research) and each 
firm's chairman/ceo and president. 
Biographical data and headquarters location were 
collected from numerous sources such as Moody's Industrial 
Manual, Standard and Poor's Register, and Marquis' Who's Who 
series. 
Analytical Methodology 
Multidimensional scaling. Two proximity matrices, one 
for each election cycle, which held the PAC contribution 
similarity measure for all firm dyads were analyzed using 
the ALSCAL procedure (SPSS Inc. 1988). The procedure 
generated two three-dimensional spatial maps, one for each 
election cycle. Since each point on a map represented a 
firm, similarities in political behavior became visually 
evident. Clustered points indicated similar behavior; 
points distant from one another indicated dissimilar 
behavior~ Thus, underlying intercorporate structure, 
otherwise hidden, was revealed. 
statistical Analyses. Multiple and canonical 
regression were used to test the hypotheses. For hypotheses 
one through five, each resource dependence and class 
cohesion variable was regressed onto the firms' MDS map 
positions. Thus, this test determined whether a firm's 
location on the map could predict its regulatory 
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environment, headquarters location, educational background 
of its chairman or president, number of interlocking 
directorates, or number of memberships with major business 
associations. 
Testing hypothesis six utilized canonical correlatibn 
analysis. The proportion of total PAC dollars contributed 
by each firm to three candidate categories (incumbents, 
Republicans, and New Right challengers) in 1977-78 was used 
to predict the corresponding 1981-82 percentage 
contributions. 
RESULTS 
Scaling Solution 
Analysis of the MDS solutions began with a visual 
interpretation of each map's dimensions, i.e., its axes. 
Each dimension represents a possible explanation for the 
spatial positioning of firms relative to one another. The 
set of maps for both election cycles appears in Figures 5-7 
and 11-13. Dimension one appears to discriminate firms 
based on their. regulatory environment in both election 
cycles. Firms subject to economic regulation tend to 
dominate the negative end of the horizontal axis while those 
subject to social regulations dominate the positive end. 
Dimension two for 1977-78 and dimension three for 
1981-82 appear to segment firms along regional lines. All 
California firms are clustered on one end of the axis, and 
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there is 'some concentration of New York and Connecticut 
firms at the opposite end with a Middle America grouping in 
the center. 
Finally, the 1981-82 dimension three seemed to pull 
out four of the five firms which had scored zero similarity 
with at least one other firm. 
Hypothesis Tests 
statistical tests were used to ensure that visually 
apparent relationships were genuine and to guard against 
overlooking less apparent relationships. Tables XXIV and 
XLV show the results of regressing the resource dependence 
and class cohesion variables onto each firm's map 
coordinates. Since these coordinates represent the firms' 
spatial position derived from similar political activity, 
hypotheses one through five are thereby tested. 
The results of the first equation in both tables 
support hypothesis one which relates similar political 
behavior with similar regulatory environment. This confirms 
the visual interpretation since the re~ression coefficients 
indicate a statistically significant relationship between 
regulatory environment and dimension one. 
Results of equations (2) through (5) (see Tables XXIV 
and XLV) do not support the class cohesion hypotheses which 
relate political behavior to elements of a corporate elite 
network. The sixth equation, however, does support a 
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relationship between headquarters location and similar PAC 
behavior, again confirming the visual interpretation. 
Table LV shows the canonical regression results in 
which the 1977-78 PAC contributions predict the 1981-82 
pattern. Forty-eight percent of the variance in the 1981-82 
contribution pattern is predictable from the .linear 
combination of the 1977-78 pattern. 
A corollary paired-comparison analysis tested the null 
hypothesis that the proportion of contributions directed to 
each candidate type did not change between election cycles; 
that is, the mean difference between the proportion 
contributed to candidate type is equal to zero. The results 
indicated that, while contributions to Republicans and New 
Right candidates did not change, the proportion of PAC 
dollars contributed to incumbents did increase. This 
supports the Eismeier and Pollock (1988) work which showed 
that the 1982 recession and intensified efforts by Democrats 
to market themselves to corporate PACs resulted in an 
increase in spending on incumbents by the business 
community. 
This change in incumbent spending patterns may account 
for some of the unexplained variance associated with the 
canonical analysis. Whether further empirical research 
aimed at.explaining more of this variance would be fruitful 
is a question at least worthy of serious consideration. 
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Nevertheless, the squared canonical correlation of 
.583, the significant wilks' lambda of .35 (F = 5.197, P < 
.0001), and the canonical redundancy analysis does not 
permit rejection of the null hypothesis. Rather, this 
results argue for a significant relationship between the two 
election cycles' contribution patterns. Thus, hypothesis 
six is not supported--disparate White House ideology did not 
significantly influence PAC contribution patterns. 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Research Findings 
The multidimensional scaling and mUltivariate analysis 
suggest several conclusions. First, though several 
idiosyncracies of political behavior emerged, the findings 
are generally consistent with the resource dependence theory 
of organizational behavior. Specifically, the 
intercorporate structure revealed by both MDS configurations 
certainly supports the proposition that there is a 
systematic relationship between the similarity of PAC 
contributions and a firm's regulatory environment. Resource 
dependence holds that corporate political activity is a 
mechanism used by management to respond to constraints, such 
as regulation, imposed by government. The MDS pattern which 
separates firms more subject to social, multi-industry 
regulation from those subject to the traditional, economic 
regulation supports the contention that some corporate 
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political behavior, at least PAC activity, is a function of 
a firm's dominant regulatory environment. 
Class cohesion as a predictor of similar PAC 
contribution behavior was not effectively supported. No 
significance was detected between similar behavior and 
interlocks, professional associations, or shared educational 
experience. 
Although a significant relationship between 
headquarters location and similar PAC behavior did emerge, 
the geographic patterns displayed by the MDS maps lend more 
support to a regional theory of business partisanship rather 
than a class theory. The latter links similar political 
strategy to the social interaction patterns of corporate 
officials whose headquarters offices are proximate. 
Logically, then, similar political behavior should be more 
pronounced among state groupings of firms than among 
regional groupings. Yet, a state-by-state discriminant 
analysis misclassified fifty percent of the sample (see 
Table LII). 
Conversely, the regional theory, recently supported by 
Burris' (1987) work, contends that some political behavior 
is influenced by the distinctive cultural climates which 
characterize various regional sectors of the United States. 
The regional configurations displayed in Figures 7 and 12 
are imperfect, but their general outline is clear, and they 
are supported statistically. All California-based firms 
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occupy the negative end of the regional axis, and firms 
located in New York and Connecticut are more pronounced at 
the positive end. Thus, the two coastal regions are 
established. A central clustering encompasses firms located 
from Missouri in the west to pennsylvania in the east. 
Finally, this is the first study which permitted a 
comparison of corporate PAC behavior between the Carter and 
Reagan administrations. The null hypothesis that PAC 
contribution patterns will not vary with ideologically 
disparate White House administrations could not be rejected. 
Some change was noted, however, in the proportion 
contributed to incumbents between the two election cycles. 
Subsequent research should be designed to more directly 
address the reasons why corporate PACs redirect their 
spending patterns. Nevertheless, the similar corporate 
political behavior displayed between disparate election 
cycles speaks to the research model's stability. Both 
analyses clearly revealed, both visually and statistically, 
a relationship between corporate PAC allocations and the 
nature of the PAC sponsors' regulatory environment. 
A caution must be noted. Resource dependence theory 
apparently describes PAC contribution patterns better than 
the coalescing of a corporate elite. This conclusion 
cannot, however, be stretched to deny class cohesion theory 
or to imply that the public interest is better served by 
resource dependent corporate behavior. 
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First, a corporate elite may choose other, less 
visible, forms of political action. A hypothesis that a 
corporate elite conducts lobbying with peers in the 
legislative and executive branches is certainly reasonable. 
Unfortunately, such actions are much more difficult to 
measure and test empirically. 
Second, there is no evidence in this study's 
conclusions that denies dominance by corporate America or 
disallows its profound influence on public policy issues. 
Third, resource dependent behavior is not necessarily 
compatible with the public interest. One should keep in 
mind that political behavior resulting from regulatory 
constraints is undertaken to manage those constraints. From 
the pragmatic perspective, efforts are made to influence 
legislators who, in turn, can wield influence over the 
agencies administering the regulatory constraints. From the 
ideological perspective, help is tendered to Congressional 
candidates likely to hold a "reasonable" view of such 
matters as environmental protection, worker safety, 
discriminatory. employment practices, and consumer rights. 
Limitations 
Several limitations of this research must be 
acknowledged. Predictions from these findings are limited 
by the population choice, the united States Senate study's 
set of one hundred major United States corporations in which 
interlocks were studied in detail. This choice is highly 
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compatible with the research objectives, but a larger 
corporate population (e.g., Fortune 500 companies) would 
have enhanced the probability of capturing a broad spectrum 
of corporate interests. 
The sample further poses two limitations. First, it 
was necessarily purposive rather than random: therefore, 
making reliable inferences to a larger population is risky 
at best. Second, it is not a large sample, although more 
than adequate for MDS.3 A larger sample would more likely 
capture differences among industry sectors. 
Subsequent research should also employ additional 
measures for resource dependent and class cohesive behavior. 
First, regulation is just one example of a dependence which 
business attempts to manage. Import and export restrictions 
or commission of corporate crimes (e.g., bribery, criminal 
fraud, illegal political contributions, tax evasion, or 
criminal antitrust violations) might also measure a firm's 
dependence on government action. 4 Second, common stock 
ownership, indirect interlocks through financial 
institutions, and economic interdependence have also been 
3A rough rule of thumb for an MDS sample size is that 
the number of objects (firms) minus one should be greater 
than or equal to four times the number of dimensions; that 
is, for this research, (42-1) >= (4*3) (Kruskal and Wish 
1978, 34). 
4A summary of Fortune 500 firms which includes 
identification of "law violators" appears in Ryan, Swanson 
and Buchholz, Corporate Strategy, Public Policy and the 
Fortune 500, 1987. 
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cited as network variables which reinforce political 
integration in the business community and, as such, could 
represent additional measures of class cohesion (Mizruchi 
1989). 
Finally, PAC activity is an accepted proxy for 
corporate political activity, and the opportunity to use 
accurate empirical data as input for MDS outweighs its 
drawbacks. This research, however, could be strengthened by 
multiple measures of corporate political activity (e.g., 
coalition building, grass roots organizing, and lobbying). 
Further, philanthropic contributions and individual 
contributions by top managers might be a strong predictor of 
a corporate culture's underlying political ideology. 
Theoretical Implications 
Over twenty years ago, Epstein (1969), in a chapter 
entitled "Corporate Political Power: A Threat to Democracy?" 
notes: 
Apprehension prompted by the purported superabundance 
of corporate political power underlies much of the 
opposition to corporate political involvement by critics 
from outside of the business community. To borrow 
Andrew Hacker's colorful language--"when General 
Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph, and Standard 
Oil of New Jersey enter the pluralist arena we have 
elephants dancing among the chickens" (187). 
While the resources, stakeholders, and expertise of 
corporate America are real, the depiction of it as a 
puppeteer manipulating the strings of Congress is largely 
illusionary. As Epstein continues: "Hackler's metaphor is 
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overstated and neglects to mention that other pachyderms are 
involved in the frolic" (187). The pachyderms are many and 
varied, including but not limited to competing interest 
groups' power, a societal commitment to pluralism, and a 
network of constraints within the business system (Epstein 
1969, 240). 
This research provides empirical evidence to support 
Epstein's pluralist view. One of the ~ounterbalancing 
elephants is the set of environmental constraints, placed on 
all united states firms, that motivates self-serving 
behavior. When combined with the self-serving behavior of 
other interest groups, the result is a political environment 
that is almost as diverse and complex as the economic 
environment. This political environment--as is generally 
the case with massive, diverse, complex systems--leans 
toward stability and equilibrium. 
Further, these research results provide a useful 
extension to Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) work on 
organizational behavior by empirically relating corporate 
political behavior and environmental constraints. The MDS 
methodology revealed intercorporate patterns which appear to 
be competitive, rather than collaborative, thereby 
suggesting a parallel between political and economic 
strategizing. For example, R. J. Reynolds and Philip Morris 
have pursued similar diversification strategies in response 
to threats to their cash cow, tobacco. Yet it is unlikely 
265 
that these similar corporate strategies emanated from a 
network linkage between the two corporate giants. Political 
strategies, like economic strategies, can be similar owing 
to similar environmental constraints. While the business 
community may be fragmented on public policy issues, sectors 
may be expected to behave in a seemingly cohesive manner 
when confronted with similar constraints. 
Finally, this study's results pertaining to 
headquarters location provides insights into the conflicting 
findings of Mizruchi and Koenig (1986) 'and Mizruchi (1989) 
on the relationship between geographic proximity of 
headquarters and PAC behavior. It is conceivable that, had 
geographic proximity been defined by region rather than by 
state, significance between political similarity and 
headquarters location would have been revealed in both 
studies. 
Managerial Implications 
Legitimacy. Corporate management clearly views 
political activity in the pluralist tradition. Brenner's 
(1979) survey of Harvard Business Review subscribers 
compared managerial attitudes toward corporate political 
activities in 1968 and 1978. Both groups viewed political 
activity as a necessary counterbalance to other interest 
groups, especially unions (155). 
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The same study reports that business and society hold 
divergent views of corporate political activity's 
legitimacy: 
To put the results in perspective, it is useful to 
understand that two distinct and apparently 
contradictory trends have emerged relative to the 
political activities of business. Business has recently 
become better organized and more skillful at employing 
the political process, while society has shown 
substantial distaste for corporations' growing political 
muscle (Brenner 1979, 149). 
Two recent surveys, conducted just before the 1990 
general elections, support this conclusion. The CBS 
News/New York Times poll reported that seventy-one percent 
of those surveyed agreed that "Most members of Congress are 
more interested in serving special interest groups than the 
people they represent" (Alston 1991, 277). similarly, the 
Time/Cabie News Network found that eighty-eight percent of 
voters surveyed agreed that "Money has too much influence on 
who wins elections" (Alston 1991, 280). 
since business is generally regarded as a dominant 
special interest, these results support Brenner's (1979) 
contention that "the public seems less sure of and certainly 
less comfortable with corporate political activity" (162). 
The Time/CNN survey produced another relevant result. 
It appears that people favor PACs over public funding as a 
source of campaign money (Alston 1991, 280). This suggests 
that federally regulated campaign financing by organized 
special interests through PACs, including corporate PACs, is 
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considered preferable to transferring these costs directly 
to taxpayers • 
The public's willingness to at least tolerate PACs, 
coupled with this study's conclusion that PAC activity is 
resource dependent, suggests a preferred outcome. First,' 
management can expect that outlawing PACs in favor of direct 
bestowing of federal tax money is not likely.S Second, to 
the extent that resource dependence is tantamount to 
pluralism, managers can justifiably regard PAC activity as a 
natural result of environmental constraints. In fact, 
political activity can be viewed as a managerial obligation 
imposed by the necessity to manage external dependencies. 
Given Epstein's (1969) caveat that a dynamic business-
government e~vironment demands continual attention to the 
role and impact of the corporation in American politics, the 
corporation's legitimacy as an active political participant 
in our pluralistic society appears to be affirmed. 
strategic management. A second implication relates to 
a strategic management model firmly based on economic 
considerations,to the virtual exclusion of social 
considerations. Michael Porter (1985) states: "The 
SThe 102d Congress is currently debating alternative 
versions of campaign finance reform bills. In at least one 
version, PAC contributions to federal campaigns would be 
banned. It is reasonable to speculate, however, that 
incumbents, especially House Democrats, are not likely to 
part with a system which keeps them in office (Alston 1991). 
Nonetheless, campaign reform, including curbing PACs, 
undoubtedly will continue to be a controversial issue. 
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fundamental basis of above-average performance in the long 
run is sustainable competitive advantage" (emphasis in the 
original) (11). The insights derived from conducting this 
research, not all of which can be articulated, much less 
quantified, have led me to the conclusion that Porter's 
model needs expanding. Sustainable competitive advantage, 
the key to above-average performance, is fast becoming 
unattainable without proactive corporate political activity. 
That corporate political activity is closely tied to 
environmental constraints has now been empirically 
supported. This support, however, does not imply that 
corporate political activity should be in reaction to 
perceived external uncertainties. 
A logical progression suggests, rather, that the 
contrary is a more realistic managerial posture. If, as 
Porter argues, the purpose of strategic management is to 
. 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage; and if, as R. 
Edward Freeman (1984, 13-17) argues, the political process 
is central to strategic management; then it follows that the 
real lessons of the resource dependence/political activity 
model are, first, that anticipating moves by political 
rivals is as critical to proactive management as 
anticipating moves by economic competitors and, second, that 
anticipating political rivals is feasible through analysis 
of their political dependencies. 
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Management practitioners must recognize that business 
and its political and economic environment are parts of a 
complex interactive system. 6 
Thus, managers must understand how government really 
works • • • how new issues arise and get on the agenda 
of Congresspersons and other government officials, and 
we must understand what organizational mechanisms are 
necessary for helping to shape the agenda. Tradition, 
in terms of "lobbying" or "voting Republican" or more 
recently "organizing PACs" need not be thrown away, but 
unless we are satisfied with the state of current 
business-government relations the need to rethink these 
strategies in other terms is critical (Freeman 1984, 
26) • 
Avenues for Future Research 
Some unexpected intercorporate relationships were 
revealed by the MDS maps. These relationships will be 
discussed first, followed by some consequent implications 
for further research. 
The sample's major defense contractors split on the 
regulatory e~vironment dimension in both election cycles. 
Defense contractors, like firms subject to economic 
regulations, are expected (Handler and Mulkern 1982, 31; 
Burris 1987, 734) to engage in pragmatic political activity. 
As a minimum, they certainly need access to key legislators 
and committees involved with weapons procurement. These 
findings suggest a more complex pattern. Indeed, one might 
6This conceptualization is based on Preston and Post's 
(1975) model of interpenetrating systems which holds that 
corporations neither completely control, nor are they 
completely controlled by, the social and political 
environments. As a result, structural adaptation occurs 
over time (25-28). 
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even suspect that defense contractors operate in a third 
sort of environment--one characterized by both economic and 
social environment characteristics. 
Two of the three metal manufacturers in the sample 
also exhibited unexpected patterns, but only for the 1981-82 
election cycle. Industries such as steel and metal 
manufacturing are generally viewed as being subject to 
social regulation, yet LTV and Bethlehem steel were clearly 
positioned in the economic MDS sector. As a tentative 
explanation, one might suppose that the 1981-82 recession, 
which was particularly hard on the steel industry, 
contributed to a strategy shift. For years, the social 
regulatory environment had prompted combat against costly 
regulations. This industry sector, however, sought 
government intervention in the form of import restrictions 
ana accepted the constraints which accompanies such 
intervention. Following the lead of the seminal works 
contributed ~y Schattschneider (1935) and Bauer, Pool and 
Dexter (1963), future research should empirically examine 
the effect of government intervention, such as foreign trade 
legislation, on political activity. 
Previous research has reported similarities of 
political behavior based on common industries (Salamon and 
Siegfried 1977; Mizruchi and Koenig 1986; Mizruchi 1989). 
My research also revealed that pairs of firms from common 
industry groupings exhibited high similarity scores (see 
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Tables XII and XXXII). Pairs of firms which exhibited zero 
similarity in PAC contributions with at least one other firm 
were also identified and, interestingly, this set included 
one banking dyad--Mellon and Wells Fargo (see Tables XI and 
XXXI, and Figure 13). 
These exceptional corporate PACs may be reflecting the 
ideological expression of a strong corporate leader, despite 
Handler and Mulkern's 1982 research. Their conclusion was 
that, even when a CEO is active in PAC governance, the 
general direction of PAC contributions follows what would be 
expected "given the nature of the firm and the regulatory 
environment which it inhabits" (77). Yet, the extreme 
dissimilarity, especially when exhibited by firms in common 
industry, suggests that the personal ideologies of corporate 
executives should be explored for an explanation. 
Two of three retailers--J. C. Penney and Federated 
Department Stores--were misclassified in the 1981-82 MDS 
map. A social regulatory environment had been established 
for retailing in recognition of the affirmative action 
pressure experienced by large retailers when the enforcement 
authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was 
enhanced in 1972. Perhaps industry sectors such as 
retailing operate in a neutral environment which precludes 
corporate political activity predictions based on regulatory 
constraint. A classification schema might acknowledge those 
industries which are not traditionally regulated and yet 
evince a reasonably good record of compliance with social 
regulations. 
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Finally, my results which supported a regional theory 
of business partisanship suggests an extension of my 
research and potentially fruitful research directions. PAC 
contributions to "home boy" candidates competing in national 
races can be factored out, thus isolating political activity 
in support of candidates from states other than the firms' 
headquarters location. Further, whether home-state and out-
of-state strategies are consistent could be of considerable 
interest. For example, home-state incumbents may be 
targeted to enhance access opportunities, while conservative 
challengers in tight out-of-state races may receive the 
balance of PAC funds. 
These observations and further reflection prompt the 
following questions which scholars might consider when 
designing future research. 
1. Does the economic-social typology adequately 
characterize the regulatory constraint on business? 
The economic-social categorization of government 
regulation is widely accepted; however, as noted previously, 
this dichotomy may be overly simplistic and thereby conceal 
some important business-government interfaces which could 
account for similarities in corporate political activity. 
For example, domain defense objectives could result in yet 
another category of regulatory constraint. Such constraints 
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move beyond production, personnel, or environmental issues 
(social regulations) and competitive forces (economic 
regulations). Rather, they threaten the very legitimacy of 
corporate objectives and thus demand a unique strategic 
response. Government intervention in the tobacco industry 
(distribution and advertising), the oil industry (windfall 
profits tax), and the chemical industry (Superfund 
proposals) have been cited as examples of unique strategic 
challenges (Baysinger 1984, 253). It could be reasonably 
argued that such challenges might foster a combination 
political strategy--support of incumbents to preserve access 
coupled with support of conservative challengers--in an 
effort to reverse attacks on managerial autonomy. Further 
research could be directed at those industrial sectors where 
government intervention impacts corporate goals and 
purposes. 
2. When is a pragmatic choice also an ideological 
expression? 
Like the economic-social typology, the pragmatic-
ideological dichotomy is generally accepted as descriptive 
of political strategy. The behavior which it characterizes 
can be observed and measured, an obvious research design 
plus. Whether corporate PACs' preference for incumbents , 
over conservative challengers is uniformly driven by 
rational venality remains unproven, however. For example, 
corporate liberalism holds that executives of large 
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corporations "have frequently adopted a more 'progressive' 
attitude toward unions, labor legislation, and social 
reform" (Useem 1984, 114). Thus, the progressive corporate 
leader might spurn conservative challengers and favor 
moderate incumbents--not just to maintain access, but to 
advance an ideological position. Such questions cannot be 
answered without r.omplementary research which incorporates 
underlying motives into the political strategy equation. 
3. Finally, does corporate political activity 
influence the outcome of elections or affect legislative 
behavior? 
Unfortunately, the efficacy of corporate political 
activity is difficult to ascertain and largely unanswered. 
The causal relationship between contributions and 
legislative behavior is undefined and, indeed, may occur in 
either direction. The multiple influences on electoral and 
legislative politics--special interests, ideology, party, 
constituents--confounds the development of analytically 
useful empirical work that could confirm or deny the power 
of business to affect political decision making. 
This research confirms that major corporations 
incorporate political strategies in their efforts to reduce 
dependencies-and manage constraints, but it remains to be 
determined whether such strategies are effective. As with 
advertising, half of the resources dedicated to political 
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strategy are likely to be wasted--the problem is not knowing 
which half. 
Closing ~houghts 
Preston and Post (1975) contend that, just as 
managements employ competitive strategies to shape and 
direct market forces, management should actively participate 
in the public policy process to shape and direct public 
policy (143). 
This highly regarded position staked out by Preston 
and Post over a decade ago points toward a question that 
could support scholarly research. The extent to which 
corporate management integrates participation in the public 
policy process with economic strategy remains unclear. 
My research clearly establishes the link between 
environmental constraints and PAC activity; much of the 
strategic management literature reflects a parallel resource 
dependence (see, for example, Porter 1985). It is to be 
hoped, then, that my research will help break down the 
intellectual barrier between economic and political 
strategies. Since both strategies are resource dependent, 
they are irrefutably coupled and should be treated as such. 
It is apparent that management scholars should 
continue to scrutinize the business-government interface; at 
this point something so simple as a survey of the extent to 
which strategic integration of politics and economics is a 
factor recognized by corporate executives might well be in 
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order. It is hoped that my research will prove to be a 
meaningful step on the journey to this integrated model of 
economic an~.political strategy. 
CORPORATE OB.JECT.IVE 
Economic regulatory environment 1-------.:----------» 
prompts pragmatic political objective 
Social regulatory environment 1----------------» 
prompts ideological political objective 
Classwide unity prompts --------------1 superordinate objectives ----------------» 
Unity strengthened by --------------
elite social network 
CORPORATE POLITICAL AC'l'IVrn 
************************************** 
*H1: Firms similarly constrained * 
* by govt regulation will exhibit* 
* similar political behavior. * 
************************************** 
Similar political behavior among 
firms will relate directly to .. 
****************************************** 
*H2: Number of interlocking directorates* 
****************************************** 
*H3: Number of memberships in major * 
* business associations * 
****************************************** 
*H4: Shared educational experience * 
* among top executives * 
****************************************** 
*H5: Proximity of HQ Location * 
****************************************** 
****************************************** 
*H6: The ideology of a sitting White * Business-government environment 
is affected by White House 
ideology 
-----------------------» * House administration will influence* 
* corporate political activity * 
****************************************** 
Figure 14. Predicted relationships: a summary of hypotheses. 
N 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Question 
Can resource dependence or class cohesion theory explain 
intercorporate patterns of corporate political activities, 
specifically political action committee (PAC) campaign 
contributions? 
Research Hypotheses 
Resource Dependence Theory 
H1: Firms similarly constrained by government 
regulations will exhibit similar political 
behavior. 
Class Cohesion Theory 
H2: Firms' number of interlocking directorates will 
relate directly to similar political behavior 
among firms. 
H3: Firms' number of associations with certain 
prestigious business policy groups will relate 
directly to similar political behavior among 
firms. 
H4: Shared educational experience among Board Chairmen 
and CEOs will relate directly to similar political 
'behavior among firms. 
H5: Geographically proximate headquarters will relate 
directly to similar political behavior among firms. 
A Political Strategy Hypothesis 
H6: The ideology of a sitting White House 
administration will influence corporate PAC 
contribution patterns. 
Election Cycles: 1977-78 
1981-82 
Time Frame 
Carter Administration 
Reagan Administration 
RESEARCH DESIGN (cont.) 
sampling Strategy 
Population: 100 Large Corporations from 1980 U.S Senate 
Study on Corporate Concentration 
Sample: 42 corporations from 14 Diverse Industry Sectors 
Measured Variables 
Corporate Political Activity: Measured by PAC campaign 
contributions. 
Regulatory Environment: Measured as either Economic or 
Social 
Professional and Social Networks: Measured by 
* Interlocking Directorates 
* Memberships in Major Business Associations 
* Prestigious University Attendance 
* Headquarters Location 
Methodology 
Data Analysi~: Multidimensional Scaling 
Hypothesis Testing: Multiple Regression 
Canonical Analysis 
Discriminant Analysis 
Chi Square Goodness of Fit 
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H01 : 
RESEARCH DESIGN (cont.) 
Null Hypotheses 
There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS Coordinates and its regulatory 
environment classification. 
293 
There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of direct or 
indirect interlocks with the set of sampled firms. 
There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of 
associations with major business policy groups. 
There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its number of 
associations with prestigious universities. 
There is no significant relationship between a 
firm's MDS coordinates and its headquarters' 
location. 
There is no significant change between patterns of 
corporate political spending ,exhibited during the 
1977-78 election cycle and the 1981-82 election 
cycle. 
APPENDIX B 
1977-78 SIMILARITY MATRIX 
1977-78 SIMILARITY MATRIX 
RAU (UNSeALED) DATA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.000 
2 0.093 0.000 
3 0.248 0.063 0.000 
4 0.312 0.099 0.216 0.000 
5 0.218 0.181 0.154 0.193 0.000 
6 0.355 0.175 0.249 0.325 0.226 0.000 
7 0.141 0.044 0.330 0.143 0.166 0.172 0.000 
8 0.072 0.000 0.147 0.077 0.056 0.085 0.270 0.000 
9 0.246 0.071 0.084 0.274 0.096 0.245 0.046 0.055 0.000 
10 0.109 0.118 0.205 0.140 0.085 0.155 0.206 0.061 0.063 0.000 
11 0.130 0.056 0.213 0.084 0.092 0.130 0.258 0.044 0.060 0.133 
12 0.337 0.146 0.230 0.339 0.184 0.455 0.111 0.038 0.349 0.186 
13 0.363 0.192 0.371 0.414 0.252 0.431 0.252 0.124 0.221 0.246 
14 0.353 0.223 0.299 0.442 0.262 0.488 0.183 0.144 0.267 0.220 
15 0.069 0.075 0.106 0.089 0.081 0.122 0.049 0.000 0.079 0.088 
16 0.271 0.049 0.092 0.246 0.079 0.240 0.064 0.000 0.234 0.086 
17 0.258 0.000 0.110 0.207 0.050 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.247 0.055 
18 0.242 0.075 0.176 0.244 0.081 0.306 0.073 0.029 0.218 0.176 
19 0.348 0.100 0.237 0.365 0.245 0.371 0.115 0.019 0.360 0.207 
20 0.293 0.063 0.299 0.413 0.160 0.346 0.193 0.131 0.213 0.212 
21 0.302 0.184 0.270 0.358 0.133 0.382 0.134 0.079 0.109 0.169 
22 0.151 0.041 0.232 0.218 0.111 0.241 0.508 0.379 0.130 0.169 
23 0.216 0.067 0.126 0.059 0.108 0.088 0.131 0.000 0.071 0.079 
24 0.331 0.072 0.237 0.181 0.058 0.341 0.188 0.111 0.133 0.233 
25 0.331 0.159 0.238 0.275 0.158 0.331 0.156 0.082 0.169 0.203 
26 0.241 0.160 0.360 0.357 0.174 0.336 0.184 0.186 0.096 0.213 
27 0.346 0.142 0.336 0.422 0.183 0.420 0.221 0.055 0.265 0.273 
28 0.148 0.137 0.173 0.203 0.124 0.150 0.090 0.035 0.024 0.135 
29 0.242 0.112 0.176 0.221 0.141 0.171 0.049 0.058 0.099 0.088 
30 0.336 0.151 0.200 0.278 0.164 0.298 0.059 0.047 0.145 0.125 
31 0.373 0.096 0.245 0.462 0.187 0.347 0.138 0.030 0.317 0.204 
32 0.045 0.000 0.139 0.246 0.053 0.048 0.192 0.000 0.026 0.144 
33 0.191 0.000 0.153 0.315 0.112 0.145 0.039 0.068 0.110 0.139 
34 0.374 0.162 0.208 0.528 0.200 0.372 0.166 0.143 0.393 0.136 
35 0.143 0.197 0.253 0.226 0.122 0.287 0.074 0.065 0.075 0.083 
36 0.271 0.058 0.194 0.321 0.143 0.346 0.134 0.159 0.233 0.069 
37 0.216 0.123 0.174 0.415 0.106 0.242 0.096 0.057 0.143 0.145 
38 0.282 0.058 0.234 0.311 0.173 0.315 0.114 0.068 0.108 0.172 
39 0.397 0.209 0.208 0.411 0.295 0.413 0.096 0.065 0.267 0.173 
40 0.370 0.171 0.270 0.424 0.268 0.450 0.174 0.133 0.334 0.146 
41 0.044 0.048 0.091 0.199 0.078 0.047 0.126 0.000 0.077 0.170 
42 0.354 0.109 0.310 0.344 0.260 0.337 0.186 0.186 0.128 0.193 
N 
\0 
VI 
11 12 13 14 15 
11 0.000 
12 0.164 0.000 
13 0.176 0.438 0.000 
14 0.188 0.515 0.527 0.000 
15 0.000 0.163 0.143 0.104 0.000 
16 0.082 0.302 0.223 0.299 0.109 
17 0.078 0.338 0.212 0.246 0.05i 
18 0.220 0.353 0.277 0.312 0.083 
19 0.106 0.448 0.416 0.412 0.084 
20 0.160 0.384 0.537 0.476 0.094 
21 0.121 0.320 0.505 0.467 0.091 
22 0.207 0.178 0.245 0.205 0.091 
23 0.113 0.073 0.080 0.074 0.000 
24 0.151 0.274 0.335 0.309 0.040 
25 0.179 0.319 0.375 0.406 0.148 
26 0.119 0.329 0.491 0.441 0.090 
27 0.150 0.427 0.495 0.491 0.099 
28 0.000 0.166 0.186 0.191 0.102 
29 0.000 0.231 0.269 0.291 0.167 
30 0.051 0.319 0.327 0.354 0.034 
31 0.114 0.434 0.447 0.482 0.129 
32 0.124 0.178 0.211 0.163 0.000 
33 0.025 0.236 0.325 0.213 0.033 
34 0.098 0.412 0.455 0.528 0.103 
35 0.071 0.308 0.379 0.353 0.063 
36 0.049 0.309 0.337 0.399 0.163 
37 0.083 0.348 0.418 0.355 0.055 
38 0.196 0.307 0.398 0.405 0.097 
39 0.177 0.412 0.423 0.473 0.094 
40 0.113 .0.499 0.549 0.594 0.170 
·41 0.162 0.175 0.173 0.120 0.000 
42 0.111 0.318 0.472 0.414 0.049 
16 17 18 
0.000 
0.305 0.000 
0.355 0.233 0.000 
0.294 0.262 0.308 
0.278 0.220 0.271 
0.164 0.142 0.183 
0.060 0.085 0.137 
0.000 0.000 0.037 
0.210 0.174 0.180 
0.213 0.147 0.237 
0.103 0.112 0.202 
0.234 0.272 0.308 
0.134 0.032 0.102 
0.164 0.078 0.146 
0.199 0.189 0.152 
0.281 0.227 0.290 
0.036 0.034 0.027 
0.086 0.061 0.115 
0.321 0.225 0.219 
0.103 0.059 0.189 
0.257 0.142 0.261 
0.251 0.136 0.192 
0.191 0.182 0.325 
0.230 0.117 0.340 
0.279 0.238 0.287 
0.035 0.067 0.027 
0.192 0.182 0.195 
19 
0.000 
0.325 
0.292 
0.138 
0.125 
0.242 
0.339 
0.249 
0.515 
0.189 
0.196 
0.261 
0.520 
0.073 
0.210 
0.452 
0.180 
0.319 
0.313 
0.251 
0.402 
0.480 
0.108 
0.304 
20 
0.000 
0.465 
0.207 
0.063 
0.294 
0.310 
0.456 
0.427 
0.115 
0.236 
0.392 
0.437 
0.339 
0.335 
0.372 
0.232 
0.361 
0.372 
0.423 
0.371 
0.530 
0.303 
0.428 
N 
\0 
~ 
21 22 23 24 25 
21 0.000 
22 0.150 0.000 
23 0.082 0.122 0.000 
24 0.252 0.175 0.107 0.000 
25 0.349 0.130 0.079 0.242 0.000 
26 0.454 0.209 0.040 0.269 0.319 
27 0.386 0.185 0.107 0.277 0.396 
28 0.224 0.056 0.000 0.123 0.145 
29 0.251 0.046 0.000 0.140 0.237 
30 0.287 0.037 0.060 0.227 0.252 
31 0.364 0.141 0.115 0.268 0.343 
32 0.105 0.120 0.049 0.026 0.078 
33 0.261 0.072 0.000 0.047 0.152 
34 0.382 0.255 0.115 0.273 0.312 
35 0.354 0.052 0.000 0.166 0.257 
36 0.286 0.251 0.000 0.236 0.290 
37 0.345 0.120 0.000 0.184 0.224 
38 0.329 0.125 0.087 0.187 0.335 
39 0.430 0.115 0.168 0.304 0.383 
40 0.443 0.233 0.114 0.327 0.348 
41 0.073 0.117 0.096 0.052 0.095 
42 0.434 0.174 0.175 0.258 0.321 
31 32 33 34 35 
31 0.000 
32 0.155 0.000 
33 0.229 0.409 0.000 
34 0.545 0.068 0.183 0.000 
35 0.260 0.062 0.224 0.224 0.000 
36 0.311 0.000 0.155 0.354 0.198 
37 0.346 0.269 0.476 0.365 0.280 
38 0.301 0.213 0.295 0.292 0.393 
39 0.464 0.107 0.213 0.450 0.283 
40 0.542 0.153 0.202 0.574 0.290 
41 0.179 0.561 0.402 0.050 0.041 
42 0.364 0.160 0.212 0.355 0.286 
41 42 
41 0.000 
42 0.110 0.000 
26 27 28 
0.000 
0.374 0.000 
0.206 0.243 0.000 
0.213 0.219 0.357 
0.227 0.~66 0.166 
0.300 0.527 0.171 
0.132 0.208 0.000 
0.310 0.282 0.101 
0.347 0.419 0.126 
0.440 0.255 0.174 
0.308 0.343 0.140 
0.339 0.346 0.084 
0.480 0.333 0.119 
0.371 0.413 0.201 
0.401 0.472 0.195 
0.101 0.217 0.000 
0.407 0.378 0.209 
36 37 38 
0.000 
0.215 0.000 
0.229 0.299 0.000 
0.331 0.316 0.338 
0.409 0.280 0.357 
0.000 0.229 0.167 
0.239 0.289 0.323 
29 
0.000 
0.068 
0.236 
0.000 
0.164 
0:194 
0.205 
0.229 
0.151 
0.211 
0.222 
0.277 
0.027 
0.207 
39 
0.000 
0.466 
0.075 
0.370 
30 
0.000 
0.357 
0.199 
0.213 
0.356 
0.204 
0.225 
0.222 
0.237 
0.332 
0.362 
0.196 
0.326 
40 
0.000 
0.110 
0.467 
N 
\0 
..... 
APPENDIX C 
1981-82 SIMILARITY MATRIX 
1981·82 SIMILARITY MATRIX 
RAY (UNSeALED) DATA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0.000 
2 0.274 0.000 
3 0.224 0.142 0.000 
4 0.357 0.181 0.193 0.000 
5 0.288 0.190 0.256 0.225 0.000 
6 0.296 0.223 0.248 0.257 0.282 0.000 
7 0.223 0.138 0.409 O.ln 0.245 0.285 0.000 
8 0.132 0.138 0.154 0.113 0.167 0.121 0.339 0.000 
9 0.320 0.241 0.097 0.192 0.121 0.228 0.195 0.108 0.000 
10 0.261 0.199 0.370 0.309 0.237 0.241 0.351 0.261 0.199 0.000 
11 0.095 0.099 0.220 0.054 0.095 0.154 0.225 0.095 0.051 O.ln 
12 0.393 0.245 0.240 0.330 0.290 0.445 0.258 0.199 0.252 0.277 
13 0.445 0.246 0.379 0.426 0.350 0.367 0.393 0.238 0.256 0.408 
14 0.391 0.263 0.269 0.382 0.294 0.423 0.271 0.201 0.325 0.334 
15 0.436 0.249 0.262 0.390 0.286 0.352 0.262 0.130 0.251 0.341 
16 0.264 0.268 0.142 0.219 0.236 0.257 0.151 0.148 0.179 0.206 
17 0.369 0.064 0.223 0.268 0.217 0.263 0.202 0.041 0.267 0.268 
18 0.270 0.184 0.304 0.211 0.281 0.263 0.247 0.079 0.112 0.232 
19 0.449 0.185 0.222 0.355 0.185 0.307 0.209 0.082 0.510 0.203 
20 0.334 0.172 0.256 0.345 0.273 0.333 0.339 0.145 0.201 0.308 
21 0.113 0.056 0.126 0.138 0.163 0.165 0.163 0.082 0.044 0.151 
22 0.174 0.065 0.289 0.129 0.157 0.139 0.398 0.292 0.152 0.232 
23 0.155 o.on 0.201 0.063 0.224 0.090 0.142 0.000 0.030 0.092 
24 0.317 0.198 0.368 0.346 0.328 0.339 0.335 0.219 0.155 0.371 
25 0.308 0.157 0.129 0.266 0.217 0.313 0.215 0.152 0.295 0.235 
26 0.115 0.075 0.130 0.136 0.200 0.146 0.158 0.193 0.059 0.194 
27 0.306 0.157 0.368 0.329 0.298 . 0.311 0.299 0.152 0.123 0.397 
28 0.403 0.234 0.324 0.324 0.292 0.292 0.329 0.257 0.191 0.349 
29 0.309 0.298 0.244 0.284 0.227 0.244 0.220 0.159 0.198 0.294 
30 0.382 0.141 0.227 0.403 0.315 0.331 0.280 0.126 0.195 0.279 
31 0.459 0.221 0.186 0.397 0.202 0.314 0.303 0.158 0.405 0.309 
32 0.144 0.042 0.186 0.260 0.151 0.195 0.273 0.020 0.081 0.236 
33 0.263 0.128 0.223 0.419 0.269 0.242 0.240 0.124 0.122 0.289 
34 0.376 0.160 0.178 0.449 0.203 0.249 0.238 0.155 0.281 0.207 
35 0.183 0.139 0.133 0.195 0.303 0.268 0.178 0.115 0.047 0.202 
36 0.358 0.128 0.163 0.249 0.265 0.278 0.231 0.088 0.357 0.186 
37 0.449 0.253 0.294 0.518 0.323 0.320 0.320 0.186 0.324 0.338 
38 0.274 0.136 0.342 0.250 0.346 0.249 0.224 0.099 0.106 0.305 
39 0.450 0.238 0.270 0.413 0.386 0.345 0.274 0.142 0.221 0.332 
40 0.382 0.190 0.243 0.419 0.283 0.401 0.333 0.245 0.247 0.315 
41 0.110 0.048 0.106 0.220 0.069 0.125 0.200 0.023 0.111 0.199 
42 0.374 0.206 0.330 0.318 0.369 0.361 0.376 0.230 0.220 0.304 N \0 
\0 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 0.000 
12 0.107 0.000 
13 0.189 0.494 0.000 
14 0.167 0.535 0.554 0.000 
15 0.143 0.433 0.532 0.459 0.000 
16 0.106 0.342 0.381 0.326 0.317 0.000 
17 0.059 0.255 0.303 0.256 0.271 0.103 0.000-
18 0.367 0.310 0.344 0.292 0.267 0.263 0.257 0.000 
19 0.039 0.354 0.359 0.445 0.372 0.263 0.332 0.219 0.000 
20 0.089 0.449 0.605 0.441 0.412 0.320 0.251 0.221 0.237 0'.000 
21 0.039 0.122 0.183 0.117 0.123 0.023 0.000 0.169 0.101 0.140 
22 0.179 0.152 0.264 0.259 0.104 0.087 0.136 0.148 0.129 0.205 
23 0.107 0.084 0.118 0.107 0.084 0.062 0.104 0.066 0.069 0.052 
24 0.156 0.376 0.471 0.371 0.327 0.273 0.242 0.401 0.253 0.358 
25 0.065 0.367 0.361 0.413 0.302 0.228 0.255 0.230 0.348 0.263 
26 0.035 0.149 0.211 0.242 0.196 0.060 0.067 0.129 0.075 0.237 
27 0.117 0.367 0.522 0.390 0.364 0.204 0.163 0.280 0.216 0.393 
28 0.161 0.426 0.508 0.426 0.384 0.265 0.220 0.310 0.292 0.384 
29 0.103 0.420 0.434 0.398 0.319 0.264 0.188 0.218 0.240 0.370 
30 0.090 0.419 0.533 0.451 0.441 0.332 0.284 0.271 0.266 0.590 
31 0.146 0.422 0.492 0.487 0.473 0.247 0.294 0.272 0.544 0.382 
32 0.115 0.158 0.231 0.182 0.209 0.100 0.206 0.125 0.149 0.282 
33 0.099 0.325 0.360 0.315 0.404 0.149 0.256 0.257 0.204 0.348 
34 0.074 0.390 0.377 0.430 0.384 0.214 0.216 0.183 0.485 0.301 
35 0.083 0.270 0.267 0.257 0.243 0.208 0.197 0.239 0.131 0.270 
36 0.101 0.308 0.301 0.371 0.263 0.191 0.230 0.157 0.350 0.265 
37 0.126 0.445 0.535 0.537 0.490 0.285 0.337 0.287 0.514 0.439 
38 0.165 0.369 0.391 0.330 0.334 0.164 0.245 0.366 0.203 0.315 
39 0.157 0.455 0.547 0.512 0.440 0.301 0.265 0.341 0.420 0.410 
40 0.087 0.492 0.5IT 0.534 0.423 0.365 0.303 0.263 0.384 0.562 
41 0.033 0.168 0.173 0.121 0.208 0.038 0.128 0.041 0.099 0.301 
42 0.135 0.417 0.563 0.419 0.411 0.296 0.282 0.307 0.258 0.474 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
21 0.000 
22 0.102 0.000 
23 0.000 0.140 0.000 
24 0.201 0.231 0.046 0.000 
25 0.093 0.129 0.051 0.243 0.000 
26 0.118 0.159 0.081 0.208 0.116 0.000 
27 0.200 0.241 0.117 0.416 0.280 0.191 0.000 
28 0.214 0.260 0.086 0.372 0.337 0.156 0.426 0.000 
29 0.088 0.162 0.073 0.363 0.296 0.125 0.379 0.526 0.000 
30 0.142 0.198 0.106 0.297 0.281 0.240 0.348 0.359 0.327 0.000 
31 0.091 0.209 0.093 0.297 0.388 0.131 0.351 0.399 0.337 0.386 
32 0.049 0.189 0.067 0.173 0.138 0.066 0.275 0.167 0.130 0.266 w 
33 0.135 0.091 0.069 0.297 0.226 0.225 0.369 0.356 0.259 0.326 0 0 
21 22 23 24 25 
34 0.126 0.169 0.022 0.348 0.379 
35 0.024 0.108 0.032 0.249 0.211 
36 0.043 0.199 0.089 0.294 0.412 
37 0.180 0.221 0.098 0.373 0.382 
38 0.161 0.170 0.083 0.375 0.203 
39 0.107 0.18i 0.2()2 0.404 0.368 
40 0.137 0.230 0.034 0.426 0.342 
41 0.028 0.022 0.000 0.099 0.079 
42 0.128 0.246 ,0.193 0.431 0.322 
31 32 33 34 35 
31 0.000 
32 0.227 0.000 
33 0.247 0.374 0.000 
34 0.468 0.210 0.335 0.000 
35 0.137 0.122 0.239 0.145 0.000 
36 0.340 0.144 0.208 0.328 0.153 
37 0.523 0.239 0.443 0.522 0.305 
38 0.241 0.208 0.255 0.191 0.371 
39 0.467 0.169 0.347 0.368 0.256 
40 0.468 0.166 0.278 0.378 0.318 
41 0.211 0.624 0.414 0.133 0.060 
42 0.358 0.218 0.318 0.309 0.254 
41 42 
41 0.000 
42 0.141 0.000 
'·1 
26 27 28 
0.112 0.325 0.369 
0.356 0.253 0.178 
0.077 0.260 0.253 
0.256 0.442 0.461 
0.340 0.372 0.312 
0.250 0.426 0.430 
0.255 0.380 0.372 
0.075 0.242 0.106 
0.228 0.423 0.425 
36 37 38 
0.000 
0.358 0.000 
0.170 0.348 0.000 
0.358 0.516 0.382 
0.333 0.503 0.355 
0.055 0.203 0.119 
0.308 0.419 0.341 
29 
0.326 
0.125 
0.252 
0.381 
0.320 
0.370 
0:377 
0.075 
0.400 
39 
0.000 
0.432 
0.136 
0.444 
30 
0.317 
0.273 
0.259 
0.454 
0.312 
0.430 
0.516 
0.250 
0.475 
40 
0.000 
0.148 
0.470 
w 
o 
... 
